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Abstract of Thesis
This thesis examines the development of children's disability concepts from a domain-
specific cognition perspective. Previous research into children's concepts of disability is
lacking and has been rarely linked to cognitive developmental theories. One particular
set of theories suggest that children represent knowledge in domain-specific ways and
that prior to formal education, children evidence three core knowledge domains; a
naive physics, a naive psychology and a naive biology, which provide causal-
explanatory frameworks for interpreting everyday events (Wellman & Gelman, 1992;
Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994).
Children's disability concepts are employed to explore how children utilise these
foundational knowledge domains in their reasoning of complex phenomena. There
were two principal objectives. Firstly, to examine the role of core knowledge domains
in children's reasoning about disability and how this may change with age. Secondly,
to provide a more comprehensive overview of the content, structure and development
of children's disability concepts.
Studies la and lb explored which core knowledge domains children use to reason
about disability. Using a semi-structured interview schedule, four to five, six to seven,
nine to ten and eleven to twelve year-olds (N = 77) were asked open-ended questions
about the consequences (Study la), causes, controllability and chronicity of different
disabilities (Study lb). The results showed that by age seven, children's disability
concepts are mainly conceptualised within naive physics and naive biology. The use of
multiple causal-explanatory frameworks did not emerge until eleven years of age.
Older children had significantly more cohesive concepts of disability and were able to
differentiate the causes of various disabilities. The results showed an early appreciation
of the physical and biological nature of disabilities but highlights methodological
limitations of open-ended interview methods.
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Study 2 examined four to five, six to seven and ten to eleven year-olds (N = 79) causal
conceptions of disability more directly and explored the issue of experience in
children's disability concepts. Children with and without classroom contact with peers
with disabilities were asked to consider the appropriateness of causes of disability
relating to each of the foundational knowledge domains (physical, biological and
social/psychological), using a forced-choice response scale. The results showed that
children of all ages rate biological and physical explanations as significantly more
appropriate causes of disability than social/psychological ones. No significant effects
of classroom contact were found. The findings highlight the abstract and implicit
nature of young children's causal concepts of disability and suggest that these causal
concepts were not influenced significantly by direct social contact.
To investigate the role of the language environment in children's disability concepts,
Study 3 examined the effects of labels on four to five, six to seven and ten to eleven
year-olds (N = 93) concepts of disability. Children heard about a character with a
disability that was either referred to by a general description, diagnostic label or a noun
label. Children were then asked about their understanding of the causes,
controllability, chronicity and perceived differences of disability. The results foimd few
labelling effects on children's disability concepts. The results suggest that the language
environment in the context of labelling have minimal effects in influencing the way
disability is conceptualised.
Together, the three studies provide evidence for the early emergence of disability
concepts, that may initially be abstract and implicit in nature but which become
progressively more explicit, flexible and theoretical with age. Furthermore, social
experience and linguistic labels do not exert much influence on children's causal
conceptions of disabilities. The educational implications of the results are discussed
and potential for future research in this area will be considered. In conclusion,
children's disability concepts have been a fruitful area in which to investigate children's
domain-specific reasoning.
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Introduction to Thesis
This thesis examines the development of children's disability concepts from a domain-
specific cognition perspective. There is a distinct lack of research into how children
conceptualise disabilities in relation to current cognitive developmental theories. One
particular domain-specific theory suggests that prior to formal education, children
acquire three core domains of knowledge; a naive physics, a naive psychology and a
naive biology (Hirshfeld & Gelman, 1994; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). To date, much of
the earlier research has examined only children's concepts that fall neatly into one
foundational knowledge domain without considering the plethora of concepts that are
less easily categorised. Consequently, children's disability concepts have been
employed to explore how children use their core knowledge domains in their concepts
of complex phenomena. This thesis has two principal aims.
The first aim of this thesis is to investigate the content, development and structure of
children's disability concepts from a domain-specific cognition perspective. This thesis
will examine the role of naive physical, psychological and biological knowledge in
children's understanding of disability, which will be an original contribution to
traditional research on children's concepts of disability. It will explore factors that may
influence the development of children's disability concepts: specifically, the effects of
direct classroom contact with disabled peers and the language environment.
Furthermore, this thesis will examine whether children's disability concepts are
structured in terms of intuitive theories.
The second and more general aim of this thesis is to provide a much more
comprehensive overview of children's disability concepts. Previous research on
disability concepts in childhood often included only one or a small number of
disabilities and have examined a limited age range of children (Diamond, 1993, 1994;
Goodman, 1989; Sigelman & Begley, 1987; Lewis, 1993). This makes it difficult to chart
the development of disability concepts both on the basis of age and on the basis of
specific disability types. This thesis will include a broad spectrum of disabilities and a
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wide age range of children with the aim of contributing a more detailed account of how
children's understanding of disability develops.
The concept of disability, for adults at least, is a complex one. Adult concepts of
disability, particularly in the sociological literature, have led to two main ideologies of
disability: the biological and social-constructionist positions (Hedlund, 2000). In this
realm, a biological understanding of disability refers to a biomedical deficit of body or
mind. The social constructionist position refers to certain social conditions that
'construct' or define a disability for a person. There has been a plethora of debate about
the definitions of disability, with impairment, disability and handicap, being used as
distinct but related terms (Thomas, 1982). However, research on childhood disability
concepts is not only sparse but has adopted a different focus. Here, investigators are
interested in children's ideas about the causes of disability, the controllability and
chronicity of disability and the specific consequences that the disability may have for the
individual. Note here that in contrast to adult concepts, the terms 'impairment' and
'disability' are used interchangeably, as will be the case in this thesis.
The general consensus of previous work on children's disability concepts is that ideas
about disability are early emerging (Diamond, 1993; 1994). Prior to any formal
education, children have by four years of age some ideas as to the causes,
controllability, chronicity and consequences of disabilities (Diamond, 1993; 1994;
Goodman, 1989; Sigelman & Begley, 1987). This previous research has been largely
motivated by discussions about the potential benefits of educational inclusion and the
development of disability concepts in childhood has rarely been linked to broader
theories of cognitive development. To date, only a handful of researchers have applied
a cognitive developmental framework to children's disability concepts, such as the
Piagetian-stage model (Diamond, 1993; Lewis, 1995; Glasberg, 2000). However, newer
approaches to cognitive development may be able to offer further insights into
children's reasoning about disability. The domain-specific approach to cognitive
development may have considerable potential for understanding children's disability
concepts as acknowledged by Lewis (2002), yet there is currently no published research
on this issue.
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In the past few years, much research has indicated that cognition is domain-specific
(Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994; Chomsky, 1988; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). That is, many
cognitive abilities are specialised to handle specific types of information (Goswami,
1998). One particular domain-specific theory suggests that prior to formal education,
children acquire core domains of naive physical knowledge, psychological knowledge
and possibly a rudimentary form of biological knowledge. These core domains of
thought encompass most phenomena in the external world, constitute naive
understandings since they are acquired without formal instruction and are considered
by many to constitute intuitive theories (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Carey, 1995). Only
recently however have researchers begun to examine how children might co-ordinate
these core reasoning systems when thinking about complex concepts, such as race and
gender, which are not neatly conceptualised within the one domain (Taylor, 1996;
Hirschfeld, 1995). Despite these advances, there continues to be a lack of research into
children's concepts of complex social phenomena. Disability may be one example of an
especially useful phenomenon in which to investigate the role of children's core
knowledge domains. This thesis attempts to understand disability within a domain-
specific cognitive framework and to contribute to existing knowledge on children's
disability concepts. This thesis is divided into eight chapters and consists of three
literature review chapters, four empirical chapters and a final general discussion
chapter. The remainder of this introduction gives a brief overview of these forthcoming
chapters.
Chapter 1 introduces and contrasts two fairly distinct approaches to cognition in
childhood. Firstly, traditional domain-general perspectives of cognitive development
are discussed which for many years have dominated research in this area. In particular,
Piaget's theory of cognitive development and information processing views of
cognition are described. Domain-general accounts of cognitive development however
have become increasingly problematic. Consequently, this chapter outlines alternative
and contemporary domain-specific approaches to cognition. In relation to domain-
specificity, this chapter considers definitions of a domain of knowledge, the structure of
domains as theories and the possibility of constraints on the acquisition of domain-
specific knowledge. It will discuss recent research on one particular domain-specific
theory of cognitive development: the core knowledge domain view. The aim of
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Chapter 1 is to provide a detailed account of domain-specificity and the core
knowledge domains theory, which is the central premise of this thesis.
Chapter 2 is the second of the literature review chapters and describes in detail the
content and development of children's core knowledge domains. Children's naive
physical knowledge, psychological knowledge and biological knowledge will be
described. In particular, debates about the onset and development of naive biological
knowledge will be discussed. Since disability has been chosen as an example of a less
easily, categorised phenomena, recent attempts at investigating children's thinking
across all three knowledge domains will be examined. Furthermore, this chapter will
also describe previous research on children's concepts of complex social phenomenon;
namely children's gender and racial concepts. Chapter 2 concludes by suggesting
disability is a potentially fruitful candidate for domain-specific research.
The final literature review is outlined in Chapter 3 and presents previous research on
children's disability concepts. Several key aspects of children's disability concepts are
highlighted including earlier studies on children's causal understanding of disability,
children's understanding of the controllability and chronicity of disability and finally
children's conceptions of the consequences of disability. Although these studies are
valuable given their contribution to our knowledge about children's disability concepts,
they are somewhat limited in scope due to their focus on one particular disability or age
range. This chapter concludes by taking a domain-specific perspective on children's
disability concepts and highlighting the unique contribution that this paradigm could
make to our understanding of disability concepts in childhood.
The first empirical study of this thesis is an initial exploratory investigation into the
content of children's disability concepts and is separated into two parts. Study la
investigates children's understanding of the consequences of disability and is described
in Chapter 4. Study lb, described in Chapter 5, examines children's conceptions of the
causes, controllability and chronicity of disability from a domain-specific perspective.
Children in four different age groups heard eight vignettes describing a character with
a disability. In Study la, children were asked to rate how competent each character
was on a variety of different tasks, in order to assess their consequence understanding.
In Study lb, the same participants were interviewed to learn their ideas about the
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causes, controllability and chronicity of disability. The aims of this study were twofold:
to examine the conceptual underpinnings of children's disability concepts and to enable
a more in-depth examination of the development of disability concepts by adopting a
developmental perspective and incorporating a variety of disabilities.
Study 2 follows up Study lb's findings by examining in more detail children's causal
conceptions of disability. Study 2 also investigates the role of social experience with
disabilities in shaping these concepts by including children who have classroom contact
with a disabled peer. Using a fixed-choice response format, children in three different
age groups were asked to rate the appropriateness of causes of disabilities relating to
each of the core knowledge domains. The aims of Study 2 were to ascertain whether
young children show a bias towards preferring some causes of disability over others
and to specifically examine their judgements about the appropriateness of biological
causes of disability, given the naive biology debate.
The findings from Study 2, reported in Chapter 6, signalled a need to identify other
possible environmental influences on children's disability concepts. The aim of the
final empirical study was to investigate the role of language on children's disability
concepts. Using a similar methodology to Gelman & Heyman (1999), children in three
different age groups heard a short description of a disabled child and were assigned to
one of three conditions; noun label condition, diagnostic label condition and description
condition. They are then asked questions about the cause, chronicity, controllability
and perceived differences of the described child. It was hoped that Study 3 would
demonstrate the effects of disability labels on children's conceptions of disability.
The final chapter of this thesis (Chapter 8) discusses children's disability concepts in
relation to the domain-specific literature. An overview of the main empirical results is
provided. These findings are then discussed with reference to the content, structure
and development of children's disability concepts. The content of children's causal
concepts of disability is discussed especially in relation to naive biology. The structure
of children's disability concepts is also considered with reference to the theoretical
status of children's knowledge. Several suggestions are then made as to the origins and
acquisition of disability concepts in childhood, including the role of cognitive
constraints, social experiences and the linguistic environment. Some limitations and
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implications for future research in this area are also considered. This chapter concludes
by addressing the educational implications of these findings and suggests that the
domain-specific cognitive perspective has been a worthwhile paradigm in which to
investigate children's disability concepts.
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CHAPTER 1
Childhood Cognitive Development:
An Introduction to the Notion of Domain-Specificity
This chapter will provide a comprehensive account of both traditional domain-general
perspectives of cognitive development and more recent domain-specific approaches to
cognition. The themes to be addressed in this chapter are the definitions of a domain of
knowledge, the structure of domains as theories and the role of constraints in the
acquisition of domain-specific knowledge. Three domain-specific theories will then be
discussed with particular reference to the core knowledge domain view, which is the
central premise of this thesis. This chapter will begin with a brief examination of three
key issues in cognitive developmental research. These issues will be specifically
addressed throughout this thesis in relation to children's disability concepts.
1.1 Issues in Cognitive Development
The study of cognition in childhood has traditionally focused around three major issues
(Lee, 2000). Firstly, cognitive developmentalists study the process by which knowledge
is acquired. As knowledge acquisition involves complex mechanisms, researchers tend
to focus on specific cognitive processes such as language, memory or perception. The
majority of research has been devoted to understanding how these cognitive processes
change with age. The second major issue in the study of cognitive development is the
content of children's knowledge at various ages. This deals with what is known by
children about the physical and social world around them. Developmentalists are
selective in their choice of research topics when it comes to ascertaining the content of
children's knowledge. Thus, many studies have examined how children learn basic
principles of physics (Spelke, 1991), how they understand their psychological world
(Leslie, 1994) and how they construe complex social phenomena (Taylor, 1996;
Hirschfeld, 1995). The third area of interest in cognitive developmental research
concerns the structure of children's knowledge. This addresses how knowledge is
represented in children and how this representation changes with age. This research
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has led to much debate about the way knowledge is structured and as a result, a wide
range of competing developmental theories exists in this area (Piaget, 1952; Case, 1985;
Kail, 1991; Carey, 1985; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).
Historically, domain-general approaches to cognitive development have dominated the
field with progress in cognition being characterised by advances in general stages or
rules of thought. For example, information-processing approaches to cognitive
development tend to assume cognition is domain-general (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). A
variety of different research findings makes a domain-general account of cognitive
development problematic however, and more recently domain-specific approaches to
cognition have been proposed as the best way to characterise the structure of children's
knowledge. Not only do domain-general and domain-specific accounts presume
different cognitive structures, but they also make differing assumptions about the
acquisition and content of cognition in children. The following section will outline
more fully, domain-general perspectives on cognitive development.
1.2 Approaches to Cognitive Development
1.2.1 A Domain-General Perspective
Traditionally, the domain-general approach dominated cognitive development (Piaget,
1929; Bruner, 1973; Case, 1985). According to this pre-dominant view, human beings
are endowed with a general set of cognitive reasoning abilities that are brought to bear
on a wide range of tasks. Thus, a common set of cognitive structures and processes
apply to all areas of thought including learning languages, solving mathematical
puzzles and the categorisation of living kinds. As such cognitive structures were
thought to be domain-general. The appeal of such domain-general approaches to
cognition has been their ability to account for a wide range of developmental features
with relatively few principles (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994).
The most detailed domain-general theory of cognitive development has been the work
of Jean Piaget. As documented, Piaget was an epistemologist, interested in the nature
of human knowledge and how it changes over time (Piaget, 1952). For Piaget, human
intelligence is neither a general mental strength or power, nor the operation of specific
cognitive processes. Rather it is the process of adaptation, through assimilation,
accommodation and equilibration that characterises mental life. Thus, intelligence
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arises neither from the 'inside' or the 'outside' but from external actions on physical
objects and other human agents (Richardson, 1998).
The most widely discussed and critiqued aspect of Piaget's theory has been his
description of general stages of thought. Piaget observed that children's understanding
of the world appeared to develop in a series of stages. Progress through each stage
occurs slowly and at any one age, the child has a particular general view of the world as
determined by that stage. Each level of thought was described as fitting together into a
succession of coherent and qualitatively different stages, the major ones being sensori¬
motor, pre-operational, concrete-operational and formal operational stages. According
to Piaget, each stage of thought is applicable to virtually any area of knowledge and in
this sense, cognitive structures are content-independent and domain-general. The
structure of each stage is such that thought is consistent in its level across different
content areas and this consistency is to be especially expected when concrete, and later
formal operations, are fully developed (Meadows, 1993). Thus, a child's performance
on a test of conservation in the concrete operational stage predicts performance on
other tests of concrete operations. The Piagetian-stage model has been extremely
influential and has been applied to several areas of conceptual development, including
children's illness concepts (Bibace & Walsh, 1979) and more recently disability concepts
(Diamond, 1993).
However, research on Piagetian tasks such as conservation and classification seems to
show that children "work out concepts in separate domains without using the same
kind of integrative structures that would be required by a general stage theory"
(Gelman & Baillargeon, 1983, p.214). That is, children are not very consistent in their
level or stage of performance across tasks (Flavell, 1982). This lack of consistency across
tasks is not a trivial matter. It questions the whole concept of 'stages' or 'sequences' in
cognitive development. As Flavell (1982, p.17) once noted, "human cognitive growth is
generally not very stage-like". This raises the possibility that cognitive development is
not domain-general but domain-specific in its representations. Consequently, if a
domain-specific view of cognitive development is adopted instead of a Piagetian
framework, this may result in a different perspective on children's conceptual
development.
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Despite many contrasts with Piagetian theory, information processing views of
development also suggest cognition is characterised by general cognitive processes.
Researchers using the information-processing approach describe cognitive
development as largely a matter of handling information in order to solve problems
(Meadows, 1993). The focus is on how mental processes select, represent, store and
retrieve information and how this changes during learning and development. For
example, Case (1985) postulates innate capabilities for setting goals, formulating
strategies to meet these goals and integrating more complex strategies together.
However, the main maturational constraint in cognitive development is the size of
short-term storage space which a child has available for information processing. Case
(1985) proposes that the capacity of short-term storage space increases with
development coupled with greater processing efficiency. These developmental changes
are proposed to influence many areas of cognition and are therefore domain-general
and universal.
A similar information-processing theory has been proposed by Kail & Bisanz (1982).
Here, development is characterised by an increasing number of rules and processes that
are 'sufficient' in that they allow more proficient problem-solving. For example, young
children often have only one strategy when solving problems which operates over a
limited range of situations. However, older children develop more complex and
conditional rules that leads to greater success. Furthermore, Kail & Bisanz (1982)
suggest that development shifts towards more efficient information-processing using
more powerful and automatic procedures. This account therefore also proposes
domain-general changes in cognition since a general improvement in capacity is held
across all domains of knowledge.
However, in the past two decades, a domain-general view of information processing
accounts of cognitive development has become problematic. Many conceptual abilities
appear to be specialised for particular types of content. For example, in a seminal
study, Chi (1978) found that memory skills or capacities were determined by specific
content and not by developmental age. Children who were chess experts outperformed
adults who were chess novices on memory for chess board positions. This was not the
result of overall better memory in children as adults had greater success on standard
memory tasks. Memory was not developing in a domain-neutral fashion but was tied
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to a particular content area. Moreover, there seems to be a degree of universality in the
types of knowledge that children acquire about the world. For example, Berlin (1978)
found cross-cultural uniformity in a content area that has been assumed to vary widely:
folk biological classification. In spite of significant variation in the types of plants and
animals that different cultures encounter, there is a striking consistency in the way
humans everywhere classify the world of living things. Atran (1990) suggests that this
must be understood in terms of a domain-specific device for categorising the biological
world. At the very least, these findings pose problems for domain-general approaches
to cognition.
1.2.2 A Domain-Specific Perspective
In the last few decades there have been marked changes in cognitive development
research. In particular, maintaining a domain-general approach to cognitive
development has become increasingly difficult as a large number of researchers have
concluded that many cognitive abilities are specialised to handle specific types of
information (e.g., language, number, physical phenomena). That is, much of human
cognition appears to be domain-specific (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). Cognitive
abilities are domain-specific to the extent that the mode of reasoning, structure of
knowledge and mechanisms for acquiring knowledge differ in important ways across
distinct content areas. For example, many researchers now conclude that the ways in
which language is acquired and represented are distinct from other cognitive skills
(Chomsky, 1988). Other candidate domains include, but are not limited to, naive
physics (Carey & Spelke, 1994; Leslie, 1994), psychology (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994;
Wellman, 1990), biology (Keil, 1992; 1999; Hatano & Inagaki, 1994) and number
(Gallistel, 1990). A domain-specific approach to cognitive development however still
retains some components of domain-generality. For example, the mechanisms of
conceptual change may occur in a similar fashion across domains of knowledge
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Yet, the differences between these two major approaches have
important implications for how we view cognitive development in childhood. Much
domain-specific research has led to revised estimates of cognitive competence among
young children in comparison to previous estimates by more domain-general
approaches (Flavell, 2000).
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1.2.3 What is a 'Domain'?
Although a domain-specific approach has now been embraced by many researchers,
the term 'domain' has been used in several separable senses (Wellman & Gelman, 1992;
Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). Firstly, it has been used to indicate an innately given
modular ability. Fodor (1983) suggests that knowledge of the world is represented in
distinct modules. Likewise, Sperber (1994) suggests there are three cognitive modules
(i.e., a meta-representational module, a physical object module and a folk biology
module) which are evolutionarily adapted and thus innately specified. Here, a domain
is the extension of a cognitive module; it is the entities in the world that have been
selected by evolution to trigger the module. In particular, Atran (1990) suggests folk
biology is a core cognitive module with living kinds as its domain. Like Sperber, Atran
considers representations of core domains to be innately determined. Secondly and
alternatively, the term 'domain' has been applied to areas of knowledge that have
special properties due to prolonged and intense experience (Chi, 1978; Chase & Simon,
1973). The notion of expert skill domains makes no appeal to innate modular structures
or evolutionary forces. A third view held by a range of domain-specific cognitive
researchers is that a domain is 'foundational' or 'core' knowledge. Accordingly, a
domain is "a body of knowledge that identifies and interprets a class of phenomena
assumed to share certain properties and to be of a distinct and general type"
(Hirschfeld & German, 1994, p.21). In this instance, it is important not to confuse
'domain' with 'module', since knowledge can be represented domain-specifically
without being modular (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).
In relation to the core knowledge view, Hirschfeld & Gelman (1994) have argued that a
domain of knowledge has two components. Firstly, domains are ontological guides
that partition the world. That is, domains function conceptually to identify phenomena
as belonging to a particular domain even when these phenomena can be categorised in
several different ways. This is not to imply that there is one correct way to partition the
world. Indeed there are several ways one could usefully organise a group of things.
For example, living kinds can be classified in a number of different ways ranging from
feeding habits to sleeping patterns or predators and prey. However, there do appear to
be domains that virtually every child masters: number, physical objects, biology and
psychology (Keil, 1999). Such domains are universal across individuals and cultures.
As noted earlier, despite the significant variation in the kinds of living things different
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cultures encounter, there is a striking consistency in the way different cultures
categorise living kinds (Berlin, 1992). Therefore, in this sense, domains refer to areas of
knowledge where there is a depth and interconnectedness between its concepts.
The second central component of a core 'domain' is to function as a causal-explanatory
framework for interpreting everyday events (Hickling & Wellman, 2001). The
explanatory framework goes beyond the original phenomena and integrates diverse
aspects of the world. For example if asked, "why did this balloon expand when placed
in the sun?" statements such as "I saw it get bigger" or "I like balloons" do not
constitute causal explanations because they do not place the phenomenon in some
larger conceptual framework. However, statements such as "it contains gas and gases
expand when heated" do, do so because this explanation follows from the framework
in a causal manner (Brewer, Chinn & Samarapungaven, 2000). Furthermore, each
domain of thought has its own unique causal-explanatory framework. For example, an
understanding of why John went to the shops is grounded in psychological-intentional
causal thinking whilst knowledge of why germs cause illness is grounded in a
biological-functional framework. Thus, the type of causal explanations that children
employ will depend on the larger domain of understanding they invoke to a particular
phenomenon. In this sense, investigating children's causal explanations of a
phenomenon, for example disability, is especially important since it will reveal which
domains of knowledge children find useful in their conceptions of that phenomenon.
1.2.4 Are Domains Theories?
Many researchers have argued that domain-specific knowledge is theory-like (Gopnik
& Wellman, 1994; Carey, 1995). That is, everyday knowledge is thought to be
structured as an intuitive theory. An 'intuitive theory' is defined as a cognitive
structure that embodies a person's ontological commitments (i.e. specifies what kinds
of things there are in the world) and provides a mode of explanation for the
phenomena within a particular domain (Carey, 1995). The definition of an 'intuitive
theory' is very similar to the characterisation of 'domains' as discussed by Hirschfeld &
Gelman (1994). Indeed, the notion of domains as 'theories' is related to assumptions
about what constitutes a domain. Central to an intuitive theory is the causal
mechanisms that it employs in its explanation. For a child to possess an intuitive
theory, the child must be able to distinguish entities within the domain of the theory
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from those outside the relevant domain and appeal to theory-like causal mechanisms
when explaining entities in the domain (Carey, 1995). Moreover, a hallmark of an
intuitive theory is conceptual coherence. The concepts that make-up the theory are
mutually inter-dependent and defined in relation to each other (Murphy & Medin,
1985; Wellman, 1990). This notion of theories and conceptual coherence can also be
applied to disability. Disability is a complex concept and children's understanding of
disability comprises several different areas of knowledge including causal concepts,
judgements about controllability and chronicity and understanding the consequences of
disability. It would be interesting to examine whether these different areas of
knowledge are coherent among children in their concepts of disability. The theoretical
status of children's disability concepts will be examined empirically in Chapter 5.
Wellman (1990) makes an important distinction between framework theories and
specific scientific theories. Framework theories outline the ontology and causal devices
for their specific theories and thereby define a coherent form of reasoning about
particular phenomena (Wellman & Gelman, 1992). Thus, framework theories define
domains. For example, intuitive knowledge of physical causality is an example of a
framework theory and understanding object forces is the specific theory (Wellman &
Gelman, 1992). The notion of domain in this view, is a set of phenomena involving the
entities recognised by the theory. In contrast, scientific theories are often formalised
and are the result of schooling (Carey, 1995). Similarly, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) retains
the term domain to cover broad areas such as language, physics and maths whilst
micro-domains refer to subsets of the domain. In a highly influential review, Wellman
& Gelman (1992) propose that three intuitive framework theories are evident in
childhood; naive physics, naive psychology and naive biology. Instinctively, these
seem to be the three major sorts of understanding that encompass most of the external
world. Other examples of specific intuitive theories in the literature include the ten-
year-olds theory of matter (Carey, 1991), high school students intuitive mechanics
(McCloskey, 1983) and an intuitive cosmology in early school years (Vosniadou &
Brewer, 1992). In each case, attribution of an intuitive theory to the child requires that
the child distinguish between entities within and outside the domain and must appeal
to theory-specific causal mechanisms.
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The idea that children have intuitive theories that enable them to engage in
explanations of the world around them underlies much contemporary research in
cognitive development. However, the notion that children's domain-specific
knowledge is theoretical, remains controversial. Keil (1999) has argued that this
attribution of theories to young children is "well justified and clearly groundless" (p.
285). For example, infants seems to possess a naive theory of mechanics which allows
them to differentiate their physical and social worlds (Spelke, 1991). However, children
are often surprisingly ignorant of many specific and critical details of how things work
in a given domain. Children may not have intuitive theories in the sense of knowing
detailed mechanisms but it is equally unlikely children proceed from no theory to full
scientific theory in a single leap (Keil, 1999). Accordingly, Keil (1999) proposes an
intermediate level of theoretical knowledge that helps organise children's expectations
about different phenomena. In a similar suggestion to Wellman & Gelman's (1992)
framework theories, Keil & Lockhart (1999) suggest children have framework modes of
construal that tell them what properties are likely to be causally important in a domain
and what causal relations are involved. This allows children some theoretical
explanatory insight into a domain of knowledge with only some fragmentary sense of
specific mechanisms.
In contrast, Atran (1994, 1998), for example, argues that it is fundamentally misleading
to construe cognitive domains as theories. From his anthropological vantage, the
notion that conceptions of the natural world develop like scientific theories, seems a
curious belief (Atran, 1994). He argues that scientific thought is a specialised activity
and one therefore that is hardly required for an understanding of a rich and varied
everyday world. For example, Atran (1998) argues that folkbiology constitutes a core
domain that need never become theoretical in any meaningful sense. Indeed, this is
related to the broader modularity approach in which cognitive modules have domain-
specific status whilst not necessarily being theoretical (Carey & Spelke, 1994).
Whichever aspects of the world children have theories about, an exact characterisation
of these theories is required. For example, how many theories are there, how does an
earlier version of a theory change as children get older and are theories universal across
cultures and history?
15
1.2.5 Domains and Learning Constraints
Most contemporary cognitive developmental researchers agree that young children
could not arrive at the wealth of the knowledge they do without some prior cognitive
constraints on learning (Keil, 1981; Gelman, 1990; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Hirschfeld &
Gelman, 1994; Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). The notion of constraints for learning and
development is not well articulated in current theories of cognitive development.
Empirically, there have been very few studies that examine how constraints operate in
conceptual development (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). Therefore, based on previous
domain-specific research, a prudent characterisation of constraints must be made.
Cognitive constraints operate by controlling or directing attention and by restricting in
advance a large number of logically possible interpretations (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002).
A unique set of constraints in each domain draws attention to the relevant aspects of
the target phenomena, to enable young children to distinguish those that should be
interpreted within the domain from those that should not. The constraints on domain-
specific knowledge are thought to be acquired early because of the ease and uniformity
that children have in acquiring core domains of knowledge. Early cognitive constraints
often take the form of biases or preferences that explain children's early and
differentiated understandings of important aspects of their everyday world. Karmiloff-
Smith (1992) argues that human cognition involves attention biases or pre-dispositions
towards particular inputs. Wilson & Keil (2000) suggest that children have constraints
on what counts as an appropriate explanation in a domain without having any specific
mechanisms in mind. This would account for the acquisition of rather complex
conceptual knowledge in childhood and may even operate in the origins and
acquisition of children's disability concepts. This issue will be returned to in the
general discussion of this thesis (Chapter 8).
The notion of cognitive constraints in the acquisition of domain-specific knowledge
does not rule out the possible influence of socio-cultural constraints. Even Karmiloff-
Smith (1992) who argues for some innate pre-dispositions in human cognition also
acknowledges that many of these pre-dispositions are merely biases that are more
directly influenced by the environment. Indeed, Inagaki & Hatano (2002) argue that
socio-cultural factors influence conceptual development because children need social
experiences and contexts in which to build naive theories. Consequently, social
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contexts can produce variations in children's conceptual knowledge and therefore act
as a form of constraint on this knowledge. They emphasise the dual role of both
cognitive and socio-cultural constraints in the acquisition of domain-specific
knowledge.
The following section introduces and summarises three domain-specific cognitive
theories which are reflected in definitions of domains discussed previously; the
modularity approach, domain-specificity and expertise, and core knowledge domains
(see Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994).
1.3 Domain-Specific Cognitive Theories
Domain-specificity is not a single unified theory of the mind (Gelman, 1999). There are
at least three distinct approaches to cognition that assume domain-specificity;
modularity, expertise and core knowledge domains. While these approaches are
dissatisfied with traditional domain-general views of cognition, each approach, as
noted earlier, has distinctive claims about domains. Many discussions centre around
where domains come from, how many there are, what are the prototypic examples,
how they are structured, whether they are theory-like and whether they undergo
conceptual change. A discussion of domain-specific theories will begin with the
modularity approach.
The most extreme domain-specific approach is modularity theory. According to the
modularity approach, the mind consists of 'separate systems' (e.g., the language
faculty, visual system) with each containing unique properties (Fodor, 1983). Proposals
regarding modularity have varied in at least two respects: whether modularity is
restricted to perceptual processes or affects cognitive processes as well and whether
modularity is innate or constructed. However, most modular theorists postulate innate
constraints and rules on the architecture of the mind and all assume domain-specificity
(Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).
Fodor (1983) has put forward an influential account of modular organisation. In
Modularity ofMind, Fodor discusses the implications of modularity for a wide variety of
domains. He has argued that the mind is made up of genetically-specified,
independently functioning 'modules'. A 'module' is an informationally encapsulated
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computational system that is largely innately specified and that is characteristically
associated with specific neuroanatomical mechanims (Fodor, 1983). Fodor describes a
number of potential modules including recognition of faces, colour perception, analysis
of shapes and 3-dimensional objects. Modules are not simply an entity for perceptual
encodings of information but are mental modules delivering representations that
characterise the natural order of things in the world (Fodor, 1983). Thus, according to
Fodor, knowledge of the different aspects of the world are mentally represented in
distinct formats.
In the past few years, modular accounts that involve central knowledge of the world
have been proposed. Sperber (1994) suggests the mind comprises three innate
cognitive modules: a meta-representational module (whose domain includes people
and their minds), a physical object module (whose domain includes objects and their
physical relations) and a folk biology module (whose domain includes animals and
plants). Leslie (1995) proposes at least four separate innate modules in children's
representations of the mind that come 'online', in an independent fashion, by age three.
A similar model has been suggested for our knowledge of living kinds (Atran, 1990)
and physical objects (Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber & Jacobsen, 1992). However, a
major criticism of 'pure' modular approaches has been the limited role given to
experience and development (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).
The modular view of cognition represents a major challenge to pre-dominant domain-
general approaches to cognition. Although it assumes domain-specificity, modularity
theories contrast significantly with domain-specific theories. The main difference is
that modularity emphasises specificity in relation to cognitive architecture whereas
domain-specificity stresses the specialisation for particular types of knowledge. This
parallels the focus of different cognitive developmental researchers, with some
exploring the structure of children's knowledge whilst others are interested in the
content of children's thoughts.
In contrast, for some theorists, domain-specificity is apparent in the remarkable skills
that develop as a result of extensive experience. With enough practice at a task, an
individual can develop extraordinary abilities in that task domain. With sufficient
experience a person can attain amazing feats of memory (Chase & Ericsson, 1981),
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develop rich networks of causally related information (Chi, Hutchison, & Robin, 1989)
and can hold an impressive array of representations (Chase & Simon, 1973).
Importantly, these abilities are sufficiently powerful that child experts can even surpass
novice adults in contrast to the usual developmental finding of adults outperforming
children (Chi, 1978). Just as important, these skills cannot be explained by individual
differences in experts or as domain-general effects. The same individual who is an
expert in one task domain shows mundane performance on skills outwith that domain.
The expertise is so focused in scope that these abilities seem to be domain-specific (Chi,
1978).
The notion of skill domains identified by expertise is distinct from other senses of
'domains' in the literature. There is no appeal to innate modular structures, innate
constraints or the importance of evolutionary forces. Rather, these domains appear to
be a result of hours of intensive practice. Expertise-skill domains pose an interesting
challenge to other notions of domain-specificity. They challenge theorists to consider
what constitutes a domain. It is clear from the expertise literature that in one sense,
domains can include arbitrary and small corners of experience. The other challenge is
that it demonstrates the effects of intensive experience in a domain, suggesting that
there may be far-reaching implications of experience and how that influences a domain
of knowledge. Although the expertise approach is not central to the present research,
the issue of experience will be returned to throughout the thesis.
The final domain-specific cognition approach to be discussed is the core knowledge
domain view. Recently, a variety of theoretical and practical research on children's
cognitive development has shown the early development of core human knowledge
domains (Wellman & Gelman, 1992). The proposal is that infants and young children
rapidly acquire domain-specific knowledge relating to the physical, psychological and
biological worlds (Wellman & Inagaki, 1997) which in turn frames later conceptual
acquisitions. Consequently, several core areas of human cognition have been identified
as important domains for children's reasoning; naive physics (Spelke, 1991; Baillargeon,
2000), naive psychology (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Leslie, 1994), naive biology (Keil,
1992; 1994).
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However, there are continuing debates amongst researchers as to the content of each
core domain, the process by which knowledge changes within each knowledge system,
and the early structure of these domains, particularly in relation to naive biology
(Medin & Atran, 1999; Siegal & Peterson, 1999). This makes it difficult to compare
different theories of how core domains of knowledge develop in childhood. The
following section will consider different theories on the structure and development of
these core domains of thought. These contrasting theories are crucial for later
discussions on children's conceptions of disability.
1.4 Domain-Specificity and Core Knowledge Domains
A key contributor to discussions about core knowledge domains is Carey (1985; 1995)
who believes both naive physics and naive psychology constitute core intuitive theories
at an early age. However, she does not believe young children have a distinct domain
of biological knowledge. Indeed, there has been considerable debate about the onset of
biological knowledge (Siegal & Peterson, 1999; Medin & Atran, 1999) and this may have
implications for the content of children's disability concepts. Consequently, the naive
biology debate will be revisited throughout this thesis. Carey (1985) argues children do
not have a distinct domain of biology because biological concepts are embedded within
a different conceptual domain. She claims a biological causal explanatory system
emerges as an independent domain from naive psychology, but not until middle
childhood.
Furthermore, the emergence of an autonomous biology requires conceptual change
according to Carey (1995). As noted earlier, core domains are sometimes thought of as
intuitive theories (Carey, 1985; 1995; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994) and changes in domain-
specific knowledge are analogous to theory change in science. Conceptual change
involves change in the core principles that define entities in a domain and govern
reasoning in that domain. It carves the world at different points, bringing new
principles that are irreconcilable with the old (Carey & Spelke, 1994). For example, one
major conceptual change in children's biological knowledge is the construction of a
new ontological category, living kinds, which includes plants as well as animals (Carey,
1985). Although Carey (1996) argues that the accumulation of facts may act as a
catalyst for conceptual change they will not alone lead to an overhaul of existing
concepts. Carey (1999) suggests children use a bootstrapping mechanism to revise
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concepts in a domain, which enables an overlap to occur between older theories and
new ones. The process of bootstrapping occurs when older theoretical knowledge
becomes blended with the newly formed theory and provides links to this new theory
(Carey, 1999). This has become a significant feature of Carey's recent work.
Similarly, Gopnik & Meltzoff (1997) propose a 'theory' theory account of knowledge
acquisition in children. They propose three characteristics of theories that ought to
apply to children's core knowledge. Firstly, children's theories should invoke
characteristic patterns of explanation relevant to that particular domain. Secondly, this
should lead to distinctive predictions that finally allow specific interpretations of the
evidence. Thirdly, a child with one theory should interpret facts differently to a child
with an alternative theory. This distinctive pattern of explanation, prediction and
interpretation are central to the notion of 'theory' theory (Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997). In
addition to theories, they also propose that children have empirical generalisations,
which are "accumulated pieces of information about the world" (Gopnik & Meltzoff,
1997, p.59). Empirical generalisations often are a rich source of theorising. Similar to
Carey's (1996) suggestions, a rich set of generalisations could provide children with an
important initial knowledge base from which new theories could later be constructed
(Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997).
Although not born directly out of the core domains perspective, Karmiloff-Smith (1992)
has proposed the representational redescription (RR) model of developmental change,
which is closely tied to the notion of theory building. The RR model attempts to
account for the way in which children's representations become more manipulable and
flexible for the emergence of conscious access to knowledge and theory building. It
involves a continuous process whereby independently functioning specific
representations are made progressively more available to other parts of the cognitive
system. In this sense, representational redescription is a process by which implicit
information in the mind becomes explicit knowledge to the mind. This process, when
repeated, is a central part of theory building and allows implicit knowledge to become
explicit and theoretical (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). Although not claiming that these areas
of knowledge constitute core domains, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) does suggest that
representational redescription occurs in children's physical, psychological,
mathematical and linguistic knowledge.
21
However, Wellman & Gelman (1992) are less clear as to the mechanisms of conceptual
development, although they do advocate some form of theory change. They argue for
the existence of three 'framework theories' comprising naive psychology, physics and
biology that are said to represent everyday domains of thought organised around
ontological distinctions and causal explanatory frameworks. They thus argue for an
early emergence of naive physical and psychological theories. However, they are as yet
non-committal as to the cognitive pre-dispositions of young children's biological
knowledge and suggest naive biology may not be as theory-like as naive physics or
psychology. They further suggest that children use these framework theories to
interpret phenomena even in the absence of specific knowledge (Wellman & Gelman,
1992; 1998). Indeed, recent evidence does seem to suggest that young children often
invoke a larger domain of causal understanding before evidencing accurate or detailed
knowledge of phenomena within that domain (Keil, 1999; Wilson & Keil, 2000).
According to Wellman & Gelman (1992) early cognitive development involves
"foundational frameworks that shape acquisition of specific understandings" (p.370).
The implication of this assertion is that the development of core domains of thought
may proceed from an abstract construal to a more concrete conceptual understanding
(Wellman, in press).
Indeed, an abstract to concrete shift in children's conceptual development has also been
proposed by Keil (1999; Wilson & Keil, 2000). Traditionally, there has been the
assumption that causal understandings must arise from clear notions of specific
mechanisms. Thus, knowledge of concrete mechanisms must precede abstract
understandings. However, despite a certain appeal to such a view, Keil (1999) suggests
in many cases development might proceed from the abstract to the concrete. Evidence
for this proposal comes from pre-school children who have a sense of 'causal potency'
in a domain prior to having insight into specific mechanisms (Keil, Levin, Gutheil &
Richman, 1999; Wilson & Keil, 2000). Keil (1992; 1994) asserts that children as young as
four years-old, have distinct theoretical domains of physical, psychological and
biological thought. Furthermore, he suggests that there are innate biases which
contribute to the acquisition of core knowledge domains by constraining the type of
input children notice and how that input is utilised (Keil, 1992). In relation to the
biological domain, he suggests that children might have abstract expectations about
biology whilst not yet understanding the specifics within that realm (Keil et al., 1999).
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For example, children prefer to explain illness in terms of germs than 'immanent
justice' (psychological explanation), despite lacking detailed knowledge about how
germs work (Keil 1992). Young children clearly do not have conscious theories of all
aspects of biology yet they still have strong biases to prefer some classes of mechanisms
over others.
The notion of 'modes of construal' has been offered as a way of describing how a young
child might have a sense of causal potency in a domain (Keil, 1989; Keil et al., 1999;
Wilson & Keil, 2000). Although Keil proposes a number of modes of construal, due to
his interest in children's biological knowledge, much of his research focuses on the
teleological-functional mode of construal. Keil (1992; 1994) argues that a universal
component of adult naive biology is a teleological-functional mode of construal. That
is, an animal's or plant's properties are explained in terms of their function. The
teleological mode of construal does not lead to specific beliefs about biological things,
but embodies biases for certain kinds of explanations over others. Thus, he
distinguishes between broad modes of construal and detailed sets of beliefs, in his
account of how knowledge becomes organised into domains and changes over time.
However, it is still unclear as to how modes of construal would interact with and guide
knowledge of the more specific mechanisms. Nevertheless, the notion of causal
potency and the abstract to concrete shift in conceptual knowledge, are interesting
suggestions as to how children reason about complex phenomena. These issues will be
returned to throughout this thesis in relation to disability and are discussed fully in
Chapters 6 and 8.
Hatano & Inagaki (2000) propose the notion of cognitive constraints in how core
knowledge domains are acquired. They assume that domain-specific constraints are
acquired early if not innate, take the form of innate biases and not specific pieces of
knowledge, and are critically important at the early phase of conceptual development.
As a consequence, development in selected domains such as physics and psychology is
easy, early and relatively uniform as a result of constraints that direct children's
attention to relevant modes of reasoning. The biological domain, whilst not emerging
from psychology, may occur later than physics or psychology (Hatano & Inagaki, 1994).
They also argue that conceptual development does not take place under cognitive
constraints alone. As children accumulate experiences in sociocultural contexts, such
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experiences are represented in the form of domain-specific knowledge, which work as
acquired cognitive constraints. Furthermore, the social contexts in which children are
exposed to biological information for example is crucial for inducing conceptual
change; that is, if children engage in activities that provide meaningful contexts, they
are likely to acquire a sophisticated biological knowledge system more readily (Hatano
& Inagaki, 1996). The emphasis on activity-based experiences and how these contribute
to conceptual development is a recent and welcome approach to domain-specificity.
This thesis will examine the role of social experiences in children's understanding of
disability (see Chapter 6).
1.5 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has introduced domain-specific approaches to cognitive development and
compared them to more traditional domain-general perspectives. Domain-general
approaches to cognitive development and in particular Piaget's stage-model of
development has been extremely influential and has been previously applied to several
areas of children's conceptual development (Bibace & Walsh, 1979; Diamond, 1993).
However, more recent domain-specific perspectives on cognition may be able to offer
new insights into children's conceptual development. This perspective has led to the
idea that young children could not arrive at the wealth of knowledge they do without
some prior constraints on learning that lead children to acquire certain inputs over
others (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). That is, children may be endowed with constraints
that facilitate learning in core areas of thinking. Indeed, one domain-specific approach
to cognition suggests that children do develop core knowledge domains that are
distinct from one another and which identify and interpret a distinct kind of
phenomena, assumed to share certain properties. Young children are thought to
develop core knowledge domains that encompass most of the external world and that
are structured as naive theories; specifically naive physics, naive psychology and naive
biology. Although researchers agree that naive physics and psychology constitute core
domains of thought, the biological domain has been a source ofmuch debate.
Researchers have typically examined children's concepts that fall neatly into one core
domain and have neglected complex phenomena, such as disability, that are less easily
categorised. This thesis will therefore investigate three main aspects of children's
disability concepts from a domain-specific perspective. Firstly, this thesis will consider
24
the content of children's disability concepts by examining the role of core knowledge
domains in their conceptualisation of disability. Secondly, the development of disability
concepts will be explored in this thesis by including a broad age range of children and
will be discussed in relation to the role of cognitive constraints in the acquisition of
knowledge. Finally, this thesis will examine the structure of children's disability
concepts as being theory-like. As discussed earlier, these three issues are central to
cognitive developmental research (see section 1.1). It is hoped that this will not only be
a unique perspective on children's disability concepts but will provide a developmental
contribution to existing research on disability concepts.
The following literature review chapters will examine in detail, the content of children's
core knowledge domains (Chapter 2) and previous research on the content of children's
disability concepts (Chapter 3). In particular, Chapter 2 discusses research that has
attempted to explore children's concepts of complex phenomena, which although
scarce, has made an important contribution to the domain-specific cognition literature.
It also provides a rationale for why disability, until now, has never been researched
from this perspective but why it may be useful to do so.
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CHAPTER 2
The Development of Core Domains of Thought
2.1 Domain-Specificity: Core Knowledge Domains
Chapter 1 described a domain-specific approach to cognitive development and
suggested the existence of at least three core knowledge domains. Prior to formal
education, children have core domains of naive physics, psychology and biology
knowledge. An understanding of the nature and behaviour of physical objects is the
essence of the naive physical domain. In contrast, naive psychology, often discussed
under the title 'theory of mind', involves intuitive notions of how the mind works and
influences behaviour (Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg & Cohen, 2000, Wellman & Estes,
1986). A great deal of work has addressed children's emerging understanding of
psychological processes which includes knowledge of beliefs, desires, thoughts and
emotions. Naive biology has been proposed as another fundamental conceptual
domain (Keil, 1989; Wellman & Gelman, 1992; Hatano & Inagaki, 1994). A core domain
of biology would include knowledge of processes such as illness, inheritance and
reproduction, functions such as eating and sleeping and outcomes such as death. These
core domains of thought encompass most of the external world and are therefore
essential to children's understanding of everyday phenomena (Keil, 1999). Each domain
of thought is organised around distinctive ontological categories and causal reasoning
frameworks (Wellman & Gelman, 1992) and empirical research on the content of
children's knowledge in each of the core knowledge domains is described below.
2.1.1 Naive Physics
It has been argued that the two key components of a naive physics are physical objects
and physical-mechanical causes (Wellman & Gelman, 1992). An understanding of the
existence and behaviour of objects is ontologically central to a naive understanding of
the physical world. Furthermore, knowledge of physical causality is required for
understanding object dynamics. If children possess an autonomous domain of physics
they must make an ontological and causal distinction between the physical world and
other aspects of their environment. In recent years, as a consequence of much research,
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naive physics has been granted special status as a core domain of thought (Hirschfeld &
Gelman, 1994; Carey, 1995). However, research within the naive physics domain
remains fragmented. For example, infant physics concepts are mostly researched by
psychologists, who share an interest in early cognitive development. In contrast,
physics concepts in childhood are mainly examined from an educational perspective
with research charting misconceptions relating to school subjects rather than cognitive
development. Nevertheless, this section will review and attempt to synthesise some of
the empirical findings on naive physics knowledge.
From the first few months of life, it would appear that infants are constrained by a
number of basic domain-specific principles about the persistence and behaviour of
physical objects (Spelke, 1991; Baillargeon, Kotovsky & Needham, 1995). Recent
experiments provide evidence that infants reason about the behaviour of inanimate
objects by drawing on knowledge of constraints on object motion (Spelke, 1991; Spelke,
Phillips & Woodward, 1995). Spelke (1991) suggests the presence of three innately
determined domain-specific principles of physics: cohesion, continuity and contact.
Infants aged three-months appear to know that inanimate objects, move cohesively,
continuously and act upon each other through contact (Spelke & Van de Walle, 1993;
Spelke, Breinlinger, Macomber & Jacobson, 1992). Furthermore, these principles seem
to act as domain-specific constraints, as infants do not apply them to all perceptible
entities (e.g., human agents, Spelke et al., 1995). Leslie (1995) similarly suggests infants
have a core module of 'theory of body' (ToBy), one which is evolutionarily adapted and
innately specified. This core module embodies beliefs that when objects move, they
possess or bear a 'force' and when objects contact other objects, they receive or transmit
a 'force'. The ToBy module allows infants to have implicit beliefs about physical
causal-mechanisms. However, these implicit beliefs still have to be translated into
explicit understandings and the method by which this is achieved is not yet fully
known.
Coupled with infancy research on naive physical understanding are many studies that
have examined pre-school and childhood concepts of physics. However,
developmental pathways between infancy and pre-school have rarely been charted.
During the pre-school years, children's naive physics concepts broaden to include a
range of specific theories about physical-causal mechanisms. For example, children
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develop naive theories of projectile motion (Kaiser, McCloskey & Proffitt, 1999; Kim &
Spelke, 1999), naive theories of floating and sinking (Howe, 1998) and naive theories of
force transmission (Howe, 1998). Pre-school children hold intuitive ideas about the
nature of projectile motion including the belief that all objects which are unsupported
will fall straight down (Kaiser et al, 1999). Pre-school children's ideas about why
objects float and sink are also numerous (Howe, 1998). Many children aged five to six
years intuitively report the weight of the object as being the key to floating and sinking
(Howe, 1998; Piaget, 1930). Other explanatory variables, although employed by
children to a lesser extent, include having air/no air inside or being solid/absorbent
(Biddulph, 1983). Children aged six years also develop ideas as to the forces that
oppose motion (Howe, 1998). For example, when Howe (1998) showed children aged
six to fifteen years a picture of a ball being rolled across paving stones and asked "what
will happen to the ball's speed?", the youngest children often predicted an internal
reduction of force would make the ball stop: that is, the ball would begin to slow down
after maintaining a steady speed. However, the most sophisticated explanations that
referred to constant external forces, were rarely mentioned in children under ten years.
An intriguing aspect of these theories is the striking misconceptions that children and
even adults hold about the physical world. In reference to naive theories of projectile
motion, the straight down rule persists even when reasoning about the movement and
fall of objects (e.g, a ball rolling off a table or a carried object dropped by a moving
person). Not until middle childhood do children correctly predict that the ball will roll
of the table following a parabolic path (Kaiser et al., 1999). In a similar vein, Howe
(1998) investigated theories of floating and sinking in children aged eight to twelve
years. Although by the age of ten years, the number of irrelevant variables reported
were decreasing, no child understood relative density as being relevant to floating or
sinking. Therefore, although children may acquire more sophisticated theories of
physical-mechanical causes with increasing age, formal teaching may be required to
modify some of these misconceptions (Kaiser et al., 1999; Howe, 1998).
Not only do young children have implicit ideas regarding physical-mechanical causes,
but they can engage in appropriate explicit physical causal reasoning in everyday
speech (Wellman, Hickling & Schult, 1997). Using the natural language database
(CHILDES) which systematically records transcripts of speech, Wellman et al (1997)
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identified several explanation modes that children use to explain things. The results
showed that a physical causal explanation mode figured prominently in the speech of
two, three and four year-old children. Young children used physical causal
explanations when explaining object behaviour or for relevant yet restricted aspects of
human activities as for example in, "he got a bad tooth because he fell off his bike"
(Wellman et al., 1997, pp.21). Physical explanations seem to appear early in children's
development and are used to exclusively explain physical activities. Young children
are apparently able to convert implicit knowledge into explicit physical explanations
and this seems to be a very early development in physical causal reasoning.
The general consensus of the research on children's physical understanding is that
naive physics constitutes a core domain of thought from an early age. Young children
can distinguish entities within a domain of physics from those not in the domain and
appeal to appropriate and specific physical causal mechanisms. Since this ability
develops early in infancy, naive physics is thought to constitute a core domain of
thought which is theory-like (Carey & Spelke, 1994; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). However,
as noted in Chapter 1, construing domains as theoretical remains controversial and
little empirical work has attempted to address the theoretical status of naive physics.
Indeed, naive physics is not thought to be the only foundational knowledge domain.
Special attention has also been paid to another core domain; naive psychology.
2.1.2 Naive Psychology
A naive psychology involves an understanding of psychological beings whose actions
are caused and explained by psychological forces and states (Wellman & Gelman,
1992). That is, our everyday understanding of people is fundamentally mentalistic; we
construe people's actions in terms of their internal mental states such as beliefs, desires
and intentions. Consequently, a naive psychology is crucial to our understanding of
the social world. There are two central components that characterise naive
psychological thinking: the ontological and causal aspects of the mind (Wellman &
Gelman, 1992). The ontological aspect concerns the nature of mental states and
processes as being distinct from real world physical objects or mechanical processes.
Mental states are internal, unobservable and subjective, whereas the contents of the
physical world are external, obvious and objective. The causal aspect of naive
psychological thinking is that people engage in behaviours because they want to or
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because they believe those actions will result in a particular outcome. This is often
called 'intentional causality' and is the cornerstone to a naive psychology (Hirschfeld &
Gelman, 1994).
Even in infancy, children develop expectations about persons that contrasts with their
expectations about physical objects (Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000). For example, within
the first year of life, infants will imitate the actions of persons (Meltzoff & Moore, 1983)
but not similar activities of mechanical objects (Legerstee, 1991). Thus, even at such a
young age, infants can make an ontological distinction between people and objects.
However, a conception of mental states and mentally caused actions requires some
knowledge of intentionality (Perner, 1991; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). Many studies
describe a period from eight to fourteen months, during which the older infant
manifests a rudimentary intentional understanding (Bretherton, McNew & Beeghly-
Smith, 1981; Stern, 1985). For example, infants at this age are thought to show a sense
of subjectivity (Stern, 1985), triadic awareness (Adamson & Bakeman, 1985) and even
an implicit theory of mind (Bretherton et al., 1981). These findings are consistent with
later achievements such as following another's direction of gaze (Butterworth, 1991),
joint reference (Adamson & Bakeman, 1985) and using pointing to refer to objects
(Murphy & Messer, 1977). However, infants' implicit intentional understanding is
quite different from children's explicit recognition of psychological beings.
Indeed, in the last twenty years, considerable evidence has shown that explicit
psychological thinking becomes evident among pre-school children. Often referred to
as 'theory of mind' research, previous studies have investigated pre-schoolers
understanding of belief states, developing psychological explanations and concepts of
consciousness (Wellman & Fagattuta, 2000). In general, such research shows that a
naive psychology is evident in most typically developing pre-schoolers. In particular,
most three year-olds can make the ontological distinction between mental states and
physical objects. Traditionally, mental phenomena were considered quite confusing for
young children. Piaget (1929) asserted that young children could not honour the
distinction between mental and physical phenomena. However, Wellman & Estes
(1986) have shown that this is not the case. When three, four, and five year-old children
are told about a person who has a dog and another who is just thinking about a dog,
children correctly judge which dog can be seen, touched and petted. Furthermore,
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when asked to consider a thought about a raisin 'in the head' versus a swallowed raisin
'in the stomach', three, four, and five year-olds know which one is literally inside the
person and which is metaphorically 'in his mind' (Watson, Gelman & Wellman, 1998).
Relatedly, yoimg children also understand something of the subjectivity of thoughts. In
simple tasks, young children are able to report that whilst they can 'see' their own
mental images, for example, others cannot (Estes, Wellman & Woolley, 1989) or that
while they think a particular cookie is yummy, someone else may think it is yucky
(Flavell, Flavell, Green & Moses, 1990).
Additionally, young children are also said to understand the causal aspect of the mind.
To understand mental causation, children must recognise that people behave in
response to intentions and beliefs and not objective facts. For this reason, children's
understanding of false beliefs has provided intriguing evidence as to how they
understand causal mental states more generally. Many studies now show that by four
years of age, children can reason appropriately about false beliefs (see Perner, Leekam
& Wimmer, 1987). For example, if participants observe a person noting where an object
is placed and then watch the person leave the room, when the object is moved to a new
location, they can accurately predict that the person will mistakenly search for the
object in the original location. Four and five year olds are able to report that person's
false belief (Wimmer & Perner, 1983). Similarly, children of this age can use
information about what a character desires to predict his or her happiness, sadness,
anger and other various outcomes (Stein & Levine, 1989; Yuill, 1984). In addition, a
number of studies have demonstrated that by four years of age, children are showing
an interest in deception and are becoming more adept at it (Sodian, Taylor, Harris &
Perner, 1991). Deception is an interesting example of naive psychological thinking
because it involves trying to alter someone else's belief. Indeed, Chandler, Fritz & Hala
(1989) found that even four year-old children employ various deceptive strategies with
the intent to create false beliefs in others' minds.
However, if young children have a core domain of psychology, they should be able to
provide spontaneous explanations about mental states and not just predictions.
Exploring children's causal explanations has become a recent and revealing
experimental tool. Earlier work has shown that when asked to explain simple human
actions (e.g., "Jane is looking for her kitten under the piano, why is she doing that?"),
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three and four year-olds, like adults, typically provide psychological explanations
(Bartsch & Wellman, 1989). More recently, studies have solicited explanations from
three and four year-olds about human actions with psychological, biological and
physical roots. These studies have found that young children give intentional
explanations for psychological action (e.g., a person deciding to stand up) and physical
explanations for physical-like human movement (e.g., a person blown over by the
wind, Schultz & Wellman, 1997; Wellman et al., 1997). Moreover, whereas by three
years of age children report physical causes are necessary to manipulate physical
objects (e.g., to open and close a pair of scissors), they assert that 'just thinking' is
sufficient to affect mental changes (e.g., thinking about opening scissors). Thus, prior to
schooling, children can already distinguish between the psychological and the physical
in their explicit causal explanations.
As discussed above, children aged three years have a domain of psychological entities
and processes that are distinct from a contrasting domain of physical objects and
mechanics. Furthermore, many researchers have argued that naive psychology is
structured as an intuitive theory (Gopnik & Wellman, 1992;1994). In contrast to the
physics domain, the theoretical status of naive psychology has been supported by
different sources of empirical work, most notably, theory of mind research. In
attempting to ascertain how children understand beliefs, researchers have developed
tasks that test children's belief knowledge alongside their understanding of other core
psychological concepts such as perception or intention. In these studies, children's
performance on false belief tasks tends to improve when they are tested within this
coherent framework (Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996; Gopnik, Slaughter & Meltzoff, 1994).
That is, children do better on false belief tasks when they have to make explicit use of
relations between beliefs and other mental concepts.
These studies show that naive psychology in general and false belief concepts in
particular, are coherent and theory-like among pre-schoolers (see Chapter 1, section
1.2.4). In each of these studies, children's understanding of beliefs improved when
considered in relation to other mental state concepts. Thus, children may be scaffolded
into a more sophisticated understanding of belief (Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996). Naive
psychological knowledge appears to be domain-specific and some of the core concepts
that structure that knowledge are coherently inter-related, as predicted by the 'theory'
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theory of domain-specific knowledge acquisition (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994). Indeed,
the influence of naive psychology on children's thinking is considered so pervasive that
some researchers have suggested this domain engulfs other areas of thought, such as
naive biology. Consequently, the status of naive biology not only as an intuitive theory
but as a core domain of thought, independent of physics and psychology, has been
increasingly questioned. It is the domain of biological knowledge to which we now
turn.
2.1.3 Naive Biology
Although there is convincing evidence that children of three years of age have
rudimentary ideas of physics and psychology, disagreement among researchers arises
in relation to a third domain; biology (Siegal & Peterson, 1999; Medin & Atran, 1999).
Although most researchers agree young children hold ideas about the biological world,
the causal-explanatory frameworks from which these ideas emerge is a source of much
debate in the literature (Hatano & Inagaki, 1999; Au & Romo, 1999). A key research
issue concerns whether children's biological knowledge is ontologically and causally
distinct from other conceptual domains.
Ascertaining how and when biological knowledge develops has become a major
challenge for cognitive developmental researchers. Although a fully developed adult¬
like domain of biological knowledge covers a wide range of topics including processes
such as illness, inheritance, reproduction and growth, children do not typically receive
formal instruction on such topics at an early age (Keil & Silberstein, 1996). As a result,
children's knowledge of biological processes such as inheritance and illness are of
interest theoretically because the causal mechanisms are unobservable and it is unlikely
young children will have any formal knowledge although they may have informal
experiences of such processes. It is assumed therefore, that in attempting to discuss
these biological processes, children will rely on intuitive knowledge grounded in a
particular causal-explanatory framework.
One of the earliest biological beliefs to be investigated was children's understanding of
the living-nonliving distinction. Traditionally, Piaget (1929) argued that young
children cannot distinguish between biological and non-biological things given
children's tendency to attribute animate properties to inanimate things (e.g., a bike is
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alive, rocks can feel pain). However, more recent research suggests children have
acquired the living-nonliving distinction early in childhood. For example, Hatano &
Inagaki (1994) found that five and six year-old children said only animals and plants
'wither and die' and 'grow' but not inanimate things. Backsheider, Shatz & Gelman
(1993) also found that pre-schoolers recognise the ability of living kinds to heal through
re-growth whilst artefacts must be fixed by a person. Consequently, it appears that
young children can distinguish ontological boundaries within their beliefs about the
biological world.
However, Carey (1985) suggests that the ability displayed by children to distinguish
living from nonliving things may depend upon their knowledge of intentional states
and hence reveals naive psychological reasoning as opposed to biological thought.
Carey argues children do not have a distinct domain of biology because from the start,
biological concepts are embedded within a different conceptual domain. She claims a
biological causal explanatory system does not emerge from naive psychology until
middle childhood (Carey, 1985; 1995), with younger children instead using intentional
(psychological) causality to explain many bodily functions such as the role of the heart.
She argued that children under nine years know very little of the physiological role of
the heart preferring to comment on its psychological and social significance ("It's so
you can love, "It makes you do the things you should"). This finding apparently
supports the claim that children's understanding of living kinds is embedded in
psychological theory, with biological processes being governed by human
psychological functioning. This reliance on psychological causality according to Carey
(1985), is due to yoimg children's ignorance of biological mechanisms.
In contrast, Wellman & Gelman (1992) believe biology constitutes a core explanatory
framework and argue that "a specific belief about biology is foimd even in young four
year-olds" (p. 364). This conclusion was based on findings from several studies on
innate potential. This is the belief that biological entities, but not other kinds of objects,
manifest an innate potential that causes living kinds to mature in specific ways
regardless of initial appearances (Wellman & Gelman, 1998). For example, a newborn
tiger is neither large nor fierce but will come to exhibit such traits. Young children's
awareness of innate potential is related to their understanding of inborn 'essence'. An
essence "is the unique, typically hidden property of an object that makes it what it is,
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without which it would have a different identity" (Gelman & Wellman, 1991, p.215).
Essences are often unobservable and by their nature require inference about some
deeper disposition. It can be thought of as an unseen quality that is responsible for the
observable features that hold a category together. A series of studies now show that
children can grasp innate potential and impute non-obvious essences (Keil, 1989;
Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Hirschfeld, 1995). Similarly, pre-school children are aware of
the importance of 'insides' as determinants of identity (Gelman & Wellman, 1991).
Since young children have an early understanding of the essence of biological
phenomena, Gelman & Wellman have concluded that even young children treat
biology as a distinct domain at least in an ontological sense and have specific biological
causal beliefs (Gelman & Wellman, 1991).
Closely related to the notion of innate potential is inheritance. Inheritance concepts, as
a research topic has become increasingly popular because it requires an awareness of
uniquely biological mechanisms. In order for children to be granted an autonomous
domain of biology distinct from psychology, children must demonstrate an awareness
of causal mechanisms specific to biological kinds and respect the ontological distinction
within this causal-explanatory framework. For example, although children as young as
four years are aware of the basic facts of inheritance (e.g. that offspring resemble their
parents), they may not understand that this resemblance is mediated through a chain of
uniquely biological causation (and not psychological or physical causation, Carey, 1985;
Solomon, Johnson, Zaitchik & Carey, 1996). That is, young children are unaware that
mechanisms of inheritance lead to physical resemblance only (e.g., physical features) as
opposed to non-physical resemblance (e.g., beliefs, temperaments). Consequently,
Carey (1985) suggests an autonomous domain of biology does not emerge until middle
childhood as prior to this, children have no knowledge of specific biological causal
mechanisms. In contrast, Springer (1999) argues that a biological theory of kinship
appears among some four and five year-olds and this allows them to generate
explanations and predictions about mechanisms of inheritance.
A second important area of research explores children's understanding of illness, as this
forms for adults at least, a specific biological belief. For example, disease only applies
to biological entities (e.g., a car cannot 'catch' a flat tyre) and contagious illnesses are
only spread by biological means. Thus, children's knowledge of illness is an interesting
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test of their biological understanding as it cannot adequately be explained by any of the
other domains. If young children cannot distinguish biological from psychological
phenomena, this should reveal itself in their illness concepts. Indeed, traditionally it
was believed that children below seven or eight years would have great difficulty
understanding the causes of illness (Bibace & Walsh, 1981; Piaget, 1929) and in open-
ended interviews on illness understanding, children were indeed likely to offer social
or psychological explanations of illness such as 'immanent justice' (e.g. you get ill
because you are naughty).
However, recent studies employing more age-sensitive methodological approaches
have contradicted these early findings. Siegal (1988) for example, believed young
children would show a better causal understanding of illness if they did not have to
express their own spontaneous explanation. In his task, four, five and eight year-old
children had to evaluate explanations given by a puppet for a cold, toothache and a
scraped knee. He found that young children could identify contagion as the cause of a
cold and reject 'immanent justice' explanations. Young children were also able to limit
their judgements of contagion (e.g. not applying them in the case of a scraped knee).
Similarly, Keil (1992) demonstrated that children limit contagion to physical/biological
attributes. For example, pre-school children denied that behaviours (e.g., obsessive
hand washing) may be caught from another person. However, although children's
conceptions of germs are limited to physical contact, an understanding of what they can
transmit seems to be much less differentiated (Keil et al, 1999). Nevertheless, these
findings highlight the importance of using appropriate methodologies to investigate
children's biological concepts, especially when those concepts may be more implicit in
nature and not accessible to verbal report.
Kalish (1996) has argued most pre-schoolers have a causal understanding of illness that
involves germs. For example, they recognise that events which often contaminate food
will not do so if no germs are involved (e.g., a cookie that falls on the floor but no germs
get on it). Young children are also more likely to judge germs than poisons as being
alive, contagious and able to move or change size (Keil, 1994). However, Solomon &
Cassimatis (1999) suggest pre-schoolers do not understand illness in terms of a
biological germ theory. In their study, pre-school children did not consider germs to be
living things, nor did they distinguish germs from poisons as causes of illness.
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Consequently, the formation of a coherent germ theory of illness is considered to be a
later construction (Solomon & Cassimatis, 1999).
According to one recent proposal, naive biology does not constitute an autonomous
domain of thought because it is not distinct from naive physics (Au & Romo, 1999). In
particular, Au & Romo (1999) suggest that before children understand any uniquely
biological causal mechanisms, it makes sense for them to apply their naive physics to
reason about living things, as it has served them well in reasoning about nonliving
things. In relation to illness, Au & Romo suggest that children aged five to thirteen
years are unlikely to talk spontaneously about biological mechanisms, instead
preferring mechanical causal mechanisms, such as the movement of germs. According
to Au & Romo, the fact that illness is something biological does not automatically turn a
mechanical causal mechanism into a biological one.
Despite ongoing debate, many researchers believe naive biology does indeed constitute
an autonomous core knowledge domain (Keil, 1992; 1994; Hatano & Inagaki, 1994;
Wellman & Gelman, 1992). Keil (1992; 1994) argues the biological domain is not
conflated with the psychological domain because naive biology constitutes
foundational knowledge from the beginning. Japanese researchers, Hatano & Inagaki
(1997) agree with Keil (1992; 1994) and Wellman & Gelman (1992) that naive biology is
a core domain among children younger than six years of age. However, they do not
view young children's initial biological knowledge as completely free from
psychological influences. In particular, they suggest that young children might
interpret some biological phenomena by borrowing psychological knowledge because
"their biological knowledge is not powerful enough to generate convincing predictions
and explanations by itself" (Hatano & Inagaki, 1997, p.124). They also stress the
importance of direct experience in shaping children's biological knowledge (Hatano &
Inagaki, 1997). In one study, Inagaki (1990) compared biological knowledge of
Japanese kindergarteners who had actively raised a goldfish at home with that of same-
aged children who had never raised any animal. It was found that despite similar
levels of factual knowledge about typical animals, the goldfish raisers had richer
procedural and conceptual knowledge about goldfish. Moreover, the goldfish raisers
used their knowledge about goldfish as a source of analogy when making predictions
about other less familiar aquatic animals (e.g., frogs). This is a welcome cross-cultural
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perspective and suggests that direct social experience may play a role in acquiring
biological knowledge prior to formal education.
In summary, considerable debate still exists about the status of naive biology as a core
domain of thought (Medin & Atran, 1999). Although children develop many ideas
about the biological world, it is unclear whether this constitutes an autonomous and
theoretical domain of thought separate from other core reasoning systems. That is, it is
still unclear as to whether young children can recognise uniquely biological
mechanisms and reflect this in their causal explanations. Younger children do
misunderstand a significant amount concerning specific biological mechanisms, but
they seem to have clear expectations at a more general level of biological understanding
(Keil, 1999; Wilson & Keil, 2000). For example, pre-schoolers know little about the
precise mechanisms of inheritance yet they have intuitive beliefs about what properties
are inherited (Hirshfeld, 1996; Springer & Keil, 1989). Young children evidence only a
rudimentary understanding of germs, yet they have strong expectations about what
diseases are contagious (Siegal, 1988; Kalish, 1999). It appears that young children have
implicit knowledge of biological processes prior to specific knowledge of mechanisms.
However, children may find it difficult to convert such implicit understandings into
explicit explanations. Recent studies on children's explanations of everyday events
does suggest that a biological mode of explanation occurs, even if it is less frequent and
less well-developed than physical or psychological ones (Wellman et al., 1997).
2.2 Children's Simultaneous Physical, Psychological and Biological
Reasoning
Rarely have studies looked at children's thinking across all three causal reasoning
systems at any age or developmentally. This is in part because investigators have
previously been interested in children's understanding of a given phenomenon such as
object motion (Leslie, 1995; Spelke et al, 1995), illness (Kalish, 1998) or belief (Wellman,
1990; Perner, 1991) which clearly falls within a specific domain. However, much of the
world does not carve up neatly into domains of knowledge and children must learn to
co-ordinate several core reasoning systems. Recently, several researchers have started
to investigate children's ability to engage in such multi-causal reasoning (Wellman et
al., 1997; Hickling &Wellman, 2001).
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Hickling & Wellman (2001) examined explanations on a range of phenomena given in
everyday conversation by children aged two to five years. Analyses of nearly 5,000
explanations showed children focus on varied entities (objects, animals and persons)
and utilised diverse modes of reasoning (psychological, physical and even biological) in
everyday explanation. For example, children offered psychological explanations
("because I'm afraid of her") and social-conventional explanations ("I got this candy
because it's a prize") in their everyday language. Moreover, physical causal
explanations ("the teddy's arm fell off because you twisted it") and biological
explanations ("you don't bleed and get bruises inside") also occurred with regularity.
Children were also able to pair modes of explanation with particular entities suggesting
flexible causal reasoning. That is, children explained intentional movement in
psychological terms but object-like movements in physical terms. According to
Hickling & Wellman (2001), children's application of several modes of explanation to
human events appears appropriate rather than indiscriminate.
In a series of studies, Wellman et al. (1997) solicited explanations from three and four
year-old children about a variety of human acts with biological, physical and
psychological impetus. Contrary to previous research, they found that young children
did not restrict each reasoning system to only specific entities. For example, three and
four year-olds did not just use psychological explanations for human acts (e.g., "he
never eats spinach because he doesn't like the taste") but also included physical
explanations (e.g., "the black toe hurts because Marky dropped a pan on it") and
biological ones too (e.g., "he'll eat his food, because to be alive"). As noted in Chapter
1, it appears that children can honour the ontological distinction between core domains
of thought whilst still recognising an overlap in the entities that each domain can
explain. Young children show evidence of differentiating and co-ordinating the three
reasoning systems in appropriate and flexible ways when considering complex
phenomenon.
In relation to one particular phenomenon, the inheritance of physical properties,
Korpan (1999) has found that by seven years of age, children are able to generate
explanations derived from numerous domains. In this study, children used an average
of five different explanation types, drawing from the domains of biology, physiology
and psychology among others. Similarly, Morris (1998) examined this issue of multi-
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causal reasoning of inheritance more directly. The aim of this experiment was to
investigate whether children employ multi-causal reasoning in cases where both
genetic and environmental influences are relevant (e.g., intelligence or weight) or
whether they use one single cause to reason why offspring resemble parents. The
results showed that even six year-old children recognised the dual contribution of
nature and nurture to the inheritance of certain traits. This was most evident for multi-
causal psychological features such as maths ability and intelligence. This is consistent
with suggestions by Hirschfeld (1995) who proposed that the ability to draw biological
and psychological inferences about the inheritance of properties requires the ability to
contrast and co-ordinate different explanatory frameworks in an appropriate manner.
Furthermore, in relation to the biological world, Gutheil, Vera & Keil (1998) have foimd
that pre-schoolers possess multiple explanatory frameworks concerning biological
kinds and these frameworks guide their inductions about various properties. In
addition, a recent study has shown that younger children are not exclusively bound to a
particular mode of explanation when reasoning about the animate world (Poling &
Evans, 2002). It was found that even six-year-old children endorsed different
explanations for different biological categories, indicating causal flexibility. However,
children's ability to engage in flexible causal reasoning of phenomena that span several
domains of thought requires further exploration.
2.3 Children's Concepts of Complex Social Phenomena
These recent studies confirm that the domain-specific approach has much potential
when attempting to understand children's concepts of complex phenomena.
Consequently, some researchers have re-examined children's concepts of more
complicated phenomena such as gender and race, using this theoretical framework.
Gender and racial concepts involve an understanding of both biological and
environmental contributions to differences between people. As such, this research is an
important contribution to discussions surrounding children's co-ordination of core
knowledge domains.
By the early pre-school years, young children provide evidence that they can readily
sort people into categories that correspond to the racial and gender categories used by
adults (Aboud, 1988; Hirschfeld, 1996; Taylor, 1996). Traditionally, young children
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were thought to construct social concepts on the basis of physically prominent and
superficial features (Aboud, 1988), with their racial and gender concepts, for example,
initially represented in terms of outward and variation in appearance. Not until middle
childhood are the intrinsic and immutable natures of these categories grasped (Carey,
1985). Pre-schoolers do so, it is argued, because prior to the age of eight years, children
do not appreciate the biological implications of complex social categories. As this
chapter has shown, there has been considerable disagreement as to whether children's
conceptions of the biological and social worlds develop independently or in tandem
(e.g., Carey, 1985). Not surprisingly then, given the debate over onset of naive
biological knowledge, children were initially thought to conceptualise social differences
in rather superficial ways.
Within the domain-specific cognition literature, Carey (1985) has argued strongly that
for children below the age of seven, gender is not a basic biological fact about people.
Coming to see gender as a biological given is part of the emergence of a distinct
biological domain. However, a variety of research has recently questioned children's
inability to distinguish between these conceptual domains (Keil, 1989), suggesting that
coming to understand the biological aspects of gender differences may occur earlier
than previously thought.
Recent findings on children's gender and racial concepts do suggest an early awareness
of the biological implications of these categories. In an attempt to ascertain whether
children view gender as a social or biological category, Taylor (1996) examined
children's beliefs about the origins of gender differences. Participants aged four to ten
years were told about a child raised with only opposite-sex individuals and were asked
whether the child would grow up to possess gender-stereotyped or biological
properties. For example, for the story with the female character, children were told
about a baby girl called 'Chris' who went away to live on island with only boys or men.
The children were then asked a series of questions about what properties the story
character would have when she or he was ten years old. Some of these properties were
stereotyped, such as 'she wears dresses', Tikes to play with dolls' and 'wants to be a
nurse'. Others were biological, such as 'she has a body like a girl's' and 'she will grow
up to be a mummy'. At issue was whether children would consider biological factors
as more important for gender category membership than social-environmental ones.
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The findings showed that by nine or ten years of age, children acknowledge that
environmental factors may influence gender-role development. That is, children under
10 years believed gender-stereotyped properties would develop in an infant regardless
of the social context in which she is raised. Younger children seem to believe that
members of a gender category share something of an innate potential which will
become manifest over time (Taylor, 1996). They assume a girl will develop similar to
other girls, regardless of being raised in an environment with boys. Thus, prior to age
nine, the biological implications of gender carry more influence than social-
environmental ones. This result is at odds with Carey's expectation (1985) that children
initially understand gender as a social construct and may even reflect an early
awareness of the biological nature of gender. In contrast, older children recognise the
role of the environment in shaping gender-role development. Furthermore, they are
able to distinguish between biological properties that develop regardless of social
influence and stereotyped properties that would develop in accordance with the social
environment. Older children are able to appreciate the dual contribution of the
biological and social worlds to gender differences. In accord with findings reported in
this chapter, older children can utilise and co-ordinate several core reasoning systems
in appropriate and flexible ways (Wellman et al., 1997; Hickling & Wellman, 2001).
In addition to research on gender concepts, much attention has been devoted to
children's racial understanding. How children acquire racial and ethnic concepts has
been of long-standing interest to both psychologists and anthropologists (Aboud, 1988;
Katz, 1982; Hirschfeld, 1996). In a series of studies, Hirschfeld (1995) revisits the claim
that young children lack a biologically based understanding of race and explores the
possibility that even pre-schoolers have a more adult-like grasp of race than previous
scholars have suggested. Adult reasoning about race is theory-like in the sense that it
appeals to a specific ontology and pattern of causal explanation. Adults believe race to
be a natural as well as a social phenomenon governed by a range of natural principles.
Thus, for adults, race is immutable across the life-span, fixed at birth and derived from
family background. Coupled with these aspects of racial thinking is a notion of non-
obvious essence (Medin & Ortony, 1989; Hirschfeld, 1995). Race is thought to be an
intrinsic feature of a person that is tied to abstract, unobservable properties. Given that
adults naturalise race and see it as biologically grounded, ascertaining whether children
also have a theory-like view of race means discovering whether children see race as
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being biologically controlled. In turn, this involves determining the extent to which
children's biological knowledge accords with adults' biological understanding.
In an extensive series of studies, Hirschfeld (1995) examined whether young children's
understanding of race is superficial or whether their understanding involves a
naturalised, essentialist construal of race. In this study, the following biological
attributes of race were examined: that race is defined in terms of physical properties
that are fixed at birth, that it is derived from family background and that it is
immutable over the life span. Hirschfeld (1995) presented 109 children in three age
groups (three, four and seven year-olds) with two sets of line drawings. Each set
consisted of a picture of an adult and two pictures of children of the same gender. Each
adult was depicted in terms of his or her race, body build and occupation (e.g., a stocky,
black police officer). Each of the comparison pictures shared one of the three
characteristics (e.g., a stocky white child dressed up as a policeman versus a stocky
black child with no occupational apparel). Subjects were either asked which of the
comparison pictures was the target as a child or which of the comparison pictures was
the target's child. If children understand the biological implications of race they should
override the influence of superficial appearance such as occupational apparel when
making judgements about inheritance and growth.
The results indicated that children judge race to be more biologically grounded than
occupation or body build. That is, children expect race to be inherited and to remain
unchanged over the life span more than occupation or body build. If, as previous work
suggests, children focus only on surface features then alterations in body build should
signal a change in identity just as readily as change in race does. Despite the fact that
all three attributes are visually obvious, socially relevant and stereotyped dimensions,
even pre-school children believe race is a better predictor of identity than body build or
occupation. In summary, "even pre-schoolers see race as immutable, corporeal,
differentiated, derived from family background and sensitive to biological principles of
causality" (Hirschfeld, 1995, p.226).
These data suggest that young children can reason deeply about intrinsic properties
such as race. That is, children's beliefs about race appear to be naturalised and involve
essentialist reasoning. Children use essentialist reasoning in that they expect racial
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identity to emerge out of a non-obvious substance. Furthermore, consistent with
findings on gender concepts, young children do appreciate the biological implications
of race. However, Hirschfeld (1996) argues that although adult and child racial beliefs
include features of naive biology, they are not derived from biological principles.
Instead, he argues that mental representations of human groups are governed by a
distinct domain of naive sociology. That is, there is a domain-specific competence for
the social domain that underlies essentialist thinking about social categories, such as
race (Hirschfeld, 1995; 1996). The proposal that naive sociology constitutes a core
domain of thinking is a relatively new one and a lack of research makes it impossible to
confirm or deny its existence.
The research findings on children's racial and gender concepts have major implications
for domain-specific research. Contrary to Carey (1985), they suggest a biological to
social shift in children's social category understanding. Furthermore, this area of
research increased debates about whether children can engage in more than one form
of causal reasoning given the dual contribution of biological and social factors to
gender and racial differences. The findings suggest that with age, children come to
differentiate the importance of biological and social factors in appropriate ways.
However, due to the methodology employed in the gender and racial studies, it is
unclear whether young children prefer to reason about complex phenomena using only
one causal-explanatory framework (biological) or whether they are cognitively unable to
utilise more than one domain of thought (biological and social). Nevertheless,
ascertaining how children conceptualise more complex phenomena is important for
domain-specific research. To this end, a phenomenon which is currently under-
researched, but which could contribute greatly to domain-specific theories of cognitive
development is children's understanding of disability.
2.4 Children's Concepts of Disability
In recent years, investigators have become interested in children's concepts of
disability. This is largely due to an increasing concern about the integration of children
with disabilities into mainstream schools. Most of this interest has been in children's
attitudes towards disabled and non-disabled peers but some research has focused on
children's understanding of disabilities (Diamond, 1993; Lewis, 1995). Although not
grounded in a strong theoretical perspective, previous research has provided some
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information on the early development of ideas about disability. In particular, young
children's understanding of disability appears to be influenced by visually salient
features (Diamond, 1993; Conant & Budoff, 1983). Consistent with earlier research on
racial and gender concepts, children frequently mention visible aspects of disability
such as walking frames, wheelchairs and glasses.
Children's knowledge of disability has received far less attention as a research topic
than racial and gender concepts. It is unclear why this is the case. Due to theoretical
and practical interest in educational inclusion (Thomas, Walker & Webb, 1998), children
will have increasing opportunities to interact with disabled peers. A general increase in
standards of health has led to a greater life expectancy of people with handicapping
conditions (Thomas, 1982) and as such both children and adults now have far more
opportunity to encounter others with disabilities. Investigating children's developing
concepts of disability therefore seems an especially pertinent and necessary area of
research.
Disability could be an under-researched area however, because it is not perceived as
having any great psychological significance. In other words, it could be that it is not
considered to be as potent a social category as race and gender. As discussed earlier,
for both adults and children, racial and gender concepts are inferentially potent
categories (Hirschfeld, 1995; Taylor, 1996). That is, they invoke a notion of underlying
essence and use biological causal principles to reason about gender and racial
differences. In contrast, in the disability literature, any focus on the biological and
intrinsic aspects of disability is frequently criticised (Oliver, 1996; Shakespeare, 1996;
Hedlund, 2000). The argument is that by focusing on the biological cause or visible
physical abnormality, this frames disability as an intrinsic, individual problem as
opposed to a societal problem. From this viewpoint, research on race and gender is
reality-based in that it examines how children and adults actually think about these
categories, whereas research on disability tends to be belief-based. That is, scholars
have debated how disability should be represented as opposed to how disability is
actually imderstood.
From this prevailing viewpoint it is not perhaps surprising that a psychological
approach to disability concepts has received very little attention, especially in relation
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to children. How and when children develop ideas about disability has rarely been
investigated as part of ongoing cognitive development, nor has it been related to
developing conceptions of race and gender. Yet, the fact that disability is such a
multifaceted concept, makes it an ideal candidate for research within a domain-specific
perspective. Given research on children's ability to co-ordinate their core domains of
thought, it would be of interest to examine the ways in which children utilise and
differentiate this knowledge when reasoning about disability. Younger children may
draw on several core domains of knowledge to reason about disability, but may not do
so in an appropriate way. For example, children may draw on biological knowledge
(some people are born with learning difficulties), psychological knowledge (learning
difficulties can be corrected through personal effort) or physical knowledge (an
accident or trauma leads to learning difficulties), although not doing so in a
discriminating way. As is the case with race and gender, older children's concepts of
disability may be more multifaceted and differentiated. Consequently, asking children
about their ideas of disability at different ages could reveal the extent to which they can
simultaneously co-ordinate multiple causal frameworks to explain the same
phenomena. Ascertaining when children become aware of the biological nature of
disability could also contribute to current debates on the status and development of
naive biological knowledge. Given recent findings on the biological to social shift in
children's understanding of race and gender, it seems reasonable to explore whether
children's disability concepts follow a similar developmental path. All of these issues
will be addressed in this thesis.
2.5 Summary and Conclusions
This chapter has described empirical research on the content of children's core
knowledge domains. Prior to formal education, young children develop ontological
and causal ideas about the physical, psychological and biological world in which they
live. This chapter has shown that while limited in number, studies on children's multi-
causal reasoning are important for exploring issues central to theories of domain-
specificity. These studies suggest that children must be able to utilise and co-ordinate
more than one core domain of thinking, especially when reasoning about complex
phenomena, such as gender and race. However, research on children's concepts of
more complicated phenomena is currently lacking, especially from a domain-specific
perspective. This chapter has introduced disability as a potential candidate for such
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research. However, as Chapter 3 will demonstrate, not only is generic research on
children's disability concepts lacking: few studies attempt to link children's disability
concepts to ongoing cognitive development or current developmental psychology
theories.
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CHAPTER 3
Children's Understanding of Disability
3.1 Traditional Research on Disability Concepts
Despite its potential to enhance discussions about domain-specificity, research on
children's disability concepts is lacking. Much of the earlier work focused on children's
awareness of and attitudes towards disability and was motivated, in part, by the rise in
inclusive educational practices (Thomas, Walker & Webb, 1998). Furthermore,
previous studies that have examined children's concepts of disability have done so
without a strong theoretical underpinning (Conant & Budoff, 1983; Sigelman & Begley,
1987; Goodman, 1989). Such studies often included only one or a small number of
disabilities and examined a limited age range of children.
The first section of this chapter will summarise previous work on children's attitudes
towards and awareness of disability. Thereafter, studies specifically addressing
children's understanding of disability will be discussed and related to a domain-
specific approach to cognitive development.
3.1.1 Children's Awareness of Disability
Children, in their pre-school years, can recognise physical and behavioural differences
in others (Conant & Budoff, 1983; Aboud, 1988; Diamond, 1993). In order to assess
patterns of expressed awareness, Conant & Budoff (1983) interviewed typically
developing children and adults about blindness, deafness, orthopaedic disabilities,
mental retardation and psychological disturbance. They found that even three to five
year-olds were able to understand that it is possible for someone to have a visual,
hearing or physical handicap. However, young children were less aware of mental
retardation or psychological disturbance. These type of impairments involve abstract
characteristics which are relatively unobservable and therefore would not be
immediately obvious to children (Conant & Budoff, 1983). Young children's awareness
of disability is not explicable in terms of the incidence of such disabilities in the
population. Blindness is relatively rare but emerged as a disability of which most
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young children are aware (Conant & Budoff,1983). Indeed, the disabilities mentioned
by the younger children in this study involved highly salient, perceptual features.
Some of these salient characteristics are inherent in the disability whilst others refer to
adaptive equipment (e.g, walking sticks and dark glasses). This study shows that even
pre-school children can recognise the presence of salient disabilities in others, despite
limited direct experience with such impairments. The role of experience in how
children form disability concepts is a topic which will be returned to throughout this
thesis (see Chapter 6).
3.1.2 Children's Attitudes Towards Disability
Previous research suggests that children's attitudes toward people with disabilities also
develop during the pre-school and early school years (Favazza & Odom, 1997). In a
review of peers' attitudes to disability, Home (1985) states that "there is substantial
evidence that handicapped students are rejected by their classmates" (p.135). However,
most of the studies reviewed by Home (1985) included children of nine years or older
and therefore it was unclear how young children would react to disabilities.
Several researchers have in fact suggested that younger children are more accepting of
the disabled than older children. Indeed, this was found in a study examining
children's attitudes to physical impairments (Richardson, Goodman, Hastorf &
Dornbusch, 1961; Richardson, 1970). In one study, Richardson (1970) examined
reactions towards various physical disabilities of children from kindergarten through
high school. Participants were shown a series of drawings of children with and
without physical impairments and were asked to rank order the pictures in terms of
preference. The results showed that preferences for certain physical impairments are
present in children aged five and six years. Interestingly, this is the only age at which
the non-disabled child is not the most liked. For every other age group, the child
without the disability is liked more than any of the physically handicapped children.
Indeed, Morgan & Wisely (1996) found that primary-school children's ratings of both
attitudes and behavioural intentions toward a child in a wheelchair became
significantly less positive with age. These finding suggest that younger children may
be more socially accepting of children with physical differences than older children.
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In relation to learning difficulties, a number of studies have shown that children with
developmental delay are consistently less preferred playmates than their peers
(Guralnick & Groom, 1987). The acceptance of children with developmental delays by
their typically developing peers appears to vary with the severity of the child's delays,
although even children with mild delays are less accepted as playmates than their
typically developing peers (Guralnick, Connor, Hammond, Gottman & Kinnish, 1996).
Guralnick (1992) suggests that these peer interaction difficulties may be associated with
deficits in social communication skills and appropriate interaction strategies. In
contrast, others have argued that children may be more accepting of a peer who is not
expected to perform well than a child for whom there is no explanation for poor
performance (Budoff & Siperstein, 1978). Thus, the implication of this argument is that
children with severe learning difficulties may be more accepted by peers, than a child
with only mild developmental delay.
This possibility was explored by Lewis & Lewis (1987) who investigated the attitudes of
young children towards peers with severe learning difficulties. In this study, a group
of six and seven year-olds who were involved in an integration project with children
with severe learning difficulties (SLD) were interviewed to assess their attitudes
towards peers who were described as 'not very clever' and peers with SLD (Lewis &
Lewis, 1987). The children reported mixed attitudes towards 'not very clever'
classmates. However, all the children expressed positive attitudes towards children
with SLD and described them in much more sympathetic terms than classmates with
difficulties. The children appeared to be making a qualitative distinction between
children with SLD and those that were 'not very clever' (Lewis & Lewis, 1987). This
study was important because it highlights the significance of experience by showing
that after a period of integration with children with SLD, typically developing children
held positive attitudes towards this group.
In the past few years, further research has explored the effect of inclusive settings on
children's attitudes to disabilities. Peck, Carlson & Helmstetter (1992) reported that
parents and teachers believe participation in an inclusive classroom promotes typically
developing children's appreciation for diversity and enhances their pro-social skills.
This has been supported by recent work on children's interactions in inclusive pre¬
school settings. In a study of social relationships between three children with SLD and
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three typically developing children in an inclusive summer programme, Hanline (1993)
found no evidence of peer rejection of children with SLD. In fact, typically developing
children tended to be more persistent in obtaining a response from a child with a
disability than from another peer. Similarly, Buysse (1993) also found that the majority
of children with disabilities who attended an inclusive school had at least one mutual
friend. In one recent study, Diamond (2001) reported that children who had social
contact with classmates with disabilities had significantly higher scores on measures of
emotion understanding and acceptance of individuals with disabilities, than did
children who had contact with typically developing classmates only.
Recently, Favazza & Odom (1997) reported that kindergarten children's attitudes
towards peers with a variety of disabilities (learning, sensory, physical, language)
became more positive after they participated in an intervention that used children's
books, guided discussion, home activities and structured opportunities to play with
children with disabilities. They were significantly more accepting of peers with
disabilities and had a better understanding of the term 'handicapped'. However,
Swaim & Morgan (2001) found that, children's attitudes and behavioural intentions
towards a peer with autistic symptoms did not improve when given educational
information about autism. Taking these findings together, it is evident that contact
with peers with disabilities, may help foster positive attitudes in children. As
Giangreco (1996) suggests "inclusion of children with disabilities, beginning in child
care centres and pre-schools, is an early step in developing a new generation that
experiences the diversity presented by disability as a routine part of everyday life"
(p.207).
3.2 Previous Research on Children's Understanding of Disability
Although research on children's reactions towards disability and attitude formation is
invaluable for informing policy and understanding of educational inclusion, it does not
tell us much about children's conceptions of disabilities. That is, few studies have
addressed whether children have any ideas as to the causes of disability or whether
they perceive disability to be a chronic and uncontrollable condition. Furthermore,
little is known about children's understandings of the outcomes or consequences of
disability. This lack of research is surprising given that knowledge about disability
may directly influence children's attitudes (Triandis, 1971). Additionally, of the work
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on children's understanding of disability that has been carried out, few attempts have
been made to relate their disability concepts to broader conceptual development. For
example, little is known about the structure of children's disability concepts, what the
precise content is of these concepts or the process by which disability concepts develop.
The remainder of this chapter will therefore describe previous research on children's
understanding of disability and will show early attempts at relating knowledge of
disability to broader cognitive structures.
3.2.1 Children's Causal Concepts ofDisability
There is a distinct lack of research into children's causal conceptions of disability. The
few findings that do exist in the literature are usually part of a larger study that is not
grounded in a conceptual development theoretical framework. Indeed, the impetus for
most of the disability concept research has not been to understand cognitive
development more fully, but is rather a reflection of the rise in inclusive practices which
has seen an increasing interaction between typically-developing children and children
with disabilities (Bricker, 1995; Thomas, Walker & Webb, 1998). Previous studies have
also usually focused attention on only one particular age group or a specific disability.
As a result, it is difficult to ascertain developmental changes in children's concepts of
disability, whether children's knowledge varies as a consequence of disability type or
how direct experience affects disability concepts. This section will review previous
findings on children's causal concepts of physical, sensory, learning and behavioural
disabilities.
One of the few researchers to conduct studies into children's disability concepts is
Diamond (1993; 1994; 1996). Diamond's focus of research is in pre-school conceptions
of disabilities, given that integrated pre-school education is now seen as 'best practice'
for young children with disabilities (Salisbury, 1991). In an early open-ended interview
of children's disability concepts, Diamond (1993) interviewed four year-old children
about their peers with disabilities. Children readily identified classroom peers with
significant physical or cognitive disabilities but not those with speech or language
delays. More importantly, young children were able to offer causal explanations for
their peers' disabilities. The most common explanation for why a peer was disabled
was references to immaturity. Responses included comments such as, "he's small" and
"when she gets bigger she can walk". Other responses included describing the
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disability without referring to its cause "she's handicapped" or referring to an accident
or trauma, for example "he broke his leg". This research is an important contribution to
the literature because it shows pre-schoolers are able to reason causally about the
origins of disabilities. Moreover, given the open-ended methodology employed in this
study, it provides preliminary evidence that pre-schoolers can give spontaneous causal
explanations for disabilities.
Since this study, further investigations have examined children's causal conceptions of
disability (Diamond, 1994; 1996). Diamond & Hestenes (1996) asked children aged
three to six years to explain the presence of physical, sensory disabilities and Down
syndrome in photographs of unfamiliar children. Children were most likely to mention
equipment as the reason for a physical or visual disability such as "she can't walk
because she's in that thing" or "she can't see because she's got that thing over her
eye"(Diamond & Hestenes, 1996). Consistent with previous findings (Diamond, 1993),
children also referred to immaturity as a reason for disabilities, especially Down
syndrome. The majority of children could not offer a causal explanation for hearing
loss.
In order to gain a better understanding of children's causal conceptions of disability,
Diamond applied a cognitive developmental framework outlined by Bibace & Walsh
(1979) to children's explanations. Bibace & Walsh (1979) developed a method of
probing responses about illness in order to determine which cognitive processes are
framing children's explanations. They compiled 12 questions assessing children's
understanding of illness-related concepts such as colds and germs (Bibace & Walsh,
1981). They then classified causal explanations into a Piagetian framework (1929) of
cognitive development as it relates to children's health and illness concepts. For
example, Bibace & Walsh's (1979) research suggests that children in the pre-operational
period typically progress through three phases of reasoning about health and illness
concepts. Firstly, children evidence incomprehension. Their responses are either
nonsensical or they do not respond at all. The next level of reasoning is phenomenism
in which illness is seen in terms of one single symptom that children may associate with
an external but concrete cause. In the final phase of reasoning, illness is still seen in
terms of a single symptom but this has more relevance than in the other developmental
phases.
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Utilising the framework outlined above, Diamond (1993; 1996) argued that at pre¬
school level, the cause and the disability are considered related through association
rather than through a causal sequence of events. For example, responses such as "she
can't walk because she has a wheelchair" occurred far more than "she can't walk
because she didn't get enough oxygen to her brain when she was being born"
(Diamond & Hestenes, 1996). According to Diamond (1993; 1996), as pre-schoolers are
operating within the pre-operational level they tend to exhibit the least mature level of
explanation of disabilities. This research suggests that instead of explaining disability
in terms of an underlying cause, pre-schoolers report salient physical features of the
impairment without indicating a cause. Pre-school children seemed to be swayed by
characteristic features that are easily observable but which lack any causal relevance.
Indeed, it has been argued that young children are often said to be 'perceptually
seduced' by typical features (Keil, 1989). Research in the conceptual development
literature (see Chapter 2, section 2.3) suggests children's initial concepts are based on
concrete observable properties which only later become more abstract with age. In
relation to disability, Lewis (1995) has proposed that children's disability concepts may
also proceed from the concrete to the abstract.
The Piagetian cognitive framework designed by Bibace & Walsh (1979) is an interesting
approach to understanding children's disability concepts and it is one of the few
attempts to assimilate children's knowledge of disability within their existing cognitive
structures. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the more recent domain-specific
approach to children's knowledge has gained in popularity and may offer further
insights into children's reasoning about disability. Recent evidence reviewed in
Chapter 2 suggests that prior to formal schooling, children show evidence of physical,
psychological and biological reasoning systems which enables them to provide causal
explanations for everyday phenomena. As such, children could have a greater causal
understanding of disabilities than first anticipated. Indeed, the studies that follow
suggest that children are able to report non-obvious, abstract causes for disabilities.
Although young children do frequently mention physical cues such as adaptive
equipment when asked to explain the cause of disability (Diamond, 1993; 1996), there is
some evidence that they can go beyond this. Sigelman & Begley (1987) examined five
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and nine year-olds understanding of peers with uncontrollable and controllable
problems. Although most five year-olds were unsure as to why a child might be in a
wheel-chair, birth defects and accidents were mentioned with some frequency and
controllable internal causes, such as lack of personal effort, were never cited. Even five
year-olds were sure about what does not cause physical disabilities: personal failings.
Therefore, although young children may not be aware of the specific mechanisms
involved in birth defects for example, they still offered this spontaneously as a possible
cause of disability. This finding is consistent with suggestions that children initially
have a sense of causal potency (Keil, 1999; Wilson & Keil, 2000) in a domain and acquire
foundational understandings even in the absence of specific knowledge (Wellman &
Gelman, 1998).
Interestingly, Sigelman & Begley (1987) found that different causes were offered for
learning and behavioural difficulties. The results showed that 53% of the younger
children and 69% of the older children attributed learning difficulty to controllable
causes such as not paying attention or trying hard enough. Similarly, in explaining
aggression, younger children cited lack of personal control as the cause. This
explanation was significantly rarer among older children. Older children were more
likely to mention environmental factors such as parental treatment for causes of
aggression. These responses suggest that although younger children frequently
mention internal causes such as birth defects, older children appreciate the role of the
environment in causing disabilities. Moreover, children of all ages appear to make a
causal distinction between learning or behavioural difficulties and other types of
disabilities.
According to Lewis (1995), children's understandings and misunderstandings about
disability arise largely because children are too immature cognitively to understand
some aspects of disability. Specifically, she suggests that disabilities with physical
indicators will be understood at an earlier age than disabilities which lack physical
indicators such as emotional or learning disorders. Support for this suggestion can be
found in evidence that younger children are more aware of physical and sensory
disabilities than learning or psychological difficulties (Conant & Budoff, 1983). Physical
attributes are very salient for young children and feature prominently in their
descriptions of others (Aboud, 1988; Keil, 1989; 1994). As such, disabilities with
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physical indicators will be more readily understood than less obvious difficulties.
Indeed, there is much evidence that points to children's difficulty in understanding
learning disorders. In one such study, Lewis (1993) interviewed typically developing
seven and eleven year-olds about their understanding of SLD. It was found that
understanding of SLD lagged behind understanding of more visible group differences
such as ethnicity or gender roles. The seven year-olds described children with SLD in
mostly physical terms with frequent references to clothing, hearing aids or spectacles of
the children with SLD. The most obvious cognitive characteristics of children with SLD
were mentioned relatively infrequently by this age group. Moreover, most seven year-
olds were confused about the nature of SLD with only one child reporting that
"handicapped means you got something wrong with your brain" (Lewis, 1993, p.137).
In contrast, many of the eleven year-olds explained SLD using phrases such as "big
bodies, young minds" and "their brains younger than what their bodies are" (p.140).
This study shows that only older children understand the quintessential aspects of
learning difficulties; namely the cognitive component of the condition.
Similarly, Glasberg (2000) explored the development of understanding of autism in
siblings of individuals with autism or a related disorder. She used the cognitive
developmental framework described earlier to categorise children's causal conceptions.
A total of 63 sibling pairs were included and were classified into one of three age
groups: five and six year-olds were assumed to be in the pre-operational stage of
development, seven to ten year-olds represented concrete operational reasoning and
children above eleven years were expected to perform at a formal operational level.
The results showed that although understanding the cause of autism increased with
age, all participating siblings demonstrated reasoning within the pre-operational
period. However, it is possible that the siblings' understanding of autism was
influenced by what their parents had previously told them about the condition.
Nevertheless, Glasberg (2000) concluded that children's difficulty in acquiring autism-
related concepts may stem from the nature of the disorders. Consistent with Lewis
(1993; 1995) she suggests that, "these concepts, being more abstract and less common
than many physical illnesses, may simply be more difficult to grasp" (p.151).
Furthermore, such difficulties seem to be robust despite direct and extensive social
experience. Future studies should aim to establish the types of experiences that can
shape children's knowledge of disabilities. Additionally, the interplay between social
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experience and children's ability to understand cognitively some aspects of disability
needs to be fully explored.
In contrast, Goodman (1989) found that by middle childhood, children had acquired a
sophisticated understanding of learning difficulties. Children aged eight and nine
years were interviewed concerning their ideas about learning disability as well as
related terms such as 'smart' and 'dumb'. Interestingly, this is one of the few studies
that used labels in their descriptions of children with disabilities, an issue that will be
investigated in Chapter 7. Although most children believed personal effort could make
a person 'smart' or 'dumb', personal effort was an infrequent explanation for learning
disability. By contrast, the cause of such difficulties was thought to be largely
constitutional; responses included it is the "way they are", "God made you that way"
and "birth defects" (Goodman, 1989). As such, akin to findings from Lewis & Lewis
(1987), learning disability was not thought to be the tail end of the intelligence
continuum. Children drew a sharp distinction between a learning disability and those
considered, 'smart' or 'dumb'.
Unfortunately, few studies exist on children's conceptions of emotional/behavioural
disorders. One exception is an early study conducted by Maas, Marecek & Travers
(1978). They examined seven year-olds, nine year-olds and eleven year-olds
conceptions of disordered behaviour. Children were given three descriptions of a
character exhibiting either antisocial, withdrawn or self-punitive behaviour. In
particular, children were asked what caused all of these behaviours. Two categories of
causal factors emerged from the data. The category of internal causation included
responses stating that the character was 'born that way' or that the behaviour had been
a result of a disease process or physical injury. The second category of responses were
social-environmental and stated that the behaviour was caused by treatment of family
or friends. Consistent with findings from Sigelman & Begley (1987), younger children
saw internal factors as the pre-dominant cause of disordered behaviour while for older
children social-environmental factors took precedence. With increasing age, children
were also likely to believe that disordered behaviour could be most effectively changed
by altering the environment, such as finding new friends. This shift towards
environmental thinking may be linked to the diminishing role of Piaget's 'egocentrism'
(Maas et al., 1978). However, an alternative interpretation is also possible. As reported
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in Chapter 2, findings by Taylor (1996) and Hirschfeld (1995) have shown that children
initially construe gender and race in biological ways and only later appreciate the
causal role of the environment. Children's causal understanding of behavioural
difficulties and other less obvious disabilities may also follow a similar developmental
path.
To summarise, ideas about the causes of disability seem to be early-developing in
children. However, the quality of the causal explanations provided by children varies
between studies. In much of Diamond's research (1993; 1994; 1996), young children
were often unable to offer a causal explanation or they mentioned salient, physical
features of the disability without indicating a cause. One interpretation of these
findings is that pre-schoolers are too cognitively immature to be able to reason
appropriately about the origins of disability (Diamond, 1993). However, in other
studies, young children were able to go beyond the phenomenal by reporting
unobservable causes such as birth defects or intentional causes such as lack of
willpower. It is difficult to reconcile these findings given differences in research
methodology and in the type of disabilities examined.
Interesting parallels can be drawn with the domain-specific literature. The range of
causal explanations that children offer for disabilities parallels the types of causal-
explanatory reasoning systems found to be early in childhood in relation to other
phenomena. For example, children's explanations of disability range from the
biological (e.g. birth defects), to the physical (e.g., accident or trauma) and
psychological (e.g., lack of effort). As noted in Chapter 2, naive biology, naive physics
and naive psychology are all thought to be core domains of thought for young children.
Furthermore, children's causal understanding of disability may shift from the internal
and biological to the external and social. This however requires detailed examination
and will be explored in Study lb. Interestingly, the biological to social shift is also
reported in children's concepts of other social categories such as race and gender.
Despite the similarities between domain-specific cognitive research and children's
disability concepts, no previous attempt has been made to reconcile these disparate
areas of research. Recently in a review of children's learning disability concepts, Lewis
(2002) supported the importance of bringing these areas together. This thesis is the first
endeavour to do so.
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3.2.2 Children's Understanding of the Controllability and Chronicity of
Disability
The previous section has shown that causal knowledge of disability develops early in
childhood. An awareness of the origins of disability, for adults at least, affects
perceptions of the chronicity and controllability of disability. For example, if a
disability is thought to be congenital in origin then the disability is likely to be
permanent and not within intentional control. Similarly, disabilities that are due to an
accident or trauma, although not controllable, may be curable through medical
intervention. Although adults may make such inferences, due to lack of research it is
unclear whether children recognise that some disabilities are chronic and
uncontrollable.
Lewis (1995) suggests that understanding the permanency and irrevocability of
disability does not develop imtil seven or eight years of age. It is argued that this is due
to a general shift in children's knowledge about which aspects of group membership do
not change. Previous studies reviewed in Chapter 2 have shown that by seven or eight
years, children recognise gender and ethnicity to be permanent and irreversible
characteristics (Taylor, 1996; Hirschfeld, 1995). Furthermore, Lewis (1995) suggests that
understanding the chronicity of less well-recognised disabilities would occur at a much
later age.
There is some support for these suggestions. Sigelman (1991) investigated the effect of
causal information on children's understanding of physical problems. Participants
aged six and nine years-old heard descriptions of obese or wheel-chair bound girls and
were presented with causes which were either uncontrollable (through disease, birth
defects or bad parental treatment) or unknown. Children were then asked to comment
on whether the girls could control such conditions. The findings showed significant
age differences in judgements of controllability. Younger children, despite being told
the condition was caused by birth defects, were optimistic about the possibility of
alleviating the problem. They did not appreciate the difficulty in undoing the effects of
birth defects. In contrast, older children viewed problems caused by birth defects to be
less remedial than problems of unknown cause or parental treatment. Additionally,
young children had much greater confidence in the ability of adults to 'fix' the
problems regardless of the causality. This study shows that in contrast to their older
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counterparts, young children are less aware of the uncontrollability of physical
impairments. The finding supports suggestions by Lewis (1995) that an awareness of
the permanency of disabilities develops with age.
Young children do certainly have difficulty understanding the permanency of learning
difficulties. Lewis (1993) has shown that most seven-year-olds are unaware of the
chronicity of SLD. Only 26.3% recognised that SLD was irrevocable and 36.8% reported
that children with SLD would grow out of their difficulties. By eleven years, children
understood that SLD could not be changed or outgrown and were aware of the limits of
medical intervention. Similarly, as results from a study reported earlier show, by nine
years children recognise the irreversibility of learning difficulties (Goodman, 1989).
Only a third of children aged eight and nine years, who when interviewed about their
ideas of learning disability, believed it was curable. Therefore, by middle childhood,
children begin to appreciate the chronicity and uncontrollability of learning difficulties.
This parallels interesting work on children's intuitions about the controllability of
mental states. Young children usually overestimate people's control over their mental
states (Wellman & Hickling, 1994; Flavell & Green, 1999). Moreover, young children
are largely unaware of the mind's proneness to faulty interpretations, memory
distortions and other shortcomings (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996).
Taken together, these studies provide support for the suggestion by Lewis (1995) that
an understanding of the permanency of disabilities does not emerge until middle
childhood and that this is especially the case for less visible disabilities. However, what
is unclear is whether children can link their ideas about the causes of disability with
their judgements of controllability and chronicity. A brief look at previous research
suggests they cannot. For example, in Maas et al., (1978), young children were more
likely to offer internal biological causal explanations for disordered behaviour. Yet, in
contrast to older children, they also judged the behaviour to be controllable through
personal effort. Similarly, Sigelman & Begley (1987) found that even when children
were provided with causal information about physical and learning disabilities, this
had no effect on judgements of controllability. They concluded that "perceived
responsibility for solving problems does appear to be independent of perceived
responsibility for causing problems" (p.112). One suggestion is that children were not
aware during the study that they should keep track of their responses and link them
60
together in a sensible way. However, another interpretation is also possible: that
children's concepts of disability are not theory-like (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.4). That
is, their ideas about the causes, controllability and chronicity are not structured in a
coherent fashion. As noted in Chapter 2, whereas children's understanding of the
physical and psychological worlds may be theoretical, knowledge of complex social
categories may not be structured in this way. This possibility will be addressed in this
thesis, to be reported in Chapter 5.
3.2.3 Children's Understanding of the Consequences ofDisability
In addition to the development of ideas about the causes, controllability and chronicity
of disability, previous research has also shown children develop concepts about the
consequences of disability. There are very few studies on children's knowledge of the
outcomes or consequences of disability. The most detailed investigation of this issue
has been the work by Diamond and colleagues (1994; 1996). Diamond (1994) explored
how pre-school children without disabilities think about the skills of their classmates
with mild learning difficulties and severe physical disabilities. Using an adapted
version of Harter & Pike's (1984) Pictorial Scale of Perceived Competence and Social
Acceptance, children aged three to five years, enrolled in inclusive classes, rated their
disabled classmates on cognitive, language, physical competence and peer acceptance.
The results showed that children with disabilities were judged to have lower cognitive,
language and physical competencies. Furthermore, children were sensitive to
differences as a function of disability type. The child with a physical impairment
received lower ratings for physical competence. However, pre-schoolers rated the child
with a learning difficulty as less competent on cognitive, physical and language tasks.
Similar findings were also reported by Diamond & Hestenes (1996). Using the same
methodology, pre-schoolers recognised that physical skills would be compromised in
someone with a physical disability. Children seemed more confused however about
the consequences of sensory disabilities. For example, the consequences of a hearing
impairment where difficulties in one area (e.g., hearing) affect performance in a
different area (e.g., language) appeared to be too complex for young children.
However, Diamond (1994) has shown that participation in a classroom with a severe
hearing-impaired peer can improve pre-schoolers understanding of hearing loss.
Children who had a deaf classmate were more likely to understand the complex
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relationship between the ability to hear and the ability to speak. This suggests that
classroom inclusion and social experience more generally can influence young
children's understanding of disabilities.
In one study (Diamond, ITestenes, Carpenter & Innes, 1997), the direct effects of
participation in an inclusive pre-school class on children's understanding of the
consequences of disability was assessed. Participants were pre-school children enrolled
in either a mainstream or inclusive school programme. Children were interviewed to
learn their ideas about immediate and long-term consequences of physical and sensory
disabilities. Using the competency rating scale as in Diamond (1994; 1996), children
were asked to judge peer performance on physical, hearing, visual and social activities.
In addition, children were asked a series of open-ended questions about the
consequences of disability. The results indicated that children in both mainstream and
inclusive schools were accurate in identifying the consequences of disability for peers
with different disabilities. However, pre-schoolers in inclusive settings were more
likely than other children to state that physical and sensory disabilities would persist
into adulthood. This finding is consistent with children's experiences since classmates
with disabilities continue to have their disability, day in day out. Diamond et al. (1997)
suggest pre-school children may acquire basic knowledge about disability from a
variety of sources but that understanding more complex aspects of disability, such as
the long-term consequences, may be more easily learned in an integrated environment.
Some interesting work has shown that children tend to generalise difficulties about one
disabled group and apply it to a less well-known disability. Maras & Brown (1992)
talked to school children who had what they described as 'categorised' and
'decategorised' contact with children with physical and learning disabilities.
'Categorised' contact described an integration where disabled children are clearly
identified as members of a group of similar others. 'Decategorised' contact was where
integration is taking place but children with disabilities are not clearly identifiable to
their mainstream peers as being members of a particular group. It was found that
children who had 'categorised' contact with children who had a visible, salient
disability were able to make accurate distinctions between physically disabled and non-
disabled children. However, those children who had 'categorised' contact with
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children whose disability was not so immediately obvious tended to distinguish less
between one disability and another.
Similarly, a study by Lewis (1993) cited earlier, demonstrated the difficulty younger
children had in differentiating between the limitations of SLD and other disabilities. At
age seven, typically-developing children drew strong distinctions between themselves
and children with SLD. They perceived little intra-group SLD differentiation and
tended to confuse learning difficulties with sensory and motor disabilities. However,
by age eleven, the conceptual distinctions between typically developing children and
those with SLD were looser and differences within SLD groups were being recognised.
Indeed, Lewis (1995) has suggested that a major change in children's disability concepts
is an awareness of intra-group differences. The recognition of intra-group differences
and inter-group similarities requires conceptual differentiation whereby the child
refines group boundaries in order to assess whether individuals are members of a
particular group. Children who, for example, understand the nature of SLD will be
able to recognise that children who have SLD vary from one to another in terms of
gender and ethnicity. Additionally, characteristics such as good health can vary within
learning disabled groups and do not define differences (Lewis, 1993). The tendency to
over-generalise the difficulties that different disabled groups experience is evident
among younger children. This tendency is further exacerbated when the disability is
abstract and has few visible cues. Thus, it may be useful to explain to children the
limited set of consequences of a disability so they do not infer difficulties that do not
exist. The development of conceptions about the consequences of different disabilities
is to be explored in Study la.
3.3 Taking a Domain-Specific Approach to Children's Disability Concepts
Research within the disability tradition has indicated that concepts of disability emerge
during the pre-school years. That is, young children develop ideas about the causes,
controllability, chronicity and consequences of disabilities. Although children's
concepts of disability are of great educational relevance, little attempt has been made to
relate the development of these concepts to broader cognitive changes. Consequently,
we do not know how children's disability concepts are structured, what the specific
content of these concepts are or what factors affect the acquisition of disability concepts.
An exception to this has been research using a Piagetian framework which has related
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children's causal concepts of disability to Piagetian stages (Diamond, 1993; Glasberg,
2000). However, this is only one theoretical stance and domain-specific approaches to
cognitive development may offer a fruitful alternative paradigm. Domain-specific
research now suggests that prior to formal education, children have three core domains
of thought that they use to reason about everyday phenomena: naive physics, naive
psychology and naive biology. Consequently, investigating children's understanding
of disability within this framework could be a useful avenue for research, for both
theoretical and applied reasons.
In the disability literature, young children appeared to have difficulty indicating a
cause for disabilities and instead referred to physical, salient features of the disability
(e.g., wheelchair). Yet concurrently, other studies within the disability literature, reveal
several different types of causes that young children can produce for disabilities. These
include biological explanations such as birth defects, physical explanations such as
accidents and psychological explanations such as lack of effort. These explanations
parallel the core domains of thought evident in young children. As such, children's
core reasoning systems could be the driving force behind causal explanations of
disability. Relatedly, these framework understandings may help children to reason
about the causes of disability even if they lack specific knowledge about the causal
mechanisms (Wellman & Gelman 1998; Keil, 1999).
It seems feasible to suggest that children can potentially use their core domains of
thought to reason about the controllability and chronicity of disability. Children who
use psychological-intentional reasoning for example, may judge disabilities to be
controllable through personal effort. Similarly, disabilities that are interpreted using
biological reasoning could be perceived as fixed and irreversible. However, whether
children can use their core reasoning systems in a theoretical way to think about
disability concepts and whether this ability is dependent on developmental level is
unclear. For example, children may be unable to relate their causal understanding of
disability to their judgements of controllability and chronicity. Thus, concepts of
disability, at least for younger children may not be theoretical. Young children may
also be unable to tailor particular causal explanations to specific types of disability in an
appropriate and flexible manner. This lack of integrated understanding can be
observed in the traditional literature on disability concepts. As discussed earlier, young
64
children's causal and controllable judgements of disability rarely tie together (Maas et
al., 1978; Sigelman & Begley, 1987). Moreover, they tend to generalise the consequences
of disability from one developmental domain to another. Young children appear
unable to reason about the different aspects of disability in a coherent and tailored
fashion. At the heart of the domain-specific approach is the notion that core knowledge
is structured as an intuitive theory and therefore this approach may be particularly
useful for exploring the extent to which children's disability concepts are theoretical.
3.4 Summary and Conclusions
In summary, previous research into children's disability concepts can be readily
interpreted within a domain-specific cognitive developmental framework. This
approach has the potential to offer new insights into children's understanding of
disabiliity; that is, the notion of theory-like concepts (Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Carey,
1995) and intuitive causal understandings (Wellman & Gelman, 1998; Keil, 1999; Wilson
& Keil, 2000). By adopting this framework, researchers could ascertain which core
domains of thought children co-ordinate when reasoning about complex phenomena,
such as disability. Furthermore, such research would be an original contribution to the
already existing literature on disability concepts.
The first study to be reported in this thesis examines the development of children's
conceptions of the consequences of disability. As noted earlier, there is a lack of studies
into this aspect of children's disability concepts and the existing studies have been
limited by their narrow age range of participants and selective types of disabilities
included in the investigations. Thus, the study reported in the following chapter, aims
to provide a more comprehensive overview of consequential concepts of disability in
childhood and examines the extent to which children have principled and
differentiated knowledge of disability.
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CHAPTER 4
An Exploratory Study into Children's Conceptions of Disability
1Study 1a: Understanding the Consequences of Disability
The first empirical study reported in the thesis is an initial exploratory investigation
that is separated into two parts. The first part, Study la, examines children's
understanding of the consequences of disability and is the focus of the present chapter.
The aim of Study la is to add to the existing disability literature by providing a more
comprehensive overview of children's understanding of the consequences of disability.
The second part, Study lb reported in Chapter 5, investigates children's conceptions of
the causes, controllability and chronicity of disability from a domain-specific cognition
perspective. The aim of Study lb is to explore directly whether children use their core
knowledge domains to conceptualise disabilities and if so, the ways in which this is
accomplished.
4.1 Children's Concepts of the Consequences of Disability
As noted in Chapter 3, very little research attention has been given to children's
concepts of the consequences of disability. The research findings that do exist on this
topic tend to focus on one particular disability, such as learning difficulties (Lewis,
1993) or age group, such as pre-schoolers (Diamond, 1994; Diamond & Hestenes, 1996),
which does not provide a developmental overview of children's disability concepts.
The most detailed investigation of this issue has been research by Diamond and
colleagues (1994; 1996). They used an adapted version of Harter & Pike's (1984)
Pictorial Scale of Perceived Competence to investigate how typically developing pre¬
school children reason about the skills of their classmates with mild learning difficulties
and severe physical disabilities. In their study, pre-school children judged their peers
performance in four areas of competence; cognitive, physical, language and peer
acceptance and ratings on each item ranged from 1 (the child has difficulty performing
the skill) to 4 (the child performs the skill very well).
1 The data from this study is published in the Journal of Child: Care, Health and Development.
The published article can be found in Appendix V.
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Diamond (1994) found that pre-schoolers were sensitive to differences as a function of
disability type. The character with a physical disability received lower ratings for
physical competence but the character with a learning difficulty was rated as less
competent on cognitive, physical and language tasks. As noted in Chapter 3, younger
children tend to generalise the difficulties that different disabled groups experience and
this may be heightened with less-obvious disabilities, as was clearly the case in
Diamond's (1994) investigation. However, there are several limitations to the previous
studies on this topic (Diamond, 1993; 1994; Diamond & Hestenes, 1996). Firstly, the age
range of the participants is traditionally quite narrow with Diamond focusing much of
her research on pre-school age children. It is therefore not clear how children's
concepts of the consequences of disability would develop with age. Secondly, they
have tended to explore typically developing children's sensitivity to their classroom
peers who have disabilities. Therefore the participants in these studies had
considerable contact with children with disabilities. Little is known about how children
with seldom contact with disabilities conceptualise the consequences of disability.
Lastly, as much of the previous investigations have been classroom-based, it has been
difficult to control or systematically include a range of different types of disability. It is
not as apparent how children's consequential understanding would vary as a function
of disability type.
4.1.1 Study 1a
This study explores the ways in which typically developing children, with limited
experience of disability, conceptualise the capabilities and limitations of children with
different types of disabilities. It extends previous studies by Diamond (1994, Diamond
& Hestenes, 1996) by firstly including children aged four to twelve years, in order to
achieve a developmental perspective on children's conceptions of the consequences of
disability. The present study also includes a broader spectrum of disabilities including
physical, sensory, learning and emotional/behavioural types in order to contrast
children's understanding of different disabilities. Furthermore, children who have little
or no direct school or home contact with children with disabilities are included in this
investigation. The aims of this study are to chart developmental trends in children's
consequential understanding, especially the extent to which young children generalise
or differentiate the consequences of particular disabilities. In addition, this study will
examine how children's knowledge about a variety of different disabilities develops.
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4.2 Method
4.2.1 Ethical Issues
In conducting study la, two key ethical concerns regarding research with children were
addressed and these will be discussed before detailing the methodology of study la.
The first issue concerned gaining access to interview children about their ideas of
disability and this was achieved through two main formal channels (Alderson &
Goodey, 1996). Firstly, permission to approach schools in the first instance was granted
by the local education authority. Secondly, following the schools' agreement to
participate in the research, parents were contacted about their child's involvement in
the study using an opt-in written procedure. This represents two levels of
'gatekeeping' as discussed by Lewis (2002) in which access to children is typically
controlled by both direct gatekeepers (parent, carer) and indirect gatekeepers (schools,
teachers, local education authorities). It was made clear to the local education
authority, schools, parents and children that the information obtained from the
interviews was anonymous and would not be traceable in written documentation to
any individual school or child. In addition, on completion of the study, all participating
schools and the local education authority were sent short reports of the main findings
of the research.
The second key ethical issue that was considered was the notion of 'informed consent'
when interviewing children. This requires that children not only give their consent to
be interviewed but also that they understand their role in the research process and the
purpose of the interview (Lewis, 2002; Lindsay, 2002; Mahon, Glendinning, Clarke &
Craig, 1996; Alderson & Goodey, 1996). Although obtaining informed consent can be
particularly difficult to achieve (Lewis, 2002), every effort was made in this study to
ensure that participating children understood the nature of the research (Alderson,
1995). Children were approached directly for their oral consent to participate and were
given information about the study. They were made aware that they had a right to
refuse to be interviewed but only a few children of the youngest age group refused to
be interviewed. During the interview it was made clear to the children that they could
leave at any time. At the end of the interview, children were acknowledged for both
their time and involvement in the study but were told nothing further about the
research. These ethical issues were considered in relation to all studies reported in this
thesis and not just study la, which is the focus of the present chapter.
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4.2.2 Participants
Table 4.1 Participant information
Males Females Total Mean Age (Range)
4-5 years 7 10 17 4,6 (4,4-5,1)
6-7 years 7 13 20 7,3 (7,1 - 7,9)
9-10 years 12 8 20 9,1 (8,9 - 9,4)
11-12 years 9 11 20 11,1 (10,11 -11,7)
As shown in Table 4.1, 77 children participated in study la. Children were recruited
from a state nursery and a state primary school of mid-range socio-economic status
through a process of written parental consent. Response rates were high as only a few
parents of the younger-aged children failed to return consent forms. According to
parental report, no child had an immediate family member (parent, sibling) with a
disability. Only the six to seven year-old age group had fortnightly contact with a child
with a physical impairment who was included in the classroom.
4.2.3 Materials
Disability Vignettes
Eight vignettes were written (see appendix II), each describing a character of
approximately eight years of age who exhibited one of the following disabilities:
physical disabilities: missing thumb (minor PD) and wheel-chair bound (major PD),
sensory disabilities: blindness and hearing loss, learning disabilities: non-specific
learning disabilities (NSLD) and Down syndrome (DS) and emotional/behavioural
difficulties: attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and lacking in social skills
(LSS). The design of the vignettes is similar to those used by Maas et al. (1978) in their
study of children's conceptions of disordered behaviour. Descriptions of each disability
were adapted from Bowley & Gardner (1980) and care was taken not to label the
character's impairment. For example:
Stephen has never been able to see very much and doesn't know what things
look like. So, Stephen has to feel things so he knows what shape they are and he
has to be careful he doesn't bump into things because he can't see very well.
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There were an equal number of male and female characters and all vignettes were
designed to be of the same length and difficulty. To maintain children's interest, they
were shown a coloured photograph depicting the character in each story (with
permission taken from Bryan, 1996; Bryant-Mole, 1994; Pettenuzzo, 1987,1988).
Competency Ratings
An adapted version of the Pictorial Scale of Perceived Competence and Social
Acceptance for Young Children (Harter & Pike, 1984) was employed and is shown in
Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 Adapted pictorial scale of perceived competence and social acceptance for young
children
4 Do you think X is good at puzzles or not very good at puzzles?
(cognitive competence)
5 Do you think X doesn't have many friends or does have a lot of friends?
(social competence)
6 Do you think X is good at running or not very good at running?
(physical competence)
7 Do you think X gets invited to parties or doesn't get invited to parties?
(social competence)
8 Do you think X is not very good at climbing or is good at climbing?
(physical competence)
9 Do you think X is good at reading or not very good at reading?
(cognitive competence)
10 Do you think X is good at jumping or not very good at jumping?
(physical competence)
11 Do you think X isn't very good at counting numbers or is good at counting
numbers?
(cognitive competence)
12 Do you think X gets invited to dinner at a friend's house or doesn't get invited to
dinner?
(social competence)
This measure required children to indicate how competent they believed someone else
was in three areas of ability; physical, cognitive and social, in contrast to four areas of
competence used by Diamond (1994). There were three items for each area of
competence and children were asked to indicate whether the child in the vignette was
'good' or 'not very good' at each item (e.g. Is this girl good at running or not very good
at running? Would this boy get invited to parties or not get invited to parties?). For
each item, two sets of line drawings of children participating in the particular task were
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pointed to and described (see Appendix III). One picture depicts a child with a high
level of competence or acceptance and the other picture depicts a child with a low level
of competence or acceptance. Children were instructed to pick the drawing which best
described the child in the vignette.
This format is similar to previously adapted versions of the scale used by Diamond
(1994) and Diamond & Hestenes (1996). However, to reduce task demands, the original
scale was modified following piloting and the standard four-point response format was
replaced with a two-point response format using phrases 'good' and 'not very good' for
each item. The child's judgement provides a score of 1 (the child is competent at the
task) and 2 (the child would have difficulty performing the task). During piloting it
was found that the four-point scale was too demanding and time consuming for the
youngest children.
4.2.4 Procedure
Primary aged children were interviewed individually in a small room separate from
their regular classroom. Pre-school children were interviewed separately within a quiet
area of the nursery classroom. Every child was read the vignettes outlined above in a
random order. Children were presented with each of the consequences and the
positive/negative response choices in a random order. Responses were video and tape-
recorded for subsequent analysis.
4.3 Results
Disabilities were analysed to see if they could be collapsed into sensory, physical,
learning and behavioural categories. However, the rank correlation coefficients within
disability categories were small, therefore each disability was analysed separately. The
reliability of the consequence scales was assessed using Cronbach's Alpha and internal
reliabilities were acceptably high: 0.79 for the physical domain, 0.79 for the cognitive
domain and 0.86 for the social domain. Consequently, judgements for each separate
item were summed within their competency areas. This provides ratings ranging from
3 (competent) to 6 (has difficulty) for cognitive, physical and social consequences, for
each disability.
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4.3.1 Disability Differences
A repeated measures two-way ANOVA was computed to test for differences in
consequence ratings across disabilities. Significant main effects were found for
consequence (F (2, 118) = 30.95; p < .001), disability (F (7, 413) = 23.40; p < .001) and
consequence by disability (F (14, 826) = 36.66; p < .001). As shown in Table 4.3, a one-
factor within subjects ANOVA for each disability separately showed an effect of
consequence type for every disability except hearing loss. Post-hoc analyses (see Table
4.3) revealed that for blindness, ratings were significantly more positive for social than
cognitive and physical consequences. Similar results were found in post hoc analyses
on the character with Down syndrome who received more positive social judgements
than cognitive and physical ratings. The opposite results were found for ADHD.
Children judged there to be more negative social consequences for the character with
ADHD than cognitive and physical consequences. The description of a character who
lacked social skills also received significantly poorer ratings for social consequences
than cognitive and physical consequences. Ratings for NSLD were more negative for
cognitive tasks than physical and social tasks. Major PD received significantly more
negative judgements on physical tasks than cognitive and social tasks. In contrast,
minor PD was judged more negatively on cognitive consequences than physical and
social consequences. Physical tasks were rated more negatively than social tasks.
4.3.2 Age Differences
The results from Table 4.4 show the mean competency ratings in each age group for
different disabilities. A two-way mixed measures ANOVA was completed for each
disability comparing consequence type (cognitive, physical and social) between ages (4-
5, 6-7, 9-10 and 11-12 years). The results in Table 4.4 show significant age effects for
hearing loss, minor PD, major PD, NSLD and LSS. A significant interaction effect of
age and consequence rating was also found for blindness, minor PD, major PD, NSLD
and ADHD. To examine the interactions in more depth, firstly a series of one-way
ANOVAs were conducted for each consequence type (physical, cognitive and social)
between ages (4-5 years, 6-7 years, 9-10 years and 10-11 years) as shown in Table 4.4.
Secondly, each consequence type was compared within age (see Table 4.5).
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Table4.3Meandiff rencencompetencyratingsfori ferentd sa ilitiacrosllg ConsequenceTypeOne-wayANOVA
Post-
■hoct-tests
Disability
Phy
Cog
Soc
F
df
V
PhyvsCog
PhyvsSoc
CogvsSoc
Blindness
5.01
5.05
3.67
73.99
150
0.001
n.s.
9.53***
10.65***
HearingLoss
3.40
3.57
3.55
n.s
-
-
-
MinorPD
4.03
4.32
3.39
38.80
148
0.001
2.46*
7.25***
8.52***
MajorPD
5.75
3.47
3.66
202.46
144
0.001
16.69***
16.93***
n.s.
NSLD
4.11
4.69
3.32
47.56
146
0.001
3.71***
n.s.
10.28***
DS
4.12
4.35
3.42
21.78
148
0.001
n.s.
5.28***
6.50***
ADHD
3.54
3.82
5.04
48.49
142
0.001
n.s.
8.97***
7.22***
LSS
3.60
3.51
4.03
9.86
150
0.001
n.s.
3.17**
3.74***
(Note:***p<.001;15)
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Table4.4Agdifferencesnmeancomp tencyratingsrdiff r tisabilities
AgeAnalyses
4-5
years
i
6-7years
1
9-10years
11-12years
MixedeasuresANOVA
Disability
Phy
Cog
Soc
Phy
Cog
Soc
Phy
Cog
Soc
Phy
Cog
Soc
Age
Conseq
AgexConseq
Blindness
4.41
4.71
4.29
5.40
5.15
3.25
5.16
5.37
10.4
5.00
4.95
3.65
F(3,70)=
.42
F(2,144)=87.75***
F(6,144)
=7.45***
HearingLoss
4.00
4.24
4.06
3.21
3.16
3.11
3.32
3.53
3.74
3.21
3.37
3.37
F(3,70)=
7.78***
F(2,140)=1.3
F(6,140)
= .84
MinorPD
4.35
5.29
4.18
3.80
4.15
3.15
4.06
4.28
3.28
3.95
3.70
3.26
F(3,71)=
10.48***
F(2,142)=41.85***
F(6,142)
=2.83**
MajorPD
5.06
4.47
4.35
5.84
3.10
3.10
6.00
3.33
3.56
6.00
3.12
3.68
F(3,69)=
4.10**
F(2,138)=341.78***
F(6,138)
=19.00***
NSLD
3.75
3.81
3.56
4.95
4.75
3.25
3.79
4.63
3.21
3.79
5.37
3.26
F(3,70)=
2.68*
F(2,140)=59.30***
F(6,140)
=9.42***
DS
3.69
3.94
3.63
4.00
4.40
3.25
4.32
4.26
3.32
3.63
4.70
3.45
F(3,71)=
1.27
F(2,142)=20.42***
F(6,142)
=1.41
ADHD
4.18
4.12
4.52
3.45
3.20
5.00
3.31
3.75
5.31
3.37
4.32
5.32
F(3,68)=
1.56
F{2,136)=54.76***
F(6,136)
=4.72***
LSS
4.18
4.18
4.12
3.20
3.10
3.90
3.70
3.40
4.20
3.42
3.47
3.95
F(3,72)=
3.22*
F(2,144)=9.19***
F(6,144)
=1.50
(Note:***p<.001;.0. 5)
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Table 4.5 Age differences in children's ratings of physical, cognitive and social consequences for
each disability
Consequence
Disability Physical Cognitive Social
Blindness F(3, 73) = 3.90** F(3, 73) = 2.15 F(3, 72) = 4.23**
Minor PD F(3, 73) = 1.68 F(3, 73) = 8.67*** F(3, 71) = 13.14***
Major PD F(3, 73) = 11.21*** F(3, 73) = 16.12*** F(3, 69) = 7.39***
NSLD F(3, 72) = 5.52** F(3, 71) = 6.69*** F(3, 72) = 1.47
ADHD F(3, 72) = 4.29*** F(3, 69) = 5.02** F(3, 73) = 1.63
(Note: ***p < .001; ** p < .0!)
Taking each type of analysis separately, significant age effects were found from tests on
the effect of consequence type between age. For blindness, significant age differences
were found for physical and social consequences. Post hoc analyses revealed pre¬
schoolers were more negative about the social consequences (p < .05) and six to seven
year-olds were more negative about physical outcomes (p < .05). An age difference was
found for major PD in relation to cognitive, physical and social tasks. The youngest age
group was more negative about the cognitive (p < .05) and social (p < .05) abilities of a
child with major PD but significantly more positive about physical consequences than
any other age group. Age differences were evident for minor PD for cognitive and
social tasks. The four to five year-olds ratings were significantly more negative on
cognitive and social functioning (p < .05) than all other age groups. Significant age
differences were found for ADHD in cognitive and physical functioning. Pre-schoolers
gave more negative ratings for physical tasks (p < .05) than all other age groups. Both
pre-schoolers and the oldest age group gave significantly more negative judgements on
cognitive tasks (p < .05) than six to seven or nine to ten year-olds. Age differences in
cognitive and physical functioning were also found for NSLD. The eleven to twelve
year-olds gave more negative ratings on cognitive tasks (p < .05) for NSLD than all
other age groups and the six to seven year-olds were more negative about physical
functioning (p < .05).
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Table4.6Differencesinchildr n'scompetencyatingforachdis bilit4-5,6 79-10d11-12year . 4-5years6-7years9 10years11-12years DisabilityCogCogPhyCogCogPhy
Cog
CogPhy
Cog
Phy
vs
VS
vs
VS
vs
vs
vs
vss
vs
vs s
ANOVA
Phy
Soc
Soc
ANOVA
Phy
Soc
Soc
ANOVA
Phy
Soc
ANOVA
Phy
Soc
Blindness
F(2,32)=
1.86
-
"
"
F(2,38)=54.25***
n.s
8.78***
10.99***
F(2,36)=43.67***
n.s
8.50***6.43 **
F(2,38)=17.64***
n.s
4.47***6.11*
MinorPD
F(2,3 )=
12.49***
3.77"
4.64***n.s
F(2,38)=11.49***
n.s
4.59***
3.90***
F(2,34)=10.50***
n.s
4.12***5.10
F(2,38)=17.51***
n.s
3.58**7 28*
MajorPD
F(2,32)=
3.93*
n.s.
n.s.
4.24***
F(2,36)=450.67***
22.36*** -
21.23***
F(2,34)=113.05***
15.90***
n.s14.71***
F(2,36)=168.77***42.14*3.011.40
NSLD
F(2,30)=
.71
-
-
-
F(2,38)=30.57***
n.s
6.10***
7.77***
F(2,36)=13.83***
2.49**
6.87***2.25
F(2,36)=46.34***
6.43***
10.48***2.24
ADHD
F(2,32)=
1.42
-
-
-
F(2,38)=21.27***
n.s
6.09***
3.94***
F(2,30)=18.98***
n.s
4.56***6.51
F(2,36)=24.36***
3.51"
3.08"8.73***
(Note:*"p<.001;* 1. 5)
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Significant differences were found in consequence ratings within each age group (see
Table 4.6). Only the pre-schoolers failed to give different competency ratings for each
of the impairments examined. Significant differences for pre-schoolers were only
found in their consequence ratings for minor PD and major PD. Post-hoc t-tests were
carried out within each age comparing each consequence type. Every age group except
pre-schoolers judged there to be physical and cognitive limitations to blindness but not
social outcomes. Compared to the older age groups, the four to five year-olds gave
more negative ratings for cognitive than physical tasks for minor PD. Whereas, the
older age groups acknowledged physical limitations for major PD compared to
cognitive and social consequences, pre-schoolers did not differentiate their physical and
cognitive competency ratings for these impairments. Both nine to ten and eleven to
twelve year-olds judged there to be cognitive and physical limitations to NSLD.
Additionally, each age group except pre-schoolers thought there to be significantly
more negative social outcomes for ADHD.
4.3.3 Summary of Key Findings
In summary, across all ages, children were able to differentiate their consequence
ratings appropriately for most disabilities. The emotional/behavioural difficulties
received less favourable social ratings in comparison to judgements about cognitive and
physical competence. The character with NSLD was judged to have more difficulty on
cognitive tasks than physical or social ones. Likewise, major PD received more
negative ratings on physical tasks. However, children did not differentiate
appropriately for minor PD.
Developmental changes in children's consequential understanding of disability are
discernible. Interestingly, in relation to major PD, the four to five year-olds perceived
there to be more negative social and cognitive consequences but they were more
positive about the physical consequences than any other age group. The youngest age
group was also more likely to generalise the limitation of minor PD. They assigned
more negative ratings for cognitive and social tasks than any other age group. They
also extended the difficulties of the character with ADHD to physical areas of
competence. For learning disabilities, both nine to ten year-olds and eleven to twelve
year-olds judged there to be cognitive and physical limitations to NSLD, although the
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oldest age group did give more negative ratings on cognitive tasks than any other age
group. There were no age differences in ratings for Down syndrome.
4.4 Discussion
The aim of this study was to examine in a more detailed fashion, children's concepts of
the consequences of disability. The findings suggest that, children of all ages, had a
positive perception of the capabilities of children with different types of disabilities.
Such findings are encouraging for issues surrounding educational and social inclusion.
Moreover, the findings extend the work of Diamond (1994, Diamond & Hestenes, 1996)
by revealing that even four year-old children can differentiate their competency
judgements for certain types of disabilities and that there is an increasing degree of
differentiation of consequences of disabilities with age.
4.4.1 Disability Differences in Consequence Understanding
Children in this study appeared sensitive to limitations associated with physical
disabilities suggesting that physical impairments are a relatively straightforward
concept for children to grasp. This is in accord with suggestions by Conant & Budoff
(1983) who found an early awareness of physical disabilities in young children.
Children in this study also understood the consequences of emotional/behavioural
impairments and the effect such difficulties may have on social functioning. This result
is similar to Milich, Landau, Kilby & Whitten (1982) who found that even pre-schoolers
had a negative social evaluation of a child with ADHD. Children across all ages
showed an understanding of the competencies of learning disabilities maintaining that
only cognitive functioning would be affected. This is an unexpected finding as
previous research has argued that disabilities with primarily psychological symptoms
are much more difficult for children to comprehend (Conant & Budoff, 1983; Lewis,
1995). However, Goodman (1989) found that eight to nine year-olds have an accurate
conceptualisation of learning disabilities, viewing such disabilities as traits that are
abstractly defined and irreversible. Additionally, children in this study did not expect
social functioning to be compromised by the presence of learning difficulties. This is an
interesting finding since earlier research suggests learning delayed children have
deficiencies in using peer-related social behaviours (Guralnick & Groom, 1985, 1987).
Despite having little or no prior experience of learning disabilities, children in this
78
study did not over generalise the effects of learning difficulties from one area of
consequence to another.
4.4.2 Age Differences in Consequence Understanding
Unlike previous research, this study investigated and found age differences in
children's understanding of the competencies of children with disabilities. Much of the
differences evident were between pre-school age and older age groups. Pre-schoolers
appeared to have a different conception of major PD than all other age groups. The
four to five year-olds were more optimistic about the physical competencies of a major
PD and more pessimistic about cognitive functioning. These findings are difficult to
interpret as the type of disabilities that have salient, physical cues are generally easier
for young children to understand (e.g., Conant & Budoff, 1983; Diamond, 1994). It
could be that, in contrast to work by Diamond (1994) and Diamond & Hestenes (1996),
pre-schoolers in this study had little experience of disabilities and thus exhibited a
general confusion about the effects of being in a wheelchair. It is worth noting that the
six to seven year-olds in this study were not confused about the consequences of a
physical disability. This could be due to the fortnightly contact this age group had with
a child who was wheelchair bound. These findings are consistent with Maras & Brown
(1992) who found that children with 'categorised' contact made accurate distinctions
between physically disabled and non-disabled children.
Plowever, the findings suggest that for several disabilities, pre-schoolers generalise the
limitations in one set of consequences to another consistent with previous findings on
older children (Maras & Brown, 1992). In this study, pre-schoolers perceived there to
be cognitive and physical limitations of children with emotional/behavioural
difficulties. They were also likely to extend the limitations of the child with blindness
to the social areas of competence, a finding also shown in other work (Diamond &
Hestenes, 1996). Interestingly, the implication of this finding is that young children do
not just generalise the limitations of disabilities, which are less easily understood or
have few visible cues. Moreover, the four to five year-olds were less likely than older
age groups to differentiate between the consequences of disabilities. Thus although
young children are aware of the competencies and limitations of children with
difficulties, they lack sufficient knowledge to make a differentiated judgement. In
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contrast to older children, pre-schoolers generalise the consequences of disabilities
across several areas of competence.
Surprisingly, older children's conceptualisation of learning disabilities was not
radically different from that of pre-schoolers. There were no age differences in
children's understanding of Down syndrome and only the eleven to twelve year-olds
made differentiated judgements on cognitive functioning for NSLD. This suggests that
children reveal fundamental difficulties in understanding learning disabilities which is
consistent with suggestions by Glasberg (2000). Future research should investigate
how we can improve understanding of learning difficulties through experience or
direct instruction.
4.5 Summary and Conclusions
In conclusion, although children were generally positive about the capabilities of
children with disabilities, several age and disability differences in children's
understanding were identified. Overall, children were aware of the specific
consequences of physical, sensory, learning and emotional/behavioural disabilities.
Young children however were more likely to generalise the limitations of a disability
from one consequence area to another and gave less differentiated judgements than
older children. This is a valuable contribution to the existing disability literature and in
relation to the core domains of knowledge research, suggests young children cannot
differentiate and co-ordinate their reasoning in an appropriate manner. Flowever, it
tells us less about the specific core knowledge domains that children use to reason
about disability, since the methodology of this study did not afford these kinds of
conceptual distinctions. That is, children's consequential understanding of disability
does not tell us a great deal about the larger conceptual framework in which disability
is placed. Consequently, Study lb reported in Chapter 5 will examine whether children
use their core knowledge domains to understand the causes, controllability and
chronicity of disability.
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CHAPTER 5
Study 1b: Children's Conceptions of the Causes, Controllability
and Chronicity of Disability
This chapter reports the second part of the exploratory investigation into children's
disability concepts. This study explores children's understanding of the causes,
controllability and chronicity of disability and seeks to demonstrate how children of
different ages use their core domains of knowledge to reason about disability. It also
considers whether children can draw on several domains of knowledge to reason about
disability and whether their disability concepts have a theoretical structure.
5.1 Children's Concepts of Disability and Domain-Specific Cognition
As reported in Chapter 2, a variety of research already supports the existence of three
causal explanatory reasoning systems (Wellman & Gelman, 1992; Wellman et al., 1997;
Hickling & Wellman, 2001). Prior to formal education, children readily develop causal
and ontological ideas about the physical, psychological and biological worlds.
However, rarely have studies investigated phenomena that could be conceptualised
across the three domains of thinking. If children evidence three core domains of
thought and if all could be used to reason about a single complex phenomena, then
children must learn to co-ordinate and differentiate them in appropriate ways.
Recently, research has begun to explore the co-ordination and flexibility of core
domains of thought (Wellman et al., 1997) which highlights the importance of studies
on children's multi-causal reasoning, for discussions surrounding domain-specificity.
However, to date, research on children's concepts of more complicated phenomena is
lacking, especially from a domain-specific perspective. As argued in Chapter 2,
disability as a research topic, is an especially promising candidate for such research.
Asking children about their concepts of disability has several important functions.
Firstly, asking children about their causal conceptions of disability will reveal the core
domains of thinking in which disability is conceptualised. As discussed in Chapter 2
(section 2.4), children could draw on their naive physical, psychological or biological
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knowledge to reason about disability and there may be important age differences in the
domains of knowledge that children find useful in their conceptualisation of
disabilities. Furthermore, children's ability to reason about the biological aspects of
disability will add to current debates about the status and onset of naive biological
thinking (see Chapter 2, section 2.1.3). Given the recent findings reported in Chapter 2
on the biological to social shift in children's concepts of race and gender, it is possible
that children's causal concepts of disability may also follow a similar developmental
path.
Secondly, asking children about their causal conceptions of disability may also reveal
the extent to which they can co-ordinate multiple causal frameworks. It is still unclear
whether children can utilise their different causal reasoning systems appropriately
when reasoning about complex phenomenon. Wellman et al. (1997) found that three
and four year-old children could utilise and co-ordinate their core domains of thinking
when explaining a variety of human acts. In explanations of inheritance, Korpan (1999)
and Morris (1998) both found that by age seven, children could draw on a variety of
different causal reasoning systems. It seems useful to ascertain whether children can
draw appropriately on several core domains of knowledge to reason about disability.
Indeed, this ability may depend on age given that in relation to consequences (Study
la), younger children had difficulty differentiating their knowledge to different
disability types.
Thirdly, taking a domain-specific approach to children's disability concepts may also
reveal the extent to which children's disability concepts are theoretical. Recall in
Chapters 1 and 2, that Gopnik & Meltzoff (1997), Carey (1995) and Wellman & Gelman
(1992) have argued that everyday domain-specific knowledge is theory-like and that
one hallmark of an intuitive theory is conceptual coherence. An example of conceptual
coherence reported in Chapter 3 is children's false beliefs concepts in the domain of
naive psychology. Children's understanding of beliefs is inextricably linked with other
mental state concepts (Slaughter & Gopnik, 1996). In relation to disability concepts,
conceptual coherence may be found in children's ability to link their knowledge
concerning causes, to their judgements about the controllability and chronicity of
disability. In addition, the theory-like status of children's disability concepts may be
influenced by age and disability type. All of these issues will be addressed in Study lb.
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5.1.1 Study 1b
Study lb examines children's disability concepts using a core domains framework,
which will highlight not only the conceptual underpinnings children use to reason
about disability but will provide insight into children's disability concepts more
generally. This study included the same participants and vignettes as Study la and
using a semi-structured interview schedule, children were asked about the causes,
controllability and chronicity of disability. The specific aims of this study were to
examine which core knowledge domains children use to reason about disability,
whether their framework understanding of disability changes with age and whether
children's disability concepts are fragmented in structure or theory-like.
5.2 Method
5.2.1 Participants
Participant information can be found in Chapter 4, section 4.2.2.
5.2.2 Materials
Disability Vignettes
The vignettes included in the present study were as described in Chapter 4, section
4.2.3. After hearing each vignette, the participant was initially asked about the causes of
the disability ("What do you think could have made X like that?"). If the child failed to
respond, a cause prompt question followed - was he or she "born that way" or did
"something happen which made him or her like that?". The order of alternatives was
randomised for the prompt question. Children were then asked a controllability
question (Judgement: "Could X (e.g., see) if he/she wanted to?" and Explanation:
"How could X (e.g., see/not see) if he/she wanted to?") and a chronicity question
(Judgement: "When X grows up to be an adult will he/she be able to (e.g., see)?" and
Explanation: "How could X (e.g., see/not see) when he is an adult?").
5.2.3 Procedure
As in Study la, primary aged children were interviewed individually in a small room
separate from their regular classroom. The four to five year-old children were
interviewed separately within a quiet area of the nursery classroom. Participants were
first told they were going to hear some stories about children who have certain
difficulties and would be asked questions about those difficulties. Every child was read
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the vignettes one at a time in a random order. Each story ended with questions
concerning the cause, controllability and chronicity of the disability presented in a fixed
sequence. Responses were video and tape-recorded and transcribed for later analysis.
5.2.4 Coding
Two separate coding schemes were employed to categorise responses about firstly,
children's causal explanations of disability and secondly, children's judgements and
explanations about the controllability and chronicity of disability.
Causal Explanations
The causal explanation coding scheme was generated by two independent coders using
content analysis (see Weber, 1985; Krippendorff, 1980). Table 5.1 shows the causal
explanations identified in children's initial spontaneous responses. Two types of
categories were initially created to indicate children's failure to give a causal
explanation. The Uncodeable category was used if no response was offered to the causal
explanation question or if the child indicated they did not know. External descriptions
were those responses that indicated superficial external features of disability (e.g.,
referring to adaptive equipment), without reference to a cause. Causal explanations
were categorised according to 'explanation modes' corresponding to core domains of
knowledge described in cognitive development research (Wellman & Gelman, 1992;
Hickling & Wellman, 2001; Bloch, Solomon & Carey, 2001). Psychological responses
explained disabilities in terms of mental states or processes, such as the character's
beliefs, intentions or desires. Social/Environmental explanations described disabilities in
terms of social behaviour or social situations, for example growing up in an
impoverished home environment or bullying at school. In contrast, responses
appealing to accidental or physical contact events were coded as Physical. Explanations
were coded as Biological if they referred to physiological systems or processes relevant
to biological kinds, for example references to birth, illness and inheritance (see Table
5.1). The inter-rater reliability coefficient of 0.87 showed an acceptable degree of
similarity between codings.
In view of the ongoing debate regarding onset of an autonomous biology, distinct from
other domains of thinking (Siegal & Peterson, 1999; Medin & Atran, 1999; Au & Romo,
1999), a conservative coding criteria was applied in classifying biological responses.
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Responses were classified as biological only if the explanations were generated without
the use of the prompt question. However, it is possible that children who heard the
'born that way' prompt on some of the previous trials incorporated this idea into
subsequent spontaneous explanations. A prompt was required on at least one trial in
36% of cases for four to five year-olds, 46% of cases for six to seven year-olds, 44% of
cases for nine to ten year-olds and 11% of the eleven to twelve year-olds.
Table 5.1 Categories and examples ofchildren's causal explanations
Category Examples
Uncodeable
External Descriptions
Physical Accident
Psychological
Social /Environmental
Biological
"don't know"
"because..."
<no response>
"he needs glasses"
"his eyes are different"
"he can't walk very well"
"she might've got it chopped off"
"he maybe fell and broke his leg"
"he could've been in a car crash"
"it's in his mind"
"because she doesn't want to play with people"
"maybe his mum and dad could've been like that
and he just copies them"
"he doesn't come from a good home"
"she could've got bullied"
"he might've been born that way"
"hemight have had an ear infection"
"she wasn't developed when she was born"
"it got passed on....her mum was like that"
In the initial analyses, no multiple causal explanations were included. Only the
'highest' level response was taken for each child which credits children with the most
sophisticated causal understanding they expressed. Therefore only one cause was
recorded from each child for each type of disability. A separate analysis was conducted
onmultiple causal explanations offered by children.
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Controllability and Chronicitv of Disability
Children's responses to the controllability and chronicity questions were coded
separately for judgements and explanations. Children's judgements about the
controllability and chronicity of the disability were coded as 'yes', 'no', 'maybe' or
'don't know' and were given numerical codes (yes=l, no=2, maybe=3, 4= don't know).
The disability literature provided a useful scoring scheme for capturing children's
explanations about the controllability and chronicity of disability, particularly the
extent to which children think disabilities are internal and irreversible. The system was
adapted from Goodman (1989) and includes the following categories shown in Table
5.2. In addition to these categories, two more categories were used to capture responses
that did not fall into any of the above: (1) Uncodeable and (2) Superficial External
Descriptions. The interrater reliability coefficient was 0.81.
Table 5.2 Categories and examples ofchildren's controllability and chronicity explanations
Internal External
Controllable Personal effort (e.g., intention, Effort of others (e.g., medical
practice, paying attention) intervention, special class)
Uncontrollable Constitutionally fated (e.g., being External fate (e.g., physical
born that way) accident)
5.3 Results
5.3.1 Causal Explanations of Disability
Preliminary investigation of the data showed that there were too few purely
psychological causal explanations to justify separate analysis. Since this category was
similar in level of sophistication to social/environmental and both categories are often
treated as related (see Carey, 1985), social/environmental and psychological
explanations were collapsed into social/psychological causal explanations.
Additionally, the 'uncodeable' and 'external descriptions' categories were combined
into 'non-causal descriptions' since both responses failed to indicate a cause. Responses
were categorised and ranked according to increasing levels of sophistication from 'non-
causal descriptions' to 'biological' causal explanations. This is similar in format to
86
studies on illness understanding (Williams & Birtnie, 2002) and knowledge of
inheritance mechanisms (Bloch et al., 2001; Solomon et alv 1996). Although biological
causal explanations may not be the most sophisticated response for all disabilities, such
as ADHD (see Anastopoulos & Shelton, 2001), knowledge of biological causal
principles is considered to be a later developmental achievement (Inagaki & Hatano,
1997; Wellman & Gelman, 1992; Au & Romo, 1999; Carey, 1995). As the data are
inherently ranked and only reflect approximate levels of sophistication, they are
analysed using non-parametric methods (Seigel & Castellan, 1988).
Figure 5.1 Percentage of causal explanations across all disability types
■ Non-causal □ Physical □ Soc/Psych □ Biological
The results presented in Figure 5.1 shows there are several age-related changes in
children's causal explanations across the different types of disability. A significant age
difference, across disability types, was found in the use of non-causal descriptions to
explain disabilities (H = 34.24, df= 3, p < .001). Post hoc comparisons revealed that four
to five year-olds were more likely than any other age group to give non-causal
descriptions when explaining the cause of disabilities (4-5 year-olds versus 6-7 years: U
= 64.5, p < .001; 4-5 year-olds versus 9-10 years: U = 83.0, p < .01; 4-5 year-olds versus
11-12 years: U = 11.5, p < .001). Children's use of biological causal explanations also
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varied significantly with age (H = 24.74, df - 3, p < .001). The four to five year-olds were
less likely than any other age group to explain disabilities in biological terms (4-5 year-
olds versus 6-7 years: U = 65.5, p < .001; 4-5 year-olds versus 9-10 years: U = 55.5, p <
.001; 4-5 year-olds versus 11-12 years: U = 22.0 p < .001). Age differences were also
evident in the use of social-psychological causal explanations (H = 11.18, df= 3, p < .01).
The oldest age group was significantly more likely than the younger age groups to give
such explanations (4-5 year-olds versus 11-12 years: U - 75.0, p < .001; 6-7 years versus
11-12 years: U = 107.0, p < .01; 9-10 years versus 11-12 years: U = 103.0, p < .01). There
was no significant age difference in the use of physical causal explanations.
5.3.2 Causal Explanations and Disability Type as a Function of Age
Disabilities were analysed to see if they could be collapsed into sensory, physical,
learning and behavioural categories. However, the rank correlation coefficients within
disability categories were low, therefore each disability was examined separately.
Table 5.3 shows that across all ages, children's causal explanations varied significantly
as a function of disability type. Taking each age group separately, pre-schoolers
seemed unable to differentiate their causal explanations to different types of
impairment (Friedman ANOVA = 10.16, df =7, p < .18). There remained no significant
differences in the causal explanations offered among the six to seven and nine to ten
year-olds for each disability (6-7 years: Friedman ANOVA = 6.28, df = 7, p < .51; 9-10
years: Friedman ANOVA = 5.98, df=7,p< .54).
However, the emergence of a more distinct pattern of responding can be observed
among the six to seven and nine to ten year-olds (see Table 5.3). At these ages, the
number of biological causes increased but were applied indiscriminately. It is not until
twelve years, that children begin to tailor their causal explanations significantly to
particular disabilities. Biological explanations are preferred for sensory and learning
disabilities whilst social-psychological explanations are only given for behavioural
disabilities.
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Table5.3Number(percentages)ofausalexplanationsfunc iodisabilityty chgdovera l
Age
4-5years6 7r9-10years11-12r**Overall***
DisabilityN/CPhysS PBio/ihysN/CPS PBio Blindness1240820839 (70.6)23 50.05 94 01( .. )(10.0936 43 )(5 .6 HearingLoss950383 9250176034 (52.9)29 40.0)17 640 05.( .0(4 . )126 035 10 8( 4.2) PhysicalMinor690271032485 (35.3)52 90.011 800( .3 ).(15.061 2)49 4( .5 PhysicalMajor1240820659719 (70.6)23 50.05 94 01( .3 )5.( 04 0)3 .127 37 Learning Disability(NS)122690154383 (70.6)5.911 8(6 03 .45 )0( .2 0)570.(49 43 92 9) Learning Disability(DS)16009274523 (94.1)0.05 90 0(45.6 .3 .0)20(754.561 3( 1 6) ADHD15005486238241 (88.2)0.0)5 90 025(4 ..3 ).06 01 )( 9 4331 28. Lackingin Socialsk lls150224603641 (88.2)0.05 960 0(1 . )2 .(3 .5 0)(59.7918 2
Note:(**FriedmanAnova=22.31,df7,p<.01:***ri d n4.44f .001)
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5.3.3 Individual Response Patterns For Causal Explanations
To supplement the above findings, children were classified on the basis of their
individual response patterns, (see, Solomon et al., 1996; Solomon & Cassimatis, 1999,
Solomon & Johnson, 2000) to explore the extent to which they rely on one particular
causal reasoning system across disabilities.
Children were categorised into four groups. The Differentiated pattern group included
all those children who differentiated between disabilities in explanation type. Children
were considered to have shown a Differentiated pattern if they explained at least 5 of the
8 disabilities causes appropriately (physical causal explanations for physical
disabilities, biological explanations for sensory and learning disabilities and
social/psychological explanations for behavioural disabilities). The '5 out of 8' criterion
for the Differentiated pattern of responding adopted in this study is not as conservative
as previous research on children's inheritance explanations (see Solomon et al, 1996).
However, given the number of legitimate causal explanations that could be offered for
the same disability, it was thought that a less strict criterion was still representative of
differentiated causal knowledge. Three other categories were included to capture
response patterns of those who were not classified as Differentiated. A number of
children showed a bias towards biological causal explanations regardless of disability
type. Subjects were considered to have shown a Biological bias if they judged at least 5
out of 8 disabilities to be biologically caused. Conversely, subjects were considered to
have shown a Non-causal bias if they failed to indicate a cause for at least 5 out of 8
disabilities. Finally, any pattern not falling into the other categories was considered to
be a Mixed pattern.
Table 5.4 shows between the ages of four and twelve, an increasing number of children
exhibited the Differentiated pattern which shows an appreciation that different types of
impairment require particular causal explanations (^ = 24.98, df = 3, p < .001). An
application of the binomial theorem, based on a 0.25 probability that a subject would
show a Differentiated pattern by chance, indicates that 12 eleven to twelve year-olds (p <
.01) who showed this pattern is significantly more higher than would be expected by
chance out of a group of twenty. There was no significant overall association between
age and the Biological bias pattern or the Mixed pattern. However, there was a
significant association between age and a Non-causal bias (jf = 16.04, df - 3, p < .001),
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with 12 four to five year-olds exhibiting this response pattern. Only two eleven to
twelve year-olds exhibited this pattern which is significantly less than would be
expected by chance (p < .01).
Table 5.4 Number (percentages) of children showing different response patterns by age
Age
Pattern 11-12 vears 9-10 vears 6-7 vears 4-5 vears
Differentiated 12 (60.0) 4 (20.0) 1 (5.0) 0 (0.0)
Biological Bias 2 (10.0) 2 (10.0) 5 (25.0) 1 (5.9)
Non-Causal Bias 2 (10.0) 8 (40.0) 5 (25.0) 12 (70.6)
Mixed 4 (20.0) 6 (30.0) 9 (45.0) 4 (23.5)
5.3.4 Multiple Causal Explanations
Table 5.5 shows the number of individual children who offered more than one causal
explanation for particular disabilities. The results reveal that with increasing age,
children are more likely to offer multiple causes for disabilities. Most nine to ten year-
olds and eleven to twelve year-olds gave multiple causal explanations that pertained to
the biological and physical domains. However, as can be seen in Table 5.5, one nine to
ten year-old did offer two biological type explanations. The oldest age group also
tended to combine physical and biological explanations and gave a wider range of
biological causes, including references to biological infection and inheritance. No
multiple response at any age included a social/psychological causal explanation.
Furthermore, the oldest age group gave multiple causal explanations on more occasions
than the nine to ten year-olds. Most nine to ten year-olds gave multiple causal
explanations for only one impairment, whilst half of the oldest age group gave multiple
causes for more than one disability. Thus, there was an age trend in the use of multiple
causal explanations of disability.
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5.3.5 Perceived Controllability and Chronicity ofDisability
Table 5.6 shows a significant age difference in children who judge disabilities to be
controllable (H = 10.30, df = 3, p < .02). Post-hoc analyses revealed that six to seven
year-olds were much more likely to state a character could not change his disability
compared with the four to five year-olds (U = 82.0, p < .007) and eleven to twelve year-
olds (If = 95.5, p < .004). Moreover, there was a significant age difference in
probabilistic judgements (H = 21.19, df = 3, p <. 001). The oldest children were
significantly more likely to say the character might change his condition (4-5 year-olds
versus 11-12 years: U = 93.5, p < .002; 6-7 years versus 11-12 years: U = 118.5, p < .004; 9-
10 years versus 11-12 years: II = 118.5, p < .004).
Table 5.6 Percentage of uncontrollability and chronicity judgements
Uncontrollability Chronicity
4-5 years 43.4 76.5
6-7 years 66.2 50.6
9-10 years 56.2 38.8
11-12 years 56.9 40.6
Kruskal-Wallis Anova 10.30, df- 3* 23.26, df = 3***
(Note: *p < .02; ***p < .001)
Table 5.6 also shows significant age differences in children who judge the disability to
be no longer present in adulthood. Post-hoc comparisons showed that four to five year-
olds are significantly more likely than any other age group to judge disabilities as
transient states (4-5 year-olds versus 6-7 years: If = 65.5, p < .001; 4-5 year-olds versus 9-
10 years: If = 41.5, p < .001; 4-5 year-olds versus 11-12 years: If = 45.0, p < .001).
Children's explanations regarding controllability and chronicity were coded and
analysed for age trends. Few significant trends emerged from the data. By seven years
of age, children are significantly more likely than pre-schoolers to say the character
could not change his disability because of internal uncontrollable reasons such as 'being
born that way' (U - 63.5, p < .003). Although most eleven to twelve year-olds think the
character will be unable to change, a significant association was found between the
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oldest age group and external controllable explanations [jf - 32.41, df - 6, p < .001).
Older children seem to appreciate that although impairment is chronic, there is
possibility of change through seeking external intervention (e.g., medical help). No
significant age difference was found in the use of internal controllable reasons.
Children of different ages also varied in the types of explanations they gave for why a
character would no longer have his/her disability when an adult. The youngest age
group were unable to give an explanation compared to the nine to ten year-olds (ii =
53.0, p < .001) and eleven to twelve year-olds (U - 36.0, p < .001). Age differences in
children's use of internal uncontrollable explanations fell just short of significance but
six to seven year-olds had the highest mean rank than any other age group (48.88;
compared to 33.56 pre-schoolers; 35.83 9-10 years; 36.92 11-12 years). A significant age
difference was found in the use of external controllable explanations (H = 12.82, df= 3, p
< .005). The oldest age group are more likely than pre-schoolers (U - 74.0, p < .001) and
six to seven year-olds (U = 120.5, p < .02) to say outside help (e.g., doctors, special
teachers) could alleviate a disability.
5.3.6 Disability Differences in Judgements of Controllability and Chronicity
Table 5.7 shows that children judged some disabilities to be significantly more
controllable than others (Friedman ANOVA = 85.53, df =7,p < .001). ADHD and lack of
social skills were perceived as being the most controllable impairments (79.2% and
83.1% respectively). Major physical disabilities (15.6%) and sensory disabilities (19.5%
for blindness; 20.8% for hearing loss) are perceived as the least controllable whilst
minor physical impairments (44.2%) and learning difficulties (45.5% for DS; 44.2% for
NSLD) are perceived as moderately controllable.
Analysis of explanations showed that children prefer to explain ADHD in terms of
intentional controllable means (j2 = 41.75, df = 3, p < .001). Indeed, over half of the
children said the character with ADHD could change through personal effort. Internal
controllable explanations were also the most popular for the character who lacked
social skills 51.78, df = 4, p < .001). Over half of the children thought they could
change through personal effort alone. Most children also cited internal controllable
reasons for non-specific learning disability and Down syndrome. The pattern of
disability type and controllability is maintained across all age groups.
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Table 5.7 Number (percentages) ofchildren who think the character can change his/her disability
Age
Disability 4-5 years 6-7 years 9-10 years 11-12 years Total
Blindness 7 (41.2) 3 (15.0) 5 (25.0) 0 (0.0) 15 (19.5)
Hearing Loss 8 (47.1) 2 (10.0) 3 (15.0) 3 (15.0) 16 (20.8)
Physical Major 3 (17.6) 1 (5.0) 5 (25.0) 3 (15.0) 12 (15.6)
Physical Minor 11 (64.7) 2 (10.0) 7 (35.0) 14 (70.0) 34 (44.2)
DS 10 (58.8) 7 (35.0) 11 (55.0) 7 (35.0) 35 (45.5)
NSLD 9 (52.9) 7 (35.0) 10 (50.0) 8 (40.0) 34 (44.2)
ADHD 15 (88.2) 15 (75.0) 14 (70.0) 17 (85.0) 61 (79.2)
LSS 14 (82.4) 17 (85.0) 15 (75.0) 18 (90.0) 64 (83.1)
Table 5.8 Number (percentages) of children who stated the character zvould not have his/her
disability when an adult
Age
Disability 4-5 years 6-7 years 9-10 years 11-12 years Total
Blindness 14 (82.3) 4 (20.0) 2 (10.0) 4 (20.0) 24 (31.2)
Hearing Loss 12 (70.6) 4 (20.0) 4 (20.0) 5 (25.0) 25 (32.5)
Physical Major 13 (76.4) 5 (25.0) 1 (5.0) 4 (20.0) 23 (29.9)
Physical Minor 12 (70.6) 3 (15.0) 3 (15.0) 8 (40.0) 26 (33.8)
DS 15 (88.2) 14 (70.0) 11 (55.0) 7 (35.0) 47 (61.0)
NSLD 15 (88.2) 17 (85.0) 14 (70.0) 8 (40.0) 54 (70.1)
ADHD 14 (82.4) 16 (80.0) 12 (60.0) 13 (65.0) 55 (71.4)
LSS 9 (52.9) 18 (90.0) 15 (75.0) 16 (80.0) 58 (75.3)
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Table 5.8 also shows significant differences in children's understanding of chronicity as
a function of disability type (Friedman ANOVA = 45.86, df=7,p< .001). Children judged
lacking in social skills and non-specific learning disabilities as more transient than
sensory disabilities (LSS versus blindness: T = -2.79, p < .01; LSS versus hearing loss: T =
-2.59, p < .01; NSLD versus blindness: T = -3.90, p < .001; NSLD versus hearing loss: T =
-3.30, p < .001) and physical disabilities (LSS versus physical minor: T = -2.67, p < .01;
LSS versus physical major: T = -3.30, p < .001; NSLD versus physical minor: T= -3.31, p
< .001; NSLD versus physical major: T = -3.62, p < .001).
Furthermore, across all ages children favour particular types of explanations when
reasoning why learning disability (%? = 11.74, df = 4, p < .02) and lacking in social skills
(jf = 13.43, df = 4, p < .01) are not chronic. The majority of explanations in each case
were internal controllable. Children also seem to favour internal uncontrollable
explanations when explaining why hearing loss - 60.38, df = 5, p < .001) and
blindness {yf = 58.39, df = 4, p < .001) are chronic.
5.3.7 Conceptual Coherence in Children's Disability Concepts
In order to examine the coherence of children's disability concepts, participants were
individually classified on the basis of their responses to the cause, controllability and
chronicity questions. This coding scheme has been previously used to assess the
theoretical status of children's inheritance concepts (Springer, 1995). Children received
2 points when their responses to the vignette were completely coherent (i.e. when
children's causal explanation cross-referenced with their controllability and chronicity
judgement). For example, to reflect a coherent response, the participant would need to
state that the character who was born with a disability did not have intentional control
over that disability and that the disability itself is chronic. Alternatively, if the character
was judged as wanting to have the disability (social/psychological cause), the disability
would need to be perceived as controllable and not chronic, for a coherent response to
be granted. Children received 1 point when their responses were mixed (i.e. when their
causal explanation cross-referenced with either the controllability or chronicity
question) and received 0 points for incoherent responses (i.e. when their cause did not
cross-reference with either their controllability and chronicity question or when a child
failed to indicate a cause). An overall coherent score was produced for each child by
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summing each child's points across the disabilities. Overall scores thus ranged from 0
to a maximum of 16 points.
Table 5.9 Number of coherent scores for each disability and age group
Age Group
4-5 years 6-7 years 9-10 years 11-12 years Overall
Coherent Scores 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0 2 1 0
Disability
Blindness 1 2 14 10 1 9 10 1 9 10 9 1 31 14 32
Physical Minor 3 5 9 8 4 8 10 0 10 17 2 1 37 11 29
NSLD 1 1 15 1 3 16 2 5 13 8 111 12 10 55
ADHD 2 0 15 7 0 13 7 3 10 11 2 7 27 5 45
Hearing Loss 3 4 10 10 2 8 7 3 10 11 8 1 31 17 29
Physical Major 0 4 13 8 4 8 10 3 7 13 3 4 31 14 32
DS 0 0 17 2 7 11 1 14 5 4 3 13 7 14 56
LSS 2 0 15 3 2 15 2 1 17 12 1 7 19 4 54
Overall Mean 0-16 0-16 0-16 0-16
Coherent Score 2.35 6.10 5.80 10.10
The results from Table 5.9 show age differences in the frequency of coherent responses,
overall and by disability. In line with Springer (1995), a parametric test of significance
was used to assess the effects of age and disability on overall coherence scores. A two-
way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of age, (F (3, 76) = 16.26, p < .001). Post-
hoc scheffe tests showed that four to five year-olds gave significantly more incoherent
responses than any other age group (p < .05). The oldest age group were more likely to
give cohesive responses than any other age group (p < .05). An analysis was also
conducted on differences in coherence scores as a function of disability type. The
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of disability (F (7, 511) = 12.27, p < .001).
Significant disability differences were found in children's coherent responses (F (7, 399)
= 11.93, p < .001). A series of post-hoc t-tests found that children gave the least cohesive
responses for Down syndrome (blindness: t (57) = -6.13, p < .001; physical minor: t (57)
= -6.84, p < .001; hearing loss: t (57) = -6.63, p < .001; physical major: t (57) = -6.30, p <
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.001; LSS: t (57) = -2.18, p < .05; ADHD: t (57) = 4.21, p < .001). The most coherent
responses were found physical and sensory disabilities. No age x disability interaction
effect was found.
5.4 Discussion
The aim of Study lb was to investigate whether children utilise and co-ordinate their
core knowledge domains when reasoning about the causes, controllability and
chronicity of disability. This was examined using an open-ended interview structure
and has yielded many interesting findings regarding the different aspects of children's
disability concepts. The remainder of this chapter will firstly discuss the findings on
children's causal explanations of disability and will consider how this relates to their
core knowledge domains. Children's understanding of the controllability and
chronicity of disability will then be examined and the theoretical status of children's
disability concepts will be discussed. Finally, potential strengths and limitations of the
open-ended verbal methodologies will be considered.
5.4.1 Causal Explanations
These preliminary findings show that children can offer causal explanations of
disability that correspond to their core knowledge domains. Physical and biological
causes feature in children's explanations of disability whereas social/psychological
causes occur far less frequently. Overall, children do not seem to find the psychological
domain a useful framework for understanding the causes of disability.
In addition, there are several age-related changes in children's causal understanding of
disability. Specifically, by age seven, children are far more likely to offer biological
causes of impairments than younger children. However, it should be noted that
children's biological causal explanations of disability and in particular, reference to
'birth' as a mechanism, could have been influenced by the prompt question on previous
trials. Consequently, it is unclear the extent to which children understand the
biological mechanism of 'being born' with a disability. Yet, their biological
explanations do not seem embedded within a psychological framework. Although it
was not the aim of this thesis to determine when a core domain of biology develops, the
results do suggest a pre-occupation with biological causes of disability in middle
childhood. If viewed with caution, these results are consistent with Carey's (1995)
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suggestion that by middle childhood, children increasingly engage in biological
reasoning.
The findings also show that children's initial conceptions of disability are not social or
psychologically driven. In fact, contrary to Carey (1985) social/psychological causal
explanations were more prevalent in late childhood and were limited to
emotional/behavioural difficulties. This is in accord with more recent research
reported in Chapter 2, on children's concepts of gender (Taylor, 1996) race (Hirschfeld,
1995) and disordered behaviour (Maas et al., 1978), reported in Chapter 3. In each of
these instances, children's initial conceptions are biologically grounded and only later
do they appreciate the causal role of the environment. In addition, in the present study,
children of all ages were able to offer physical causal explanations of disability. Indeed,
four to five year-olds provided more physical causes for disability than biological ones.
This is in accord with previous studies on children's disability concepts (Diamond,
1993; Sigelman & Begley, 1987) and suggests that conspicuous and concrete causes offer
enticing explanations of disability for young children.
Only older children are able to exploit several causal-explanatory systems when
reasoning about disability. This is consistent with previous studies that showed
flexibility in children's causal reasoning systems when explaining various phenomena
(Wellman et al., 1997; Korpan, 1999; Morris, 1998). By age eleven, more children can
spontaneously produce multiple explanations for different disabilities, including
biological and physical causes. Interestingly, social/psychological causal explanations
of disability were never offered as 'one cause among many'. This is in contrast to a
recent study by Inagaki & Hatano (1999) who found that (Japanese) college students
believed that both psychological (e.g. depression) as well as biological/physical factors
(e.g. imbalanced diet) would make some contribution to diseases. Social/psychological
causes were only offered for particular disabilities indicating that older children have
the ability to differentiate simultaneously between appropriate and inappropriate
causes of disability.
In contrast to previous research (Wellman et al., 1997; Hickling & Wellman, 2001),
younger children were unable to produce multiple causal explanations. Although
young children can reason about particular causes for different disabilities, it seems
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they are unable to think about more than one type of cause for the same disability. As
suggested in Chapter 2, the ability to reason multi-causally about a particular disability
seems to develop at a later age than the ability to engage in just one form of causal
reasoning. This does not seem to be purely attributable to verbal ability. Even the six
to seven year-olds and nine to ten year-olds, who gave fewer 'non-causal' responses
compared to the youngest age group, rarely gave multiple causes for the same
disability. This finding has implications for how children would conceptualise other
complex phenomenon besides disability, which are not easily categorised into specific
domains of reasoning. One issue for future research is to determine the mechanism by
which older children can draw spontaneously upon different core reasoning systems in
order to explain disability.
5.4.2 Controllability and Chronicity
The present study found that yoimg children perceive disability to be more controllable
and less chronic than older children. This is in accord with several studies which show
young children's tendency to overestimate human competence in a variety of domains
such as memory (Flavell, Miller & Miller, 1993; Flavell & Green, 1999) and
interpretation (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). However, it should be highlighted that
that four to five year-olds were not more inclined than older children to give internal
controllable reasons. Although younger children may over-estimate the ability to
control a disability they do not necessarily believe this is achieved through personal
effort.
By seven years, children are aware disabilities are not controllable through intentional
means and often said the characters described in the vignettes could not change
because they were 'born that way'. This is perhaps more evidence, that in middle
childhood, children reason about disabilities in increasingly biological ways. However,
it is not until late childhood that children become probabilistic in their judgements
about the controllability and chronicity of disability. As mentioned in the previous
section, this could be due to a greater awareness of the role of the environment in the
causation and alleviation of disabilities. In the present study, older children were more
likely to suggest external help as a means of change. Indeed, Kalish (1998) has argued
probabilistic judgements become more prevalent with age in understanding illness and
the present findings suggest this may generalize to disability.
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The type of disability also has an effect on children's perceived controllability and
chronicity. The emotional/behavioural disabilities are seen as most controllable. It is
suggested that these disabilities have behavioural indicators that are salient to children
and as such the origins and outcomes are considered to be controllable through
behaviour alone. This is consistent with previous findings from Maas et al. (1978), in
which younger children judged disordered behaviour to be controllable through
personal effort.
Surprisingly, many children misunderstood the chronicity of learning disability stating
it was a temporary condition that would disappear with transition into adulthood.
Indeed, Conant & Budoff (1983) argued that children are less aware of disabilities that
are psychological in origin. Intuitions about the controllability-uncontrollability of
mental states seems to undergo a period of rapid development after the pre-school
years (Flavell et al., 1993). As discussed in Chapter 3, previous research suggests that
understanding the permanency and irrevocability of disability is not thought to
develop until seven or eight years of age (Lewis, 1993; 1995). The fact that many
children have misconceptions surrounding learning and behavioural disabilities is a
concern considering many children with these disabilities are integrated into
mainstream schools. An interesting question for further study is how direct experiences
of disability interact with children's developing conceptions of disability? This issue
will be explored directly in Study 2 and is reported in Chapter 6.
5.4.3 Theory-like Understanding ofDisability
In order to develop a systematic and principled concept of disability, children must
learn to co-ordinate their causal explanations of disability with their knowledge about
the stability of the condition. In the present investigation, the four to five year-olds
gave the least coherent responses in their understanding of disability. This could be
due to methodological reasons. Perhaps young children did not deem it important to
keep their answers consistent during the interview. This is in line with Sigelman &
Begley's (1987) findings that providing young children with causal information about
disabilities had no effect on judgements of controllability (see Chapter 3 section 3.2.2).
However, it also raises the possibility that young children do not have a coherent and
theoretical understanding of disability.
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The oldest children displayed a much more coherent understanding of disability,
suggesting that the ability to reason in a theory-like way about disability develops with
age. Naive theories allow children to explain phenomena in a coherent and principled
way and the present findings may indicate that children do not develop a naive theory
of disability until eleven years of age. Indeed, this suggestion is further supported by
the individual patterns of children's causal explanations. No pre-school child showed a
Differentiated judgement pattern in their causal explanations. Most four to five year-
olds showed a Non-Causal bias in their causal explanatory patterns and many children
displayed a Mixed pattern of responding. This could reflect a general confusion about
causal mechanisms of disability. It is suggested that although young children may
have psychological and biological knowledge at their disposal, they do not use these in
a principled and theory-like fashion when reasoning about disability. In contrast, older
children are beginning to differentiate in their understanding of the causes of disability.
They seem to be much more flexible in their reasoning than younger children who
tended to over apply one particular cause to all disabilities. These findings are
consistent with those of Study la which showed that younger children, although aware
of the consequences of disability, lacked sufficient knowledge to make a differentiated
judgement. The combination of results from both Studies la and lb indicates that the
ability to think flexibly and coherently about various aspects of disability appears in
later childhood.
Interestingly, in addition to age, the type of disability also seemed to affect the
coherence of children's disability concepts. Children's perceptions of the controllability
of learning disability were inconsistent with their types of causal explanations for this
disability. For example, a large number of explanations given by children referred to
biological causes as the reason for learning difficulties. Yet, despite this, many children
thought a learning disability was controllable through personal effort. As discussed
earlier, children appear to have fundamental difficulties in their understanding of
learning disabilities, which in this instance, is reflected in their fragmented pieces of
knowledge.
5.4.4 Methodological Note
This study has provided us with some early insights into how children conceptualise
disability and the role that core knowledge domains play in children's disability
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concepts. The findings have highlighted age differences in children's ability to co¬
ordinate more than one causal-explanatory framework when reasoning about
disability. In addition, the theoretical status of children's disability concepts appears to
be influenced by age and disability type. Together, these findings are an original
contribution to existing research on children's disability concepts.
The open-ended verbal methodology employed in this study however has raised
several important issues for discussion. Firstly, this method was particularly
advantageous in examining the extent to which children can explicate their concepts of
disability. Not surprisingly, some of the younger children had difficulty causally
explaining disabilities. There are two potential reasons for this finding. Firstly, young
children may have little causal knowledge of disabilities evidenced by the large number
of responses from the four to five year-olds that were 'non-causal'. Many four to five
year-olds described superficial features of disabilities rather than indicating a causal
origin. For example, when asked what could have made the character blind, many
young children replied "it's cause he needs glasses". This supports findings by
Diamond & Hestenes (1996) in which four to five year-olds often referred to adaptive
equipment (e.g., wheelchairs) in their comments on disabilities. Additionally, as
discussed in Chapter 2, young children are often said to be 'perceptually seduced' by
typical features, especially in relation to their understanding of social categories (Keil,
1989; Aboud, 1988). Pre-school children seem to be swayed by characteristic features
that are easily observable but which lack any causal relevance.
However, given the large volume of research into children's physical, psychological
and biological causal reasoning systems, it would seem doubtful that young children
did not have any intuitive ideas about the causes of disability (Siegal & Peterson, 1999;
Wellman & Gelman, 1992; Sperber, Premack & Premack, 1995). It is more likely that, in
contrast to older children, the four to five year-olds found it difficult to produce an
open-ended causal explanation of disabilities. In reaction to Piaget's classic interview
studies it has been thought that articulating verbal explanations is an especially
demanding task for young children and hence one that distorts rather than reveals
basic modes of thought (see Bullock, Gelman & Baillargeon, 1982; Kalish, 1996).
Indeed, fixed-choice response methods are now used extensively in research on young
children's conceptual development (e.g., Hatano & Inagaki, 1999). Although young
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children may lack explicit knowledge of causal mechanisms of disability, it is possible
they may have intuitive notions of appropriate causes that could be revealed through
an explanation preference task than open-ended procedures. This possibility is
explored in Study 2.
5.5 Summary and Conclusions
The results from this study have shown the usefulness of adopting a domain-specific
approach to investigate children's disability concepts. Children's causal concepts of
disability are mainly drawn from the physical and biological domains with
social/psychological causal reasoning of disability emerging only in later childhood.
In contrast to Carey's view (1985; 1995) children's biological reasoning is not initially
subsumed within a social/psychological framework. Interestingly, children's ability to
draw upon multiple causal frameworks to reason about disability is not evident until
nine years. This is also the age at which children can tailor their causal explanations to
particular disability types. The notion of children's disability concepts as theoretical is
also an interesting and novel contribution to the literature. The present results suggest
that a theory-like concept of disability does not emerge until eleven years of age, as
prior to this, children's understanding of the various aspects of disability do not link in
a cohesive manner. Together, these findings show that the ability to reason about
disability in a principled, flexible and cohesive manner develops in later childhood.
The results from Study lb are based on children's explicit understanding of disability.
It is possible that young children may show a greater awareness of the causes of
disability if allowed to express their knowledge non-verbally. Thus, although young
children may find it hard to explicate their concepts of disability, they may exhibit
implicit and intuitive knowledge of disability. This possibility is examined in Study 2.
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CHAPTER 6
Study 2: Children's Causal Conceptions of Disability
6.1 Children's Understanding of the Causes of Disability
Study lb showed that children can provide causal explanations of disability which are
accessible to verbal report and that there are age differences in the kinds of causes of
disability that children offer. A central finding of Study lb to this chapter, is that the
four to five year-olds gave many 'non-causal' responses. It would be premature to
conclude from this that young children know little about the causes of disability based
on their tendency to give these non-causal responses. It is more likely that the youngest
children in Study lb found it demanding to give a verbal causal explanation of
disability. Many recent studies indicate that young children have an implicit
understanding of what the world is like far earlier than is revealed in their explicit and
verbal thoughts (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). As Chapter 1 noted, young children often
invoke a domain of causal understanding prior to displaying any detailed knowledge
of phenomena in that domain (Wellman & Gelman, 1992; 1998; Keil, 1998; Wilson &
Keil, 1999).
Despite young children's difficulty in providing verbal causal explanations, Wellman
& Gelman (1992) argue that children can use their framework understandings to
interpret phenomena even in the absence of specific knowledge. Similarly, according to
Keil (1999; 2000), children can have a sense of causal potency in a domain prior to
having any insight into specific mechanisms, through the operation of cognitive
constraints and modes of construal. In relation to the biological domain, young
children clearly do not have access to conscious theories of all aspects of biology yet
they still have strong expectations about what causal mechanisms are operating in the
biological domain (Inagaki & Hatano, 1993; Keil, 1992; Springer & Keil, 1991).
In an attempt to tap less explicit knowledge, new forced-choice methods have been
adopted, especially in the domain-specific literature (e.g. Springer & Keil, 1991). These
have shown that young children can choose the most appropriate causal explanations
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from amongst a set of presented alternatives even if they lack knowledge of specific
mechanisms. Springer & Ruckel (1992) allowed children to consider competing causal
explanations for illness rather than asking children to provide explanations themselves.
This resulted in children consistently rejecting naive psychological explanations in
favour of biological causes, such as germs. Similarly, when Inagaki & Hatano (1993)
devised an explanation-preference task for the question "Why do we eat food every
day", six year-old children were much more likely to endorse vitalistic (biological)
reasoning as opposed to intentional (psychological) causality. Thus, when a different
methodology is employed, children often exhibit a much higher level of understanding
at an earlier age.
In addition to an alternative methodology, children may also display more
sophisticated causal knowledge of disability if they have direct contact with those with
disabilities. Several investigators have argued that children with classroom contact
with peers with disabilities do exhibit a greater conceptual understanding of disability.
As reported in Chapter 3, Diamond (1994) demonstrated that participation in a
classroom with a hearing-impaired peer significantly improved young children's
understanding of hearing loss. Young children in inclusive settings were also more
likely than other children to state that physical and sensory disabilities would persist
into adulthood (Diamond et al., 1997). According to Diamond et al., understanding the
more complex aspects of disability may be more easily learned in an inclusive setting.
Together, the findings from these studies have shown that children's disability concepts
may be influenced by their social experiences, specifically direct contact with disabled
peers.
If children's understanding of the most complex aspects of disability would be more
readily acquired in an integrated environment, then this should be evident in relation
to children's causal conceptions of disability. Indeed, previous research within the
domain-specific tradition has demonstrated the advantages of social experience in the
acquisition of complex conceptual knowledge. For example, Inagaki & Hatano (2002)
propose a variety of social practices that may be influential in the development of naive
biological knowledge, including raising animals and plants, visiting a zoo or botanical
garden, and joint reading of picture books on animals or plants. As noted in Chapter 2,
Inagaki (1990) found that young children who had actively engaged in raising a
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goldfish at home had richer factual and conceptual knowledge about goldfish than
children of the same age who had never raised any animal. Inagaki, Hatano & Namiki
(in an ongoing study, yet to be published) propose that a visit to the zoo may provide
children with a framework in which to conceptualise the animal kingdom. In a recent
study, Inagaki & Oshima (2001) examined whether the joint reading of a book on atopic
disease would help young children understand the disease. Children aged six years,
with and without an atopic skin condition, were read a picture book about atopic skin
disease and given a comprehension test after the reading. The results indicated that
many non-atopic children understood the content of the book although they did not
have as deep a conceptual understanding as the atopic children. The difficulty,
however, with this study is establishing which factor lead to the greater conceptual
understanding: joint reading of the picture book or experiencing the disease. Overall,
these studies suggest that a variety of social experiences can lead to advancements in
children's conceptions of the biological world. As a consequence of this research, an
aim of Study 2 is to examine the effects of classroom contact with disabilities on
children's causal conceptions of disability.
6.1.1 Study 2
Study 2 will investigate, in more depth, the development of children's causal
explanations of disabilities using an explanation preference task. Participants were
presented with descriptions of four children each with a particular disability and were
asked to consider the appropriateness of physical, biological and social/psychological
causes. Each cause presented in this study is taken from the most frequent spontaneous
explanations generated by children in Study lb. Furthermore, the effect of classroom
contact on children's causal understanding of disability is investigated. This study
addresses two key research questions. Firstly, do children, in particular four to five
year-olds, show a bias in preferring certain causes of disability over others and which
types of causal explanations are deemed most appropriate? Secondly, do children's
causal ratings change with age and as a function of classroom experience with
disabilities?
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6.2 Method
6.2.1 Participants
In total, 79 children from three age groups were included in the study. There were 26
four to five year-olds (mean age = 4, 11; range: 4,5 - 5,2) 26 six to seven year-olds (mean
age = 7,1; range: 6,4 - 7,3) and 27 ten to eleven year-olds (mean age = 10,4; range: 10,3 -
11,4). As important age differences were found in Study lb, four year-olds, seven year-
olds and eleven year-olds were also included in Study 2. The children were recruited
from two inner-city schools and one school from a middle-class suburban area of
Edinburgh through a process of parental written consent. In contrast to the first study,
half of the participants in each age group had, at the time of data collection, daily
classroom contact with at least one child with a speech/learning difficulty (but no other
disabilities) thereby allowing the possible influence of experience of disability on
conceptual development to be explored. This information was collected from the head
teachers from all the participating schools. In addition, information about contact with
peers with disabilities that children may have out with the school setting was collected
via the parental consent letters. Across both high and low classroom contact groups, a
third of parents reported that their child has some level of contact with disabilities out
with the school setting (e.g., a neighbour who was learning disabled). Only one pre¬
school child had an immediate family member with a disability.
6.2.2 Materials
Disability Vignettes
In this study, children were asked to listen to an audio-tape of a 'teacher' describing
four children in her classroom who were of the same age as the participant. The taped
description of each target child, always a boy, outlined his disability in concrete terms.
The four disabilities chosen from Study la and b were; (a) physical disability; PD
(described as confined to a wheelchair and unable to walk or run); (b) blindness (not
being able to see, having to be lead around); (c) learning difficulty; LD (takes longer to
learn, cannot remember well and takes longer to finish work); and (d) attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder; ADHD (gets excited quickly and can only pay attention for few
minutes). Each vignette (see appendix IV) included both generalised descriptions of
the disability and one specific example of it. Each specific example described a positive
social interaction. The vignettes were designed to be of the same length and detail in
their descriptions of disabilities. For example:
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One thing to tell you about Andrew is that he isn't able to move his legs so he
can't use them to get around. He's got no feelings in his legs so he can't run or
walk. This means he has to use a wheelchair to get around. On Friday,
Andrew's friends were playing a running game in the playground so they
helped push him in his wheelchair.
Causal Explanation Rating Task
After hearing about each of the four target children, participants rated nine possible
explanations for their likelihood as causes of disability. Table 6.1 outlines the 3 causes
used that pertain to each of three intuitive domains: social/psychological, biological
and physical. Recall that in the previous study (see Chapter 5. Section 5.4.1), it was
unclear whether children understood 'being born' with a disability as a uniquely
biological phenomenon. Consequently, in the present study, emphasis was placed on
the biological process of malformation in relation to the 'birth' cause (see Table 6.1).
Participants rated each cause on a l-to-3 response choice scale with the options 'likely',
'maybe' and 'unlikely'. The options, developed through extensive piloting, were
graphically displayed on a poster board in the format of a 'thumbs up, thumbs down'
game (see Appendix IV). The rating procedure was explained to ensure the child
demonstrated understanding of the scale. Unless the participant responded 'maybe',
subjects were further asked to rate confidence in their response by stating whether they
were 'very sure' or 'not so sure' about their answers. This resulted in a l-to-5 response
scale that has been used previously to examine children's causal conceptions (see
Taplin, Goodenough, Webb & Vogl, 1999; Sigelman & Begley, 1987).
6.2.3 Procedure
Each child was interviewed individually in a separate room from the classroom. The
order of the four vignettes was decided by each participant to ensure randomisation
and the causal explanations were also presented in a randomised order. Using the
scale, participants rated each causal explanation. The order of sure/unsure questions
was randomised by the experimenter.
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Table 6.1 Causal explanations
EXPLANATION MODE CAUSE
Social /Psychological
He is (disability) because he wants to be like that
He is (disability) because he comes from a really bad home where
is mum and dad always shout at him
He saw someone who was (disability) and he decided to copy
them
Biological
He had been playing with a friend who was (disability) and he
caught bugs from him which made him like that
His mum is also (disability) so the mum passed it onto him when
he was growing inside her as a baby
When he was growing in his mum's tummy he didn't grow
properly and was born (disability)
Physical
He is (disability) because he was playing and got dirt in his eye
(blindness)
He is (disability) because he was playing and fell over onto his leg
(physical disability)
He is (disability) because he fell over and banged his head
(learning disability) (ADHD)
He is (disability) because a firework blew up in his eye (blindness)
He is (disability) because a car hit his legs when he was running
across the road (physical impairment)
He is (disability) because he hit his head in a car accident
(learning disability) (ADHD)
He is (disability) because he fell off a fence and broke his arm
Note: Minor and Major physical causes are disability-specific
6.3 Results
In line with Springer & Keil (1991), children's causal ratings are analysed using
parametric statistics as it was reasoned that the response choices conformed to an
interval scale. This type of analysis is also consistent with previous studies using
similar forced-choice response scales (see, Sigelman & Begley, 1987; Hatano & Inagaki,
1999; Taplin et al., 1999; Williams & Binnie, 2002). Two sets of analyses are presented.
Intentional
Upbringing
Copy Behaviour
Contagious Illness
Inheritance
Birth
Minor Trauma
Major Trauma
Irrelevant
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Firstly, differences in overall causal ratings (across the disability types) will be
described. Within this analysis, age differences in children's overall causal ratings will
be presented. Secondly, children's causal ratings will be analysed for disability
differences both across the ages and between age groups. The causal ratings reflect
children's preferences for causal explanations and a higher score indicates children did
not think the cause was a likely explanation of disability. Although half of the children
included in the study had classroom contact with disabled peers, no significant effect of
classroom contact was found on overall causal ratings (F (1, 73) = .03, p < .87), on age
differences in causal ratings (F (2, 73) = 1.85, p < .07) or on causal ratings as a function of
disability type (F (24, 1848) = .83, p < .70). A separate analysis was also conducted on
the effects of family contact with disabilities but no significant results were found (F (1,
77) = 2.62, p < .11). The data are therefore analysed in relation to the whole sample.
6.3.1 Age Differences
Table 6.2 illustrates mean differences in children's causal ratings across disability types,
both as a function of age and across all ages. A mixed model ANOVA found significant
cause effects (F (8, 608) = 77.37, p < .001), age differences (F (2, 76) = 6.28, p < .01) and a
significant age x cause interaction (F (16, 608) = 7.35, p < .001). Post-hoc t-tests were
conducted within each 'explanation mode' (see Table 6.3). Across all ages and
disabilities, 'major physical' causes received more favourable ratings than 'minor' or
'irrelevant injuries'. The 'birth' cause also received significantly more favourable
ratings than 'illness' and 'inheritance' explanations. Children did not show a
preference for 'illness' over 'inheritance' causes. 'Intentional' causes were given
significantly less favourable ratings than 'upbringing' but not 'copy' behaviour.
Overall, 'birth' and 'major physical' causes were the most preferred causal explanations
of disability with neither being favoured over the other. 'Intentional' and 'irrelevant
physical' causes were the least favoured causal explanations with equally low ratings.
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Table6.2Meancausalr tingsforchaggroupdover l
CausalExplanations
Social/PsychologicalBiol gic lPhys l
AgeIntentionalUpbri gingCopyIll essnher tanceBi thM norTraumaajIr l v nt
Trauma
4-5years3.745612 97.4586233 39 6-7years4.392413 27.72 54 38 10-11years4.500744. 93 9622 54 7 Total4.223 98195.742 324
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Table6.3Meandifferenceincausalr ti gswithinchaggroup 4-5years6 710-11rOv rall One-wavANOVAF(8,200)=10.62**
F(8,200)=7.69***
F(8,20 )=61.96***
F(8,624)=8.13***
Post-hoct-tests Social/Psvch IntentionalvsUpbri ging IntentionalvsCopy CopyvsUpbringing
n.s. n.s. n.s.
n.s. n.s. n.s.
t(25)=-2.06* n.s. n.s.
t(25)=-2.14* n.s. n.s.
Biological
BirthvsIllne s
BirthvsInhe itance IllnessvInheritance
n.s.
t(25)=2.49* t(25)=2. 5*
t(25)-3.63***
t(25)=-7.87***
t(25)=-2.63**
t(25)=11.31***
t(25)=-12.16***
t(25)=2.70**
t(25)=6.85***
t(25)=-10.47*** n.s.
Physical
Minorvsaj MinorvsIrrelevant MajorvsIrrelevant
t(25)=2. 4*
t(25)=-3.54**
t(25)=-6.81***
t(25)=2.45* t(25)=-4.34*** t(25)=-9.47***
t(25)=6.57***
t(25)=-9.67***
t(25)=-15.12***
t(25)=5.83***
t(25)=-9.06***
t(25)=-15.19***
(Note:***denot sp<.001;.05)
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To examine preferences in causal ratings within each domain, a series of one-way
ANOVAs were completed for each age (see Table 6.3). The results showed that four to
five year-olds, six to seven year-olds and ten to eleven year-olds exhibited clear
preferences between causal explanations within domains. Post-hoc t -tests revealed no
difference in four to five year-olds preferences between social/psychological causal
explanations. In relation to biological causes, the youngest age group rated 'birth' as
more probable cause of disabilities than 'inheritance'. Indeed, 'inheritance' was their
least favoured explanation even over 'contagious illness'. 'Major physical' explanations
were preferred by four to five year-olds as causes of disabilities and they opted for
'irrelevant injuries' the least. Similarly, the post-hoc tests showed that the six to seven
year-olds did not rate any of the social/psychological causes significantly differently
and 'birth' was the most preferred biological causal explanation. 'Inheritance' was the
least favoured biological cause. Consistent with the youngest age group, the post-hoc
tests revealed that the six to seven year-olds thought 'major physical traumas' were
more likely to cause disabilities than 'minor' or 'irrelevant injuries'. The oldest age
group did show a preference for certain social-psychological causes. Although such
causes were rated as being generally inappropriate, the older age group responded that
'upbringing' was a more possible cause than 'intentional' reasons. The older age group
also rated 'birth' as a highly likely cause for a disability and 'contagious illness' as the
least likely biological cause. 'Major physical traumas' were the most popular physical
cause.
A series of one-way ANOVAs comparing age groups were computed to investigate the
age x cause interaction effect. Significant age differences were found for 'intentional'
cause (F (2, 76) = 6.72, p < .01), 'copy' cause (F (2, 76) = 6.56, p < .01), 'upbringing' cause
(F (2, 76) = 5.39, p < .01), 'contagious illness' cause (F (2, 76) = 12.38, p < .001), 'birth'
cause (F (2, 76) = 6.67, p < .01) and 'irrelevant trauma' cause (F (2, 76) = 16.91, p < .001).
Post-hoc t-tests revealed that four to five year-olds judged the 'intentional' (p < .05),
'copy' (p < .05) and 'irrelevant trauma' (p < .05) causes more favourably than any other
age group. However, it should be noted that the four to five year-olds ratings for such
causes (means: 3.74, 3.71 and 3.39, respectively) indicated that they were unsure as to
the role of social/psychological causal mechanisms for disabilities. Both six to seven
year-olds and ten to eleven year-olds judged 'birth' to be a more appropriate cause of
disabilities than four to five year-olds (p < .05). The ten to eleven year-olds rated
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'contagious illness' explanations lower than six to seven year-olds or four to five year-
olds (p < .05) suggesting they were more aware that disabilities are not contagious.
6.3.2 Disability Differences
Table 6.4 shows the mean causal ratings for each disability. Across all ages, a two-way
repeated measures ANOVA found a significant cause x disability interaction (F (24,
1872) = 7.45, p < .001). To investigate this more fully, a series of one-way ANOVAs
were conducted for each causal explanation to establish whether certain causes were
favoured for particular disabilities (see Table 6.4).
Significant differences in causal ratings for the disabilities were found in relation to
'intentional', 'copy behaviour', 'upbringing', 'birth' and 'major trauma' explanations.
Taking each cause separately, 'intentional' explanations were given more favourable
ratings for ADHD than any other disability, although children were generally unsure
about this explanation as a cause of ADHD (blindness: t (78) = -6.27, p < .001; LD: t (78)
= -2.59, p < .01; PD: t (78) = -5.89, p < .001). 'Intentional' explanations were favoured
least for blindness and PD. Participants also judged 'copy behaviour' explanations as
more appropriate for ADHD than blindness (f (78) = -4.83, p < .001), LD (f (78) = -2.07, p
< .05) and PD (f (78) = -3.51, p < .001). 'Upbringing explanations' were preferred more
as causes for ADHD (blindness: t (78) = 4.80, p < .001; PD: t (78) = -6.08, p < .001) and LD
(blindness: t (78) = 4.80, p < .001; PD: t (78) = -5.59, p < .001). It should be noted
however that although social/psychological causes were more favoured for ADHD
than other disabilities, children were still unsure about the appropriateness of these
causes. Only one biological explanation received different causal judgements
depending on the disability. Participants judged 'birth' causes to be least likely for LD
(blindness: t (78) = -2.11, p < .04; physical disability: t (78) = 2.48, p < .02). No difference
was found between LD and ADHD for this cause. Additionally, only 'major trauma'
received different causal judgements for each disability. A 'major trauma' was thought
to be the least likely cause of ADHD compared to all the other disabilities (blindness: t
(78) = 3.56, p < .001; PD: f (78) = 4.69, p < .001; LD: t (78) = 3.39, p < .001).
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Table6.4Meancausalr tingsforachdis bi ity
CausalExplanations
Social/Psv hologic
Biological
Physical
DisabilityIntentionalUpbri gingCopyllnessI herita ceBi th
Minor Trauma
Major Trauma
Irrelevant Trauma
Blindness4.65
4.48
4.63
3.63
2.77
2.13
3.08
2.04
4.32
Physical4.67 Disability
4.57
4.57
3.67
2.71
2.09
2.94
1.87
3.96
Learning4.08 Disability
3.51
3.99
3.47
2.80
2.66
2.84
2.24
4.13
ADHD
3.47
3.38
3.58
3.58
2.84
2.51
3.08
2.96
4.30
One-wayF(3,234)( ,234)=n.s. Anova=17.98***19.74***4 57
n.s.F(3,234) =2.95*
n.s.
F(3,234) =8.80***
n.s. 116
As shown in Table 6.5, a series of one-way ANOVA's and post-hoc t-tests were
conducted for each disability separately to examine differences in preferences for
explanations within each domain. The results showed that participants preferred
certain causal explanations for blindness, PD, LD and ADHD. In relation to blindness,
children gave significantly higher ratings for 'major physical' causes than 'minor' and
'irrelevant traumas'. 'Birth' was the most popular biological explanation for blindness.
All social/psychological causes were rated as equally unpopular. A similar pattern
was observed for PD. 'Major physical traumas' were judged the most appropriate
physical cause. 'Birth' was rated more highly than 'inheritance' or 'contagious illness'
explanations. As for blindness, social/psychological causes were judged to be
inappropriate explanations for why someone may have a PD. Although
social/psychological causes were not rated favourably for LD, children did show a
differential preference for such causal explanations. A poor 'upbringing' was judged to
be a the most likely social/psychological cause. 'Contagious illness' explanations were
thought to be an unlikely cause of a LD compared to 'inheritance' and 'birth'. In line
with blindness and PD, 'major traumas' are judged to be the most appropriate physical
cause of LD. A similar pattern was observed in children's causal ratings of ADHD.
'Major traumas' were rated higher than 'irrelevant injuries' but no difference in ratings
was found between 'major' and 'minor' accidents. 'Illness' explanations were judged to
be the least likely biological cause of ADHD. Children did not give significantly
different social/psychological causal ratings for ADHD.
The results also showed a significant age x disability effect on children's causal ratings
(F (48, 1824) = 1.66, p < .001). A series of repeated measures ANOVAs showed only an
age x disability effect for 'major physical' (F (6, 228) = 2.98, p < .01) and 'birth' (F (6, 228)
= 2.16, p < .05) cause. One-way ANOVAs were conducted within each age group for
both causes. The results showed that only six to seven year-olds (F (3, 75) = 6.74, p <
.001) and ten to eleven year-olds (F (3, 78) 11.90, p < .001) rated the disabilities
differently on 'major physical' causation. The oldest age group rated this as least
plausible for ADHD (PD: t (26) = 5.71, p < .001; and blindness: t (26) = 4.42, p < .001; and
LD: t (26) = 3.85, p < .001). The six to seven year-olds rated 'major physical traumas' as
equally unlikely for ADHD and LD.
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Table6.5Disabilitydifferenc snmeancausar ting
Blindness
PhysicalDisability
LearningDisab lity
ADHD
One-wavANOVA
F(8,624)=48.51***
F(8,624)=54.03***
F(8,624)=16.63***
F(8,624)=9.83***
Post-hoct-tests Social/Psvch IntentionalvsUpbri ging IntentionalvsCopy CopyvsUpbringing
n.s. n.s. n.s.
n.s. n.s. n.s.
t(78)=2.51** n.s. t(78)=2.19*
n.s. n.s. n.s.
Bioloeical
BirthvsIllne s
BirthvsInheritance Illnessvnheritance
t(78)=6.23*** t(78)=2.64**
t(78)=4.20***
t(78)=6.08*** t(78)=2.84**
t(78)-5.06***
t(78)-3.08** n.s. t(78)=3.15**
t(78)=4.75*** n.s. t(78)=4.12***
Physical
Minorvsaj MinorvsIrrelevant MajorvsIrrelevant
t(78)=4.70***
t(78)--5.39*** t(78)=-9.20***
t(78)=4.69***
t(78)=-4.34*** t(78)=-9.19***
t(78)=3.25**
t(78)=-5.92*** t(78)=-8.25***
n.s.
t(78)=-5.36**
t(78)=-6.04***
(Note:***denot sp<.001;.0p5)
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For the 'birth' cause, only four to five year-olds gave significantly different ratings for
each disability (F (3, 75) = 3.49, p < .02). Among the four to five year-olds, 'birth' was
thought to be the least likely explanation for LD (PD: t (25) = 2.16, p < .05; blindness: t
(25) = -2.71, p < .01; ADHD: t (25) = -2.77, p < .01). There were no age differences in
children's ability to differentiate between the disabilities on the remaining causes.
6.4 Discussion
Although Study lb provided valuable information on children's spontaneous causal
explanations of disability, due to the open-ended questioning procedure, it is unlikely it
captured the full extent of young children's causal knowledge. Consequently, Study 2
intended to further explore children's causal understanding of disability using an
explanation preference task. Furthermore, this study investigated the effects of
classroom contact with disabilities on children's conceptual understanding of disability.
The aims of the present study were to ascertain whether children, especially the
youngest participants, had a preference for some causal explanations of disability and
whether such a preference was influenced by age and classroom contact with
disabilities.
6.4.1 Children's Preferences for Causal Explanations of Disability
The results show that children do have a bias in preferring certain causal explanations
of disabilities. Children of all ages rated biological and physical type explanations as
significantly more appropriate causes of disabilities than social/psychological ones.
This is similar to the findings from Study lb. Taken together, these results provide a
further indication that disabilities are not thought to be social or psychologically
caused, even by younger children. There is currently great debate (see Chapter 2) as to
what might constitute an early but distinct form of biological thought independent of
psychological and physical reasoning (Inagaki, 1997; see also Medin & Atran, 1999). At
the very least, these data show that young children have a sense that disability should
be causally explained in terms of biological and physical causes as opposed to
psychology, even if they lack the means to articulate this. However, a key challenge for
future research will be to examine what sorts of knowledge enable children to prefer
some classes of explanations over others even if they lack insight into specific
mechanisms.
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An interesting finding was that children were able to differentiate between various
types of biological and types of physical causes of disability. Children rated 'birth' as the
most appropriate biological cause of disabilities. Even the four to five year-olds
thought it possible that babies could be born with disabilities as a result of a biological
malformation (and therefore the biological prompt was unlikely to be a distorting factor
in Study lb). Interestingly, the youngest children also thought 'contagious illness' was
a more plausible cause of disabilities than 'inheritance'. They seemed to over-
generalise their notions of germs to be causal agents of disability. This supports earlier
research noted in Chapter 2, that although children can limit the method of
transmission of germs to physical contact, their conceptions of germs themselves and
what they can transmit seem to be much less constrained (Keil et al., 1999). By age ten
years, children are aware that not all illnesses are infectious and notions of contagion
and contamination seem to no longer be the central feature of children's illness
concepts (see Kalish, 1999). The most consistent age difference to emerge was that only
the oldest age group were able to differentiate between types of social/psychological
causes of disabilities. They were more likely to judge a 'poor upbringing' as a possible
cause of disabilities compared to 'intentional' causes. This finding, together with Study
lb, suggests only older children are aware of the possible role of the environmental
factors as a causal agent of disability. This supports earlier research discussed in
Chapter 3 that only older children cite social/environmental factors in their causal
explanations of emotional/behavioural disorders (Maas et al., 1979).
6.4.2 Causal Potency
Young children's preferences for certain causal explanations of disability indicate that
they can have a sense of how disabilities can be causally explained even if they are
ignorant of actual mechanisms. It is unlikely four to five year-olds know the precise
mechanisms involved in being born with a disability or contracting disability through
an illness-like process, yet they had a strong bias to rate these causes more favourably
than 'inheritance'. This is likened to the notion of causal potency, as discussed in
Chapter 1.
A series of recent studies has found that children, prior to formal schooling, have a
sense of causal potency in a domain before having insight into specific mechanisms
(Keil et al., 1999; Wilson & Keil, 2000). For example, in the realm of biological thought
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pre-school children evidence only a rudimentary understanding of germs as causes of
contagious disease yet they have strong expectations about disease and contagion
(Kalish, 1999; Keil et al., 1999). Additionally, young children know very little about the
precise mechanisms of inheritance or reproduction yet they have intuitive beliefs about
how and what properties are inherited (Williams & Tolmie, 2000; Williams & Affleck,
1999; Hirschfeld, 1996; Springer & Keil, 1989). In these instances, it seems possible to
have some relevant causal knowledge without any concrete idea of the mechanisms
involved. The findings from Study 2 suggest this could also be the case for disability.
However, it should be noted that young children still have much to learn about the
causes of disability.
6.4.3 Tailoring of Causes to Disabilities
In contrast to Study lb, children of all ages were able to tailor their causal ratings to
particular types of disabilities. For example, social/psychological causes were viewed
more favourably for ADHD than for blindness or physical disability. This ability to
differentiate causes was evident even among pre-school children who did not apply
causes indiscriminately to all disabilities, as was seen in Study lb. It seems therefore
that by four years of age, children are neither entity-based in their explanations
(restricting disabilities to one causal reasoning system) nor widely confused
(indiscriminately applying causes to all disabilities). This difference in findings
between the studies may be largely due to the methodologies employed and the level of
knowledge being tapped (i.e., explicit vs implicit knowledge). In Study lb young
children may have been so concerned with spontaneously generating a cause that they
did not differentiate between different disability types. However, when the task
demands are reduced, by presenting children with causal explanations, the four to five
year-olds showed an impressive early tailoring of causes to disabilities. The implication
of this finding is that given an appropriate methodology, even yormg children show the
beginnings of more differentiated concepts of disability. However, children must come
to convert such theory-like recognition into explicit understandings that are open to
verbal report and the process by which this is done has still not been fully investigated.
In relation to children's multiple causal explanations, the methodology used here does
not allow us to reliably establish whether children can reason about different causes of
disability simultaneously. The forced-choice response scale required children to
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endorse different causes individually. Many four to five year-olds thought both
physical and biological causes were appropriate explanations of disability and this
could suggest the ability to engage in multi-causal reasoning of disability. However it
is still not clear whether children thought about each cause independently or in
conjunction with one another. Even if young children could think about different
causes for one disability, the implicit nature of this understanding would make it
difficult to establish empirically.
6.4.4 The Effect of Classroom Contact
Although half of the children in this study had daily classroom contact with at least one
child with a speech and learning difficulty, such experience did not affect children's
causal understanding of disability. This is inconsistent with previous studies showing
that early experiences of disability can shape children's factual knowledge of
disabilities (Diamond & Hestenes, 1994). However, recent findings by Glasberg (2000)
suggest experience may not affect children's knowledge of disabilities, especially when
the experience is with disabilities that children find difficult to conceptualise. This
could also have been the case in the present study. Children's contact with learning
difficulties did not influence their causal understanding of disabilities. Previous studies
have demonstrated children's difficulties in conceptualising learning disabilities
(Conant & Bndoff, 1983) and this difficulty may persist even in the face of direct
classroom experience with learning difficulties.
The results from the present study are also in contrast to findings from Inagaki &
Hatano (1997) who stress the importance of direct experience in shaping naive
biological knowledge (see Chapter 2 section 2.1.3). However, in other areas of
conceptual development (e.g., inheritance concepts, Williams & Affleck, 1999), social
experience or the provision of facts does not always lead to improvement in conceptual
knowledge. Although future studies should aim to establish the types of experiences
that can shape children's knowledge of disabilities, the present results demonstrate that
cognitive causal frameworks exert a powerful influence over children's understanding
of disabilities regardless of direct experience. The interplay between core conceptual
frameworks and everyday experience in shaping children's conceptions requires
further attention.
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However, this study is unable to provide any firm conclusions on the role of experience
more broadly. A potential limitation of this study is that the precise contact pattern
between children with and without disabilities is not known as observation in the
classroom did not take place. There was a lack of detail about the content or quality of
the interaction between typically developing children and those with disabilities and
therefore the classroom experience may have been quite limited. Contact patterns can
vary in relation to the frequency of classroom interactions and the types of interactions
that children are engaged in. Although half of the participants in Study 2 did have
classroom contact with speech and learning difficulties, it is unclear whether this was
categorised contact or decategorised contact (Maras & Brown, 1992). As Chapter 3
noted, decategorised contact describes a process whereby integration is taking place but
children with disabilities are not identified as members of a particular group.
Therefore, if in the present study, children with disabilities had never been identified
and if no classroom based discussions had ever taken place about disabilities, this may
have resulted in the lack of experiential effects.
It would thus be premature to conclude that classroom contact with disabilities has no
effect in shaping children's disability concepts. The findings from this study only
showed that causal understanding of disability is not easily influenced by limited social
experience but there may be other aspects of children's disability concepts that are
shaped by more extensive classroom contact. For example, in line with Diamond et al.,
(1997), children's knowledge of the consequences and chronicity of disability may be
influenced by an inclusive classroom setting. Furthermore, although not discernible
from the methodology used in this study, social experiences with disabilities may
enable children to explicate and verbalise their causal concepts of disability. This
possibility should be explored with additional research.
6.5 Summary and Conclusions
This study has found that children demonstrate a preference for physical and biological
causes of disability, which is consistent with Study lb's findings. These results are
further confirmation that children do not find naive psychology a useful domain for
conceptualising disabilities. Furthermore, the forced-choice methodology employed in
this study has allowed the younger children to show their causal knowledge of
disability. The four to five year olds also preferred certain physical and biological
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causes of disability which suggests they have a sense of how disabilities should be
causally explained even if they lack detailed knowledge of the mechanisms involved.
The youngest children also showed, in contrast to Study lb, an impressive early
tailoring of causes to particular disability types. The results from Studies lb and 2
highlight the contrasting findings that can be obtained by employing two different
methodologies in relation to one research topic. Forced-choice explanation tasks have
previously been criticised for their difficulty in "making different explanation types
comparable with respect to the informativeness of the explanation and the familiarity
with the information it contains" (Carey, 1995, p.297). However, this method has
proved useful in the present and previous research not only for demonstrating
children's implicit causal understandings but also for selecting meaningful fixed-choice
responses (Springer & Ruckel, 1992; Hatano & Inagaki, 1994).
Surprisingly, this study also found no effect of classroom contact with disabled peers
on children's causal conceptions of disability. The causal-explanatory frameworks that
are evident early in childhood and that children use to conceptualise disability may be
relatively unaffected by direct social experience with disability. Consequently, there is
a need to establish other factors that may influence children's disability concepts. One
such factor, which is considered to influence attitudes towards disability, is language.
There has been considerable research, in the disability literature, about the possible
influence of labelling on children's and teachers' attitudes towards others with
disabilities. Concurrently, researchers working in the area of conceptual development
have for some time been interested in the effects of language on social category
understanding (Markman, 1989; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). Yet, to date, these disparate
strands of research have never been unified. Chapter 7 will therefore describe a final
empirical study that explores the effects of labelling on children's conceptions of
disability. The aims of Study 3 are to ascertain whether children's understanding of
disability can be influenced by the linguistic label assigned, and to explore the
relationship between language and children's causal-explanatory frameworks.
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CHAPTER 7
Study 3: The Effects of Labels on Children's Conceptions of
Disability
Interestingly, Study 2 did not find any significant effects of classroom contact on
children's causal understanding of disability and consequently there is a need to
identify additional experiences that may shape children's concepts of disability.
One such experience that has received much research attention in the disability
literature is language (Dunn, 1968; Mercer, 1971; Wood & Valdez-Menchaca, 1996).
The role of language and how this influences children and teachers' attitudes
towards those with disabilities has become a key research issue. What is not clear,
however, is the role of language in shaping children's conceptions of disability. The
fact that no research has addressed this issue is surprising given that conceptual
development research has highlighted the effects of language on social category
understanding (Markman, 1989; Gelman & Heyman, 1999). Furthermore, Inagaki &
Hatano (2002) very recently have identified linguistic variables that may contribute
to the acquisition of naive biology concepts. Consequently, it is possible that
language may influence children's disability concepts. The final study in this thesis
will examine the effects of disability labels on children's conceptions of disability.
The aims of this study are to investigate the role of language in shaping children's
conceptions of disability and more specifically, to ascertain whether language
influences the causal-explanatory framework within which disability is
conceptualised.
7.1 Language and Disability
There has been widespread concern over the way language shapes perceptions of
disability (Dunn, 1968; Mercer, 1971; Graham & Leone, 1988). This is reflected in the
attempts to eradicate terminology such as 'cripple' or 'spastic' and the change in
reference from 'disabled people' to 'people with disabilities'. Moderating the role of
language is more complex than the removal of offensive words and the use of labels
and how this affects perceptions of children with disabilities is a core controversy in
special education (Wood & Valdez-Menchaca, 1996).
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Much concern has long been expressed about the detrimental effects of labelling a
child as disabled (Mercer, 1971; Dunn, 1968). Critics of the labelling process have
attributed several negative consequences to the assignment of disability labels,
including lower teacher expectations and a disregard for individual differences
(Blatt, 1972; Dunn, 1968). Some of the strongest arguments against adopting the
labelling process have been based on the viewpoint that labelling produces a
condition of self-fulfilling prophecy and has an adverse effect on teacher, parents
and peer expectations of the labelled child (Dunn, 1968). Investigators have
demonstrated that teachers and peers respond negatively to a child identified with a
special need such as a learning disability, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder or
developmental delay (Foster & Ysseldyke, 1976; Foster, Schmidt & Sabatino, 1976;
Ysseldyke & Foster, 1978).
A considerable amount of research exists' on the labelling process and many have
emphasised the negative effects of labelling children as disabled. Much of the
research has focused on how labels affect teachers' or children's attitudes towards
others with disabilities (Wood & Valdez-Menchaca, 1996; Cornett-Ruiz &
Hendricks, 1993; Graham & Leone, 1988; Gottlieb, 1974; Seitz & Geske 1976; Foster
et al., 1976). However, there is currently no research that explores the extent to
which disability labels influence children's conceptions of disability. Indeed, many of
the more recent studies on children's disability concepts (see Chapter 3) actively
avoided using disability labels, instead providing general descriptions to children
about peers with disabilities (Diamond, 1993; Sigelman & Begley, 1987; Lewis, 1995),
as in Studies la/lb and 2. Although this previous research has provided valuable
information about children's disability concepts, it is unclear to what extent
labelling the disabilities could have altered ideas about the causes and irrevocability
of disabilities. It does seem remarkable that parallels have never been drawn
between the disability research and the conceptual development literature, which
for many years now has been interested in the effects of labels on social category
understanding (Markman, 1989; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Gelman & Heyman, 1999).
7.2 Language and Conceptual Development
Research within the conceptual development tradition has shown that the linguistic
form in which a category (e.g., biological, social) is expressed may have important
effects on perceptions of that category (Markman, 1989; Gelman & Markman, 1986).
For example, many properties that may be considered transient states (e.g., Mary
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always does her homework) may seem more enduring when expressed in the form
of a label (e.g., Mary is a hard worker). Thus, giving a label may emphasise the
defining features of that individual in ways that other information would not
(Gelman & ITeyman, 1999). Furthermore, there are many different forms that a label
can take, including common nouns (e.g., slob), adjectives (e.g., lazy) or diagnostic
phrases (e.g., has attention deficit hyperactivity disorder) and there may thus be
important differences in the type of information that these labels convey. Evidence
in fact suggests that there is an association between whether a category is richly
structured or arbitrary and whether it is referred to by a noun or an adjective. In
particular, Markman (1989) argues that a concept referred to by a noun may have
considerable inferential depth. In a series of adult studies, she found that people
expect a noun label to support more inferences, to provide fundamental essential
information about the object, to provide information about the identity of the object
and that the information is enduring and permanent. However, there is little
developmental research to complement these adult studies.
An exception is recent research by Gelman & Heyman (Gelman & Heyman, 1999;
Heyman & Gelman, 2000), who have carried out a number of studies specifically
examining how language affects children's understanding of social categories.
Gelman & Heyman (1999) investigated how language effects children's inferences
about novel social categories. They hypothesised that children would make more
inferences about a social category when referred to by a noun label as opposed to a
verbal description. Children aged five to seven years learned about a characteristic
of a hypothetical person (e.g., "Rose eats a lot of carrots"). Half of the children were
then given a noun label for each character ("She is a carrot-eater") whereas half
heard a verbal predicate ("She eats carrots whenever she can"). The children were
then asked four questions about the stability of the characteristic (eating carrots).
They found that children judged properties as significantly more stable over time
and contexts when referred to by a noun label than when referred to by a verbal
predicate. Although the linguistic distinction is subtle, it does seem to convey to the
child important information about feature stability. In particular, Gelman &
Heyman's findings show that language can be especially powerful for
understanding novel social categories.
Despite the ongoing debates surrounding the effects of labelling children as
'disabled', no previous research has examined how language influences typical
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children's understanding of disability. Intuitively however it would seem highly
plausible that linguistic labels might exert a powerful influence over children's
inferences about disability. For example, one can refer to a disability using a noun
label (e.g., he's a slow learner) and this may provide significantly more information
to a child than simply describing the disability (e.g., he is slower at learning). A
similar effect may also be found with a diagnostic possessive label (e.g., he has
Down syndrome), although no research to date has explored this issue.
Furthermore, it is unclear as to what type of information such labels could convey.
In Gelman & Fleyman's (1999) 'carrot-eater' study, children were only asked to
judge the stability of the attribute. However, labels could also provide information
about the causal origins of disability, such as whether they are inborn or acquired.
If labels do have an influence on the causal-explanatory framework which children
use to reason about disability then this would suggest an important relationship
between language and domain-specific knowledge. The role of language and its
influence on the development of core domains of knowledge has rarely been
investigated.
7.3 Language and Core Knowledge Domains
Arguably, the acquisition of physical, psychological and biological knowledge could
be influenced by language given that one of the primary functions of this form of
communication system is the sending and receiving of information. By the time
children have become competent language users they, like adults, have come to rely
heavily on language as a major source of knowledge (Tager-Flusberg, 1993). Yet the
role that language plays in shaping children's core domains of thought has to date
never been fully explored.
In relation to naive psychology, there has been increased interest in examining how
the development of language relates to a theory of mind (Dunn, 1994; Bartsch &
Wellman, 1995; de Villiers & de Villiers, 2000; Tager-Flusberg, 2000; Woolfe, Want &
Siegal, 2002). One proposal is that theory of mind performance is closely tied to the
development of children's language skills, particularly proficiency in syntax (de
Villiers & de Villiers, 2000). Another proposal is that children's exposure to talk
about mental states gives rise to theory of mind reasoning (Dunn, 1994; Siegal,
Varley & Want, 2001). According to this view, the more children are exposed to talk
about thoughts and other invisible mental processes, the earlier they develop a
theory ofmind.
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Linguistic variables are also thought to contribute to the acquisition of naive
biological knowledge (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). Stavy & Wax (1989) showed that
within Israeli culture, plants are attributed a different life status in comparison to
animals as a result of the Hebrew words for 'animal' and 'plant'. The Hebrew word
for 'animal' is very close to that for 'living' and 'alive', yet there is no such related
term for 'plant'. A similar outcome was also found in Japanese culture where
linguistic factors contribute to children's judgements about the life status of
inanimate objects (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). Each of these studies focuses only on
the role of language in shaping one sub-domain of knowledge: namely theory of
mind beliefs in naive psychology and living kind concepts in naive biology. It
remains unclear whether language can influence the causal-explanatory framework
within which disability is conceptualised. Consequently, the present study will
directly explore the influence of labelling on how children conceptualise disabilities.
7.3.1 Study 3
The purpose of Study 3 was to explore the role of language in shaping children's
disability concepts using a similar format to Gelman & Heyman's (1999) 'carrot-
eater' study. In particular, this study investigated whether the form of the label
itself is sufficiently powerful to produce differing ideas as to the causes,
controllability, chronicity and perceived differences of disability. Participants aged
four to eleven years heard five passages describing children with disabilities and
were subsequently given a noun label, a diagnostic label or a general description.
Each participant was then asked questions regarding their conceptions of the
particular disability. The aims of the study were to ascertain the possible influence
of labels on children's understanding of different aspects of disability and the extent
to which the labelling process is moderated by age and type of disability. It was
hoped that the present study would not only add to recent research on children's
language and cognitive development but also highlight practical and educational
considerations surrounding the use of disability labels more generally.
7.4 Method
7.4.1 Participants
A total of 93 children participated in this study (see Table 7.1). Children were
randomly assigned to one of three conditions: the noun label condition, the
diagnostic label condition and the description condition. Children were recruited
from three state nurseries and two primary schools through a process of opt-in
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written parental consent (see Appendix I for sample copy). Half of the pre-school
children had nursery/home contact with children with language difficulties, non¬
specific learning difficulties, autism and Down syndrome. None of the older
children had classroom contact with a child with a disability. However, information
collected from the parental consent letters indicated that 11 participants aged six to
seven years and three subjects aged ten to eleven years had contact with people
with disabilities outside the school setting.
Table 7.1 Participant information
Noun Label Diagnostic Label Description Overall
4-5 years 10 (4.6)
4.4-5.0
10 (4.6)
4.4-5.1
10 (4.7)
4.5-5.2
30 (4.6)
4.4-5.2
6-7 years 11 (7.2)
6.8-7.5
11 (7.1)
6.9-7.4
11 (7.1)
6.8 - 7.5
33 (7.1)
6.8- 7.5
10-11 years 10 (10.8)
10.5-11.4
10 (10.7)
10.4-11.2
10 (10.6)
10.5-11.1
30 (10.7)
10.4-11.4
Overall 31 31 31 93
Note: Figures in brackets indicate mean age in years
Italicised figures indicate age range in years
7.4.2 Materials
Each participant received five item sets which are outlined in Table 7.2. For each
set, participants heard a three-sentence description, followed by a set of four test
questions. The three-sentence description included the character's name and age, a
description of the particular disability and either a norm label, a diagnostic label or a
description.
In line with Studies la/lb and 2, a broad range of disabilities were selected
(emotional/behavioural, learning difficulty, sensory disability and physical
disability) in order to contrast children's understanding of different types of
disabilities. Real diagnostic medical labels were used instead of more familiar
disability labels so that participants would be more likely to make inferences based
on the label rather than on prior knowledge or experience with the disability (see
also Gelman & Heyman, 1999). An imaginary label (mopia) was also included in
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line with previous research on children's understanding of novel social categories
(Heyman & Gelman, 2000).
Table 7.2 Five item sets
John is nine years-old. John is always on the go.
He is a hyperactive child (norm label condition)
He has hyperactivity (diagnostic label condition)
He is on the go all the time (descriptive phrase condition)
Tom is seven years-old. Tom is slower at learning tilings.
He is a Down syndrome child (noun label condition)
He has Down syndrome (diagnostic label condition)
He is slower to learn things in class (descriptive phrase condition)
David is eight years-old. David's eyes see everything fuzzy
He is an astigmatic (noun label condition)
He has astigmatism (diagnostic label condition)
His eyes make him see everything all fuzzy (descriptive phrase
condition)
Chris is ten years-old. Chris keeps bumping into things.
He bumps into things all the time (descriptive phrase condition)
Andrew is eight years-old. Andrew has a thumb missing on his hand.
He is a mopic (noun label condition)
He has mopia (diagnostic label condition)
His hand has got a thumb missing (descriptive phrase condition)
The four test questions for each item set concerned the cause, chronicity,
controllability and perceived differences of the disability. Each participant was first
told they would be asked to think about what made the character that way by rating
the appropriateness of three different causes of disability (see Table 7.3), in the same
five point format as Study 2 (see Chapter 6 section 6.2.2). The set of explanations
comprised one that described an underlying biological cause (birth), one physical
cause (physical major) and one social/psychological cause (upbringing), all taken
from Study 2. Each type of cause was rated as most popular in Study 2. Only the
physical causes are tailored for specific disability types (see Table 7.3).
Ide is a dyspraxic (noun label condition) PI
He has dyspraxia (diagnostic label condition)
131
Table 7.3 Causal explanations
CAUSE EXPLANATION TYPE
"When he was growing in his mum's tummy he didn't grow properly Biological
and he was born like that"
"He is (disability) because he comes from a really bad home where Social/Psychological
his mum and dad always shout at him"
"He is (disability) because a firework blew up in his eye" Physical
(astigmatism)
"He is (disability) because he hit his head in a car accident" (Down
syndrome, hyperactivity, dyspraxia)
"He is (disability) because he had a bad accident that cut it off"
(mopia)
Note: Physical causes only are disability-specific.
In addition, as in Study lb, participants were asked for their judgements regarding
controllability of the disability ("Could X (e.g., see) if he wanted to?"), chronicity of the
disability (e.g., "When X grows up to be an adult will he be able to ((e.g., see))?")
and perceived differences between themselves and the described character ("Do you
think X sounds the same as you or different to you?"). Responses regarding
controllability, chronicity and were coded as 'yes', 'no' or 'don't know' and were
given numerical codes (yes = 1, no = 2 and don't know = 3). In contrast to Study lb,
no child gave a "maybe" response. Responses to the perceived differences question
were also given numerical codes (1 = same, 2 = don't know and 3 = different).
7.4.3 Procedure
All children were tested individually during a 10-minute session. The six to seven
and ten to eleven year-olds were interviewed in a separate room from their class
and the four to five year-olds were tested in a quiet corner of the nursery. Each
child received all five item sets and were asked all four test questions. The items
were provided in a different random order for each participant. The causal question
was always presented first because it required use of the 5-point scale. The
remaining questions were presented in a random order.
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7.5 Results
As in Study 2, children's causal ratings were analysed using parametric statistics
and the causal ratings reflect children's preferences for each of the causal
explanations. Results are first presented in terms of differences in overall causal
ratings (across all disability types) for each labelling condition and age group.
Children's causal ratings will then by analysed for disability differences. Preliminary
analyses revealed no significant effects of gender at any age or any significant
effects of contact amongst the four to five year-olds, so these variables were not
included in further analyses.
7.5.1 Causal Ratings
Table 7.4 indicates labelling and age effects on mean causal ratings. Overall causal
ratings were entered into a 3 (label condition: noim label, diagnostic label and
description) x 3 (age: 4-5 years, 6-7 years, 10-11 years) mixed model two-way
ANOVA. The results showed no significant effect of labelling on any of the causal
explanation types.
Table 7.4 Mean causal ratings as a function ofage and labelling condition
Label Type
Norm Label Diagnostic Label Description Overall
Age Cause
4-5 years Biological 3.44 2.44 2.96 2.93
Physical 1.90 2.30 2.36 2.19
Soc/Psy 4.32 4.72 4.86 4.63
6-7 years Biological 2.75 2.51 2.13 2.46
Physical 2.64 2.42 1.93 2.33
Soc/Psy 4.62 4.64 4.51 4.59
10-11 years Biological 1.84 2.36 2.70 2.30
Physical 1.80 2.34 2.10 2.08
Soc/Psy 4.24 4.40 4.36 4.33
Overall Biological 2.68 2.43 2.58 2.56
Physical 2.13 2.35 2.12 2.20
Soc/Psy 4.40 4.59 4.57 4.52
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However, there was a significant main effect of cause (F (2, 168) = 144.39; p < .001).
A series of paired t-tests revealed that the biological and physical causal
explanations received more favourable ratings than the social/psychological cause
(biological vs social/psych; t (92) = -16.09; p < .001: physical vs social/psych; t (92) =
-22.92; p < .001). These data are consistent with findings from both Studies lb and 2.
7.5.2 Disability Differences in Causal Ratings
Table 7.5 shows the mean causal ratings for each disability type and labelling
condition. In order to examine disability differences, children's causal ratings were
entered into a 5 (disability: astigmatism, dyspraxia, Down syndrome, hyperactivity
and mopia) x 3 (label condition: noun label, diagnostic label and description) x 3
(age: 4-5 years, 6-7 years, 10-11 years) ANOVA. There was no effect of labelling on
children's causal ratings for different disabilities. Physical causal explanations were
preferred for mopia and astigmatism, whilst both biological and physical causes
were rated favourably for dyspraxia, Down syndrome and hyperactivity.
Social/psychological causes were the least preferred for all disabilities, although in
line with Study lb, the social/psychological mean causal ratings were higher for the
learning (Down syndrome) and emotional/behavioural disability (ADHD). In
addition, a significant age x disability interaction effect was found for causal ratings
(F (16, 720) = 2.54, p < .001). A series of repeated measures ANOVA's showed an
age x disability effect for the social/psychological cause only (F (8, 360) = 5.48, p <
.001). One-way ANOVAs were conducted within each age group for the
social/psychological ratings. The results showed that only the six to seven year-
olds (F (4, 128) = 19.68, p < .001) and ten to eleven year-olds (F (4, 116) = 19.02, p
<.001) rated the disabilities differently on social/psychological causation. The six to
seven year-olds thought the social/psychological cause was most plausible for
Down syndrome (astigmatism: t (32) = 5.28, p < .001; mopia: t (32) = -5.28, p < .001;
hyperactivity: t (32) = -3.12, p < .01; dyspraxia: t (32) = -5.28, p < .001). The ten to
eleven year-olds judged this cause to be most appropriate for both Down syndrome
(astigmatism: t (29) = 5.56, p < .001; mopia: t (29) = -5.56, p < .001; dyspraxia: t (29) =
-4.76, p < .001) and hyperactivity (astigmatism: t (29) = 5.35, p < .001; mopia: t (29) =
-5.35, p < .001; dyspraxia: t (29) = 3.76, p < .001).
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7.5.3 Controllability, Chronicity and Perceived Differences
The number of uncontrollable, chronic and perceived differences judgements for
each age group and labelling condition across all disability types are shown in Table
7.6. In line with Study lb, children's responses were analysed using non-parametric
statistics. No significant effects of labelling were found in children's overall
controllability, chronicity and perceived differences scores.
Table 7.6 Number of uncontrollable, chronic and perceived differences judgements for each
age group and labelling condition
Noun Label
Label Condition
Diagnostic Label Description Overall
Age Judgement
(N = 30)
4-5 years Uncontrollable 20 28 21 71
(n= 10 Chronic 30 31 26 76
per cond) Differences 33 35 32 100
(N = 33)
6-7 years Uncontrollable 30 43 34 104
(n =11 Chronic 24 35 33 90
per cond) Differences 36 39 34 105
(N = 30)
10-11 years Uncontrollable 27 31 35 91
(n = 10 per Chronic 28 32 28 89
cond) Differences 20 29 42 95
(N = 93)
Overall Uncontrollable 77 102 90 269
(n = 31 per Chronic 82 98 87 267
cond) Differences 89 103 108 300
There was a significant age effect on children's judgements about controllability (H
- 8.91, df=2,p< .01). Post hoc analysis revealed that the four to five year-olds were
more likely to judge the disabilities as controllable (4-5 year-olds versus 6-7 year-
olds: U = 310.0, p < .01; 4-5 years versus 10-11 year-olds: U = 292.0, p < .02). This is
consistent with Study lb's results. Although there were no significant age
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differences in chronicity responses, Table 7.6 shows that the four to five year-olds
were more likely judge disabilities as transient conditions. There was no age x label
interaction in children's overall controllable, chronic and differences scores.
The only labelling effect that was found in the present study was on children's
judgements about the controllability of dyspraxia. Children's perceptions of
whether dyspraxia is controllable was influenced by the label assigned (H = 11.10, df
= 2, p < .001). Children who heard the diagnostic label were much more likely to
perceive dyspraxia as uncontrollable (noun label vs diagnostic label: U = 324.0, p <
.01; diagnostic label vs description: U - 283.50, p < .001).
Across all labelling and age groups (Table 7.7), there was a significant effect of
disability on judgements of controllability (Friedman ANOVA= 14.50, df = 4, p < .01)
and chronicity (Friedman ANOVA = 10.55, df = 4, p < .03). Paired sample Wilcoxon
tests showed that mopia (missing finger) and astigmatism were considered to be the
least controllable disabilities. Mopia (missing finger) was also considered the most
chronic disability. Age did have an influence on judgements of controllability for
some disabilities. An age difference was found in children who judged mopia
(missing finger) to be controllable (H = 16.29, df = 2, p < .001). In contrast to older
age groups, the four to five year-olds perceived this disability to be controllable (4-5
year-olds vs 6-7 year-olds: U = 310.5, p < .001; 4-5 year-olds vs 10-11 year-olds: U =
300.0, p < .01). Children's judgements about the controllability of astigmatism was
also influenced by age (H = 8.13, df = 2, p < .02). The youngest age group gave
significantly more controllable scores than the older age groups (4-5 year-olds vs 6-7
year-olds: U = 354.5, p < .01; 4-5 year-olds vs 10-11 year-olds: U = 335.5, p < .03).
Finally, there was no effect of labelling, age or disability type on perceived
difference judgements for any of the disabilities.
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7.6 Discussion
Overall, the results from this study indicate that labelling has little effect on
children's conceptions of disability. That is, the form of a disability label alone does
not have a strong influence on children's ideas about the cause, course and
perceived difference of disabilities. These findings are in contrast to Gelman &
Heyman's (1999) 'carrot-eater' study, which found that labelling, in the form of a
noun, provides important information about the stability of novel characteristics.
Furthermore, a failure to obtain a significant effect of labelling, at any age, in the
present study indicates that children are not developmentally influenced by the
presence of disability labels.
7.6.1 Lack of Labelling Effects
One possible explanation for the general lack of labelling effects is that the assigned
labels were not presented with enough potency. That is the labels may not have
been presented for a sufficient length of time or in a salient context. However, this
is unlikely given that the method of presentation was identical to that employed by
Gelman & Heyman (1999). It is more likely that these non-significant results are
due to the nature of the labels that were examined and the aspects of children's
conceptions that were probed. In the 'carrot-eater study', Gelman & Heyman (1999)
chose novel characteristics (e.g., carrot-eating, creature-believer) and consequently
children were not simply retrieving rote meanings but were making use of a general
linguistic rule. However, the present findings indicate that children's responses
were not based on the linguistic form of the label. Although labels often have an
influence on attitudes towards disability (Foster et al., 1976; Wood & Valdez-
Menchaca, 1996; Cornett-Ruiz & Hendricks, 1993), it is possible that disability labels
have little influence on children's core understanding of disability. That is, children
may have already formed fundamental conceptions about disabilities that are
impervious to subtle changes in linguistic form. The results from both Study 2 and
the present findings indicate that children's causal conceptions of disability are not
easily influenced by experiential factors such as limited classroom contact or
language in the form of labelling.
An implication of these findings is the difficulty in ascertaining which factors could
shape children's causal conceptions of disability. The fact that labelling has little
influence on the way children causally construe disabilities suggests that this
particular form of language is not a factor in activating a particular causal-
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explanatory framework. This is not to suggest that language has no role in
triggering a causal reasoning system or foundational knowledge domain (see Stavy
& Wax, 1989; Inagaki & ITatano, 2002), but the particular linguistic form in which
disability is expressed, does not. Future research should examine more closely not
only the links between language and disability but also how the development of
language relates to the acquisition of core knowledge domains.
The present study did find one labelling effect on children's disability concepts.
When children were given a diagnostic label for dyspraxia they were much more
likely to perceive this disability as uncontrollable. This result may have been a
chance finding given that no other significant results were found. However, it
could also be argued that assigning a diagnostic label to this particular disability
conveyed information about stability in a way that a simple description did not.
There is a need for further research to explore the possible influence of diagnostic
labelling on children's disability concepts. It may be that the diagnostic information
contained in the label is more important to children rather than the diagnostic label
itself. That is, if children are told about an illness or disability in diagnostic terms,
then this may influence their conceptions of that particular condition.
The finding that disability labels were generally unsuccessful in shaping children's
conceptions of disability has important practical and educational implications. In
the last few years there has been a shift away from labelling disabilities to providing
general descriptions. For example, the Down Syndrome Educational Trust
encourage people to refer to 'children with Down syndrome' rather than 'a Down's
child', as they argue labels affect how we think and behave towards people with
disabilities. Although few would disagree with the attempts to eradicate such
derogatory terminology, the role of labelling used by parents and educators may be
minimal in shaping children's rmderstanding of disability. What remains unclear is
whether the effect of disability labels would be more apparent after a prolonged
period of exposure, especially in the context of conversations with significant others
(Dunn, 1994). If children lack existing knowledge about a disability or do not even
construe a particular condition as a disability, then the influence of labels on their
disability concepts may be more manifest. Furthermore, there may be other
important aspects of language that play a more influential role in shaping children's
disability concepts and these will need to be examined with future research.
140
7.6.2 The Replication of Key Findings from Studies 1b and 2
Although the findings from Study 3 do not indicate any significant labelling effects
on children's disability concepts, they are important for confirming the reliability of
results obtained in Studies lb and 2. As in Study lb and 2, children showed a
preference in the present study for physical and biological causes of disability over
social/psychological causal explanations. This provides further support for the
notion that children find naive physics and naive biology useful domains in which
to conceptualise disabilities. In addition, children were also able to tailor their
causal ratings to particular disabilities. Interestingly, younger children were unable
to tailor the social/psychological cause to different disabilities, which may indicate
as suggested in Study lb, their uncertainty about the role of such causes in
disability.
Study 3 also found age differences in children's judgements about controllability. In
confirmation of Study lb's results, the youngest children had a tendency to
conceptualise disabilities as controllable. The younger children were also more
likely to say that the disabilities would not persist into adulthood, although this age
difference was not significant. Also consistent with Study lb is the finding that
physical and sensory disabilities are considered to be the least controllable and most
chronic impairments. Together, the findings from the present study confirm many
of the key results from Studies lb and 2. This highlights the reliability of the
findings across the empirical studies of this thesis.
7.7 Summary and Conclusions
In conclusion, the results from the present investigation suggest that the language
used to refer to disabilities is not especially critical to children of any age and does
not influence the causal conceptual framework within which disability is
understood. However, there may be a possible influence of diagnostic labelling on
children's disability concepts that warrants further investigation. Importantly, key
findings from both Studies lb and 2 were replicated in the present study. Children
showed a preference for physical and biological causes of disability over
social/psychological ones and children's judgements about the controllability of
disability differed as a function of age and disability type. Although labelling did
not influence children's disability concepts in this study, the role of language in
shaping children's understanding of disability should still be pursued. Several
issues for future research are whether diagnostic phrases are more inferentially
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potent in comparison to other labels. In addition, the role of other aspects of
language in the development of disability concepts should be ascertained (e.g.,
whether exposure to talk about disability influences concepts of disability). Such
findings may have important implications in our conversations with children about
disabilities.
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CHAPTER 8
General Discussion and Conclusions
The theoretical approach underlying research reported in this thesis contends that prior
to formal education, children acquire three core domains of knowledge which they use
to reason about everyday phenomena; a naive physics, a naive psychology and a naive
biology. Each domain of thought is organised around distinctive ontological categories
and causal reasoning frameworks. Much of the research to date has examined only
those concepts that fall neatly into one foundational knowledge domain, which
although highlights the early onset of concepts in each domain, does not tell us about
how children reason about less easily categorised phenomena.
Children readily encounter phenomena that can be conceptualised in more than one
domain and only recently have researchers begun to examine how children might co¬
ordinate their core knowledge domains. This thesis attempted to make considerable
headway on this issue by investigating children's concepts of disability. The studies
presented in this thesis had two broad aims. Firstly, to examine the role of children's
core domains of knowledge in their reasoning about disability. Secondly, to provide a
more comprehensive overview of the content, structure and development of children's
disability concepts. This chapter attempts to synthesise the results from the three
empirical studies and discuss them in terms of children's disability concepts and what
they tell us about domain-specific cognition. The following section will provide a brief
summary of the results and the remainder of the chapter will discuss the content,
structure and acquisition of disability concepts in childhood.
8.1 Summary of Empirical Findings
The first study reported in this thesis was an exploratory investigation into the
development of children's disability concepts and was separated into two parts. Study
la specifically examined children's understanding of the consequences of disability and
was designed to extend previous work by Diamond and colleagues (Diamond, 1994;
Diamond & Hestenes, 1996) by including a wide spectrum of disabilities and a broad
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range of ages. The results found that across all ages, children had a conceptualisation
of the consequences of physical, learning, sensory and emotional/behavioural
disabilities. In addition, age differences were found in Study la. The four to five year-
old children had a tendency to generalise the limitations of a disability from one set of
consequences to another. In comparison to older age groups, they were also less able to
tailor the consequence types to specific disabilities. While the results from Study la
extended previous disability concept literature, it did not inform us of the conceptual
basis of children's disability concepts.
Consequently, Study lb examined which core domains of knowledge children use to
reason about the causes, controllability and chronicity of disability using a semi-
structured interview format. The aims of Study lb were to ascertain which domains of
knowledge children use to reason about disability, whether their understanding of
disability changes with age and whether children can draw upon several causal-
explanatory reasoning systems to conceptualise disability. The 'causal' results showed
significant age differences in children's causal conceptions of disability. Although four
to five year-old children found it hard to give a causal explanation of disability, by age
seven, the number of biological causal explanations increased significantly.
Social/psychological causes figured more prominently among older children. Indeed,
only older children were found to engage in multi-causal reasoning of the same
disability. In relation to controllability and chronicity of disabilities, four to five year-
old children were much more likely to judge disabilities as controllable and transient
states. By age seven, children were significantly more aware of the immutability of
disability. The findings also suggest that the ability to think flexibly and coherently
about disability appears in later childhood. The coherence of children's disability
concepts increased significantly with age and in line with Study la, older children were
more able to differentiate their causes to particular disabilities. However, given the
reliance on open-ended verbal techniques, Study lb may have somewhat under¬
estimated young children's causal understanding of disability. Therefore, Study 2
investigated in more depth, children's causal concepts of disability.
In Study 2, children were asked to consider the appropriateness of physical, biological
and social/psychological causes of disability, using an explanation preference
paradigm. Furthermore, the effect of classroom contact on children's causal concepts
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was explored. The aims of Study 2 were to firstly ascertain whether the four to five
year-olds would show a bias in preferring certain causes of disability and which types
of causes would be deemed appropriate. Secondly, it aimed to establish whether
children's causal ratings would be influenced by age and classroom contact with
disabilities. The results showed that children of all ages preferred biological and
physical type explanations of disability in comparison to social/psychological causes.
Interestingly, even the four to five year-old children showed a preference for some
biological causes of disability over others. In contrast to Study lb, yormg children were
able to differentiate their causal ratings to particular types of disabilities. These results
highlight the methodological differences between Studies lb and 2. Additionally, there
was no significant effect of classroom contact with disabilities on children's causal
conceptions of disability. This surprising finding signalled the need to establish
whether other environmental factors may influence children's disability concepts.
Consequently, Study 3 examined the potential role of language in shaping children's
concepts of disability.
The purpose of Study 3 was to investigate the role of language labels in shaping
children's understanding of disability and to ascertain whether language influences the
causal-explanatory framework within which disability is conceptualised. In particular,
this study examined whether the form of a disability label is sufficiently powerful to
produce differing ideas as to the causes, controllability, chronicity and perceived
differences of disability. The results indicated that labelling has little significant effect
on children's conceptions of disability at any age. The form of the label in which
disability is expressed does not influence the way in which it is conceptualised.
However, consistent with Study 2, children showed a preference for physical and
biological causes of disability over social/psychological causal explanations. The
results also confirmed findings from Study lb that young children conceptualise
disabilities as more controllable and less chronic. These findings highlight the
reliability of key results found in previous empirical chapters.
The remainder of this chapter will discuss these findings in terms of the content and
development of children's causal concepts of disability with reference to their core
domains of knowledge. The structure of children's disability concepts as theoretical or
fragmented will then be considered. The origins and acquisition of disability concepts
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will be discussed and reference will be made to the role of cognitive constraints, social
experiences and the linguistic environment in the development of disability concepts.
Finally the educational implications of these findings and the limitations of the present
thesis will be examined. The potential for future research in this area will also be
considered.
8.2 Children's Causal Concepts of Disability: Content and Development
According to the core knowledge view (see Chapter 1, section 1.2.3), a domain of
knowledge has two components. Firstly, it acts as an ontological guide to partition the
world. Secondly, it functions as a causal-explanatory framework for reasoning about
everyday phenomena (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). The reported findings on
children's causal concepts of disability provide a rich source of information on
children's disability concepts. They are also particularly informative of the larger
conceptual framework within which disability concepts are placed elucidating the
content and development of children's core knowledge domains.
It is clear from the results of this thesis that children's causal concepts of disability
emerge by the age of four years. This is consistent with the age at which Diamond
(1993; 1996) observed the emergence of causal explanations of disability amongst
children. In particular, she found that physical causal explanations were offered with
some regularity amongst four year-old children. The results from Studies lb and 2
have also shown that young children verbalise and endorse physical causal
explanations of disability, such as traumas and accidents. In addition, children have
been shown in this thesis to reason about the origins of disability in biological ways,
especially around seven years of age. Although young children in Study lb found it
difficult to verbalise a biological explanation, in Study 2 the four year-olds showed a
preference for particular biological causes (birth) over others (inheritance). This result
is consistent with Sigelman & Begley (1987) who found that five year-olds also
mentioned biological causes (birth defects) when explaining why someone might be in
a wheelchair.
Not only are these findings interesting in terms of children's knowledge about
disabilities, but they also highlight the core knowledge domains with which children
conceptualise disability. The evidence from Studies lb and 2 show that both naive
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physics and naive biology are central to young children's causal concepts of disability.
It is not until later in development that children begin to see the usefulness of naive
psychology in their conceptualisation of disabilities. Social/psychological causes of
disability became more prominent by eleven years of age and were limited to
emotional/behavioural disabilities. These findings have ramifications for a key issue in
core knowledge research: the status and development of naive biological knowledge.
The most current and vehement debate regarding children's core knowledge is the
status and onset of naive biology as an autonomous domain of thought (see Chapter 2,
section 2.1.3). Although it was not the aim of this thesis to investigate the naive biology
debate a range of findings are highly relevant to this issue. This thesis has shown that
biological causal explanations do figure in young children's reasoning about disability
and that in contrast to Carey (1985; 1995), they are not initially subsumed within the
social/psychological domain. Indeed, social/psychological reasoning did not appear
until eleven years of age. By middle childhood, many children in Study lb were aware
that someone could be born with a disability and some mentioned causes of disability
that were akin to illness concepts (e.g., ear infections) and inheritance concepts (e.g.,
disabilities being passed from mother to child). Carey (1995) has argued that an
autonomous domain of biology does not emerge until seven years of age, as prior to
this, children have no knowledge of specific biological mechanisms. Although it is not
clear from the reported findings if younger children do understand any specific
biological mechanisms of disability, they did show a preference for the 'birth'
explanation, which is an unequivocal biological mechanism. That is, the four to five
year-olds in Study 2 not only accepted biological explanations for disability but also
attributed disabilities to processes that involves some malformation of growth prior to
birth. At the very least, these data show that an awareness of the biological nature of
disabilities emerges prior to formal education. Furthermore, there appears to be a
biological to social shift in causal understanding of disability which has been
previously noted in children's gender and racial concepts and understanding of
emotional/behavioural disorders (Hirschfeld, 1995, Taylor, 1996; Maas et al., 1978).
The present findings indicate a similar shift may also occur in children's disability
concepts.
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In discussing the data on children's causal concepts, it seems important to draw a
distinction between the explicit causal explanations offered in Study lb and the implicit
causes that were endorsed in Study 2. In Study lb, young children often failed to
produce an explicit verbal causal explanation and therefore it could have been assumed
they had little or no knowledge of disability causes. However, when given an
explanation-preference task young children can clearly demonstrate an awareness of
appropriate causal origins of disability that is not yet amenable to verbal report. The
methodological differences between these two studies have raised some interesting
issues about the nature and development of young children's causal concepts. More
specifically, it highlights the distinction between implicit and explicit causal concepts of
disability.
Young children's initial causal understanding of disability appears to be relatively
implicit. Despite research on both implicit and explicit cognition, characterising the
differences between these types of knowledge has proved elusive (Keil, 1999). There is
a tendency to characterise implicit knowledge as less complex and more perceptually
grounded. In particular, the ability to express thoughts in language is often said to
represent a major change in cognition (Vygotsky, 1934). A common view is that if
children cannot verbalise a belief then they probably do not have such a belief (Keil,
1999). If adopting this view of explicit knowledge, Study lb's results would suggest
that young children have little idea as to the causes of disability. The four to five year-
olds frequently failed to give a causal explanation while in contrast, the oldest age
group rarely gave 'non-causal' responses. However, it is not always clear whether non-
explicit responses are representative of non-existent beliefs. As Keil (1999) points out:
"children's inabilities to talk about a wide range of phenomena, ranging from aspects of
biology to number have been taken as evidence for lack of any knowledge or
understanding in those areas" (p. 174). Furthermore, Karmiloff-Smith (1992) argues
that children can have cognitive representations or beliefs that are available to
conscious access but not to verbal report. In a similar vein, young children may have
knowledge about the origins of disability that are reflected in their awareness, but that
cannot be expressed to others.
From the results of Study 2, there is little doubt that four year-old children have implicit
knowledge of causes of disability prior to an explicit recognition of mechanisms.
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Although the youngest children were largely unable to express an explanation as to the
origins of disability (Study lb), they do have implicit beliefs about the appropriateness
of various causal explanations (Study 2). The implication from Study 2 is that there is
little developmental change in children's causal concepts, since older children showed
similar preferences in their causal judgements to younger children. This is not to imply
there are no differences in disability concepts between four and eleven year-olds, but
those differences may have little to do with their contents. The present data suggest
that young children initially have an implicit knowledge of causes of disability that
with increasing age becomes more accessible to verbal report. This implicit to explicit
shift in how knowledge is represented is also the cornerstone of Karmiloff-Smith's RR
model (1992).
Coupled with the implicit nature of children's causal concepts of disability, it could also
be suggested from the reported findings that children's initial causal understanding of
disability is relatively abstract, only later becoming more concrete when they acquire
specific knowledge about causal mechanisms. Despite the long-standing intuitive
appeal of the concrete to abstract shift proposal (Werner, 1948; Vygotsky 1934/1986),
causal understanding of disability may well be an exception to this view. This proposal
does not contradict the suggestion by Lewis (1995) of a concrete to abstract shift in the
types of disabilities that children find easy to conceptualise (see Chapter 3, section
3.2.1). The abstract to concrete shift proposal in this thesis relates specifically to
children's causal understanding of disability.
How could young children have an abstract insight into the causes of disability prior to
a concrete one? Although this may seem counter-intuitive, there is evidence from the
present findings and previous domain-specific research that allows for an abstract
insight into complex phenomena prior to a concrete one. As Study 2 illustrated, young
children appear to have a sense of what causes disability prior to having any detailed
knowledge about causal mechanisms of disability. Even the four to five year-olds
judged the 'birth' explanation to be a more accurate cause of disabilities than
'inheritance', despite having no formal education on either pre-natal development or
genetics and being unable to verbalise this explanation. In addition, despite having
never been taught about the causes of disability, younger children still rejected
intentional causal explanations. As Wilson & Keil (2000) note, "you might be able to
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choose appropriately between competing explanations for reasons that are not obvious
even to yourself, simply because one explanation just seems to fit better" (p.97). These
results support the notion of causal potency discussed in Chapter 1, where children can
have some form of explanatory insight in a domain prior to knowing anything specific
about phenomena within that domain (Keil et al., 1999; Wilson & Keil, 2000). In
discussions about naive biology, Keil et al. (1999) have argued that children have
abstract expectations about biology prior to understanding anything concrete about
biological phenomenon (see Chapter 2, section 2.1.3). The present data suggest this
could also be the case for disability.
Children can have an abstract insight into a domain as a consequence of their modes of
construal (Keil, 1992; 1994) or foundational knowledge domains (Wellman & Gelman,
1998). The modes of construal or foundational domains do not embody specific beliefs
about phenomena but embody biases for certain kinds of explanations over others by
constraining the type of input that children utilise (Keil, 1992). A similar process may
also apply to children's early causal understanding of disability. The existence of
foundational knowledge domains and their accompanying causal-explanatory
frameworks may help orientate children towards particular explanations of disability.
There are an indefinitely large number of possible causal explanations of disability, yet
the reported findings show that children selectively favour some over others. Even
young children, for example, did not pay particular attention to superficial features of
the vignettes, such as whether the wheelchair bound child is wearing a red sweater
(Study lb) or if he plays with his friends on a Friday (Study 2). The point is, that
children can use their core reasoning systems to filter out irrelevant explanations,
which is essential for the acquisition of even a basic causal understanding of disability.
Thus, children may acquire a framework understanding of disability even in the
absence of specific knowledge (Wellman & Gelman, 1998). However, it is still
necessary to establish how children learn to combine different causal explanatory
knowledge systems when providing insight into complex phenomena such as
disability. This seems to be a much more difficult task and one that is only mastered
later in childhood.
If children do initially have an abstract insight into the causal nature of disabilities, by
what process does this develop into a concrete and explicit causal understanding of
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disabilities? One plausible interpretation of how children proceed from understanding
to explanation is that children's language ability improves with age, which makes it
easier for older children to articulate explanations about complex phenomena.
Although this may make the process of articulation easier, it fails to explain how
children proceed from understanding to explanation. Indeed, even adults with all their
linguistic skill rarely have access to explanations for all phenomena. For example, Keil
(2000; cited in Wilson & Keil, 2000) has demonstrated college students' inability to give
coherent causal explanations for a variety of familiar devices, such as toilets and contact
lenses. Thus, most adults assume they have a fully mechanistic understanding of how
something works but when forced to make this understanding explicit through
explanation, their assumptions are groundless (Wilson & Keil, 2000).
The progression from an abstract to a concrete understanding of causes will lead
children to acquire a deeper conceptual understanding of disability, that allows them to
specify explicitly and concretely, explanations for disability. It is not clear however
whether this type of progression is akin to conceptual change, as discussed in Chapter 1
(Carey, 1995; Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992). The present findings do
indicate that children's core causal conceptions remain stable, which would contradict a
strong conceptual change view. The causal frameworks within which disability are
conceptualised at age four are not abandoned in favour of new ones when those
concepts are made explicit and concrete in later childhood. Thus, the abstract to
concrete shift proposal in causal understanding is unlikely to be a radical conceptual
change as espoused by Carey (1985) and Gopnik & Meltzoff (1997). A conceptual
change (as opposed to conceptual development) in children's causal concepts of
disability is only evident when children reach late childhood and begin to see the
relevance of social/psychological explanations of disability, as evidenced in Studies lb
and 2. It takes a few years for children to recognise that naive psychology may be a
useful domain in which to conceptualise some disabilities and this may be considered a
kind of conceptual change, similar to a relevance shift (Keil, 1999).
8.3 The Structure of Children's Disability Concepts
Many researchers consider children's domain-specific knowledge to be theory-like with
everyday knowledge being structured as an intuitive theory (see Chapter 1, section
1.4.2). The hallmarks of an intuitive theory are conceptual coherence and a specific
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causal explanatory system (Wellman, 1990; Carey, 1995). This thesis examined the
cohesion of children's disability concepts and the extent to which children reason about
disability in a differentiated way. Although Wellman & Gelman (1992, p.368) argue
that "the charge of coherence is perhaps a difficult one to assess empirically", Study lb
has provided important data on whether children's beliefs about disability cross-
reference one another as opposed to whether contradictory beliefs are held. In
addition, results from Study la and 2 found that children's reasoning about different
aspects of disability becomes increasingly flexible and differentiated with age.
Study lb showed that the disability concepts held by the youngest children were not
cohesive. That is, their causal explanations of disability did not match up with their
judgements about controllability and chronicity. This result may have somewhat
under-estimated young children's disability concepts since they found it difficult to
verbalise any causal explanation of disability. In contrast, the older children did have
more cohesive beliefs about disability. This finding has implications for the structure of
children's disability concepts as theoretical. If the function of an intuitive theory is "to
offer principled and coherent predictions and explanations" (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002,
p.15), then data from Study lb shows that a theory-like understanding of disability
does not emerge until late childhood. In order to be granted theoretical knowledge of
disability however, a 'strict' criterion had to be met in this study (Inagaki & Hatano,
2002). Study lb required children to offer a causal explanation whereas other
researchers judge children to possess a naive theory even if they cannot offer
explanations themselves (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). However, it was thought that
meeting this strict criterion provides stronger evidence for a theoretical concept of
disability. Consequently, it appears from the present finding that a theoretical structure
to children's disability concepts is not evident until approximately eleven years of age.
In addition to an increase in the theoretical status of children's disability concepts, the
structure of their explicit concepts becomes increasingly differentiated and access to
knowledge about disabilities becomes more flexible. Indeed, Karmiloff-Smith's (1992)
RR model describes a similar process whereby children's cognitive representations
become gradually more flexible and manipulable. The ability to draw on several
causal-explanatory systems simultaneously when reasoning about disability explicitly
was only observed amongst the oldest age group. This is an interesting insight into
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how children utilise their core knowledge domains when reasoning about complex
phenomena. Although different causal-explanatory frameworks are available to young
children, they are not able to use these in a simultaneous fashion to reason about
disability. The findings from Study 2 however show that young children can implicitly
accept several different causes of disability and this may indicate their ability to reason
about multiple causes of disability. Yet in relation to consequences, young children
failed to apply their knowledge of disabilities in a principled manner. Study la found
that the four to five year-olds tended to generalise the consequences of a disability from
one developmental domain to another and in Study lb, they were unable to
differentiate their causal explanations for particular disability types.
These findings demonstrate a gradual increase with age in the principled and flexible
nature of children's explicit disability concepts and stand in contrast to Wellman et al.
(1997), who found that by age three children could differentiate and co-ordinate their
core reasoning systems in appropriate and flexible ways. Moreover, contrary to similar
findings by Morris (1998) and Korpan (1999), the ability to engage in explicit multi-
causal reasoning of disability did not appear in middle childhood. When reasoning
about complex phenomena such as disability, explanations must be modified and
interconnected as new causal mechanisms come to light (Keil & Wilson, 2000), but this
ability does not seem to develop until late childhood. The conclusion is that young
children often have fragmented and implicit pieces of knowledge about disability prior
to having a more differentiated and cohesive theoretical concept of disability. Indeed,
it is not surprising that young children possess a piecemeal understanding of disability.
In relation to single domains of knowledge, such as biology, young children are
thought to have a fragmented concept of living things (Carey, 1985; 1995), inheritance
(Solomon et al., 1996) and illness (Solomon & Cassimatis, 1999). The cognitive
demands will be even greater when children have to co-ordinate several foundational
knowledge domains to reason about a single phenomenon, such as disability.
There is another sense in which children's disability concepts are fragmented. The
reported studies have shown that no single disability concept exists in childhood but
instead that children have a set of concepts each relating to specific disabilities. At
certain ages, children's knowledge of some disabilities is more advanced than others
and they seem to acquire concepts of particular disabilities in a specified order. At all
153
ages, children were able to reason about the causes, controllability, chronicity and
consequences of sensory and physical disabilities. Consistent with suggestions from
previous research (Diamond, 1993; Lewis, 1995; Conant & Budoff, 1983), sensory and
physical impairments are amongst the first disability concepts to be acquired. In
comparison, children's conceptions of learning disabilities take considerably more time
to develop. This is in line with suggestions by Conant & Budoff (1983) and Lewis (1993;
1995), who have both highlighted children's conceptual difficulties with learning
disabilities. Until the late primary school years, children generalise the consequences of
learning disabilities from the cognitive to the physical domain (Study la). The
implication is that learning disabilities seem to lead children to generalise and over-
extend the limitations experienced by a child with a learning difficulty. Furthermore,
the findings from Study lb indicate a lack of cohesion in children's conceptions of
Down syndrome. A full appreciation of the nature and course of learning disabilities
may only be acquired later in childhood.
Yet, an understanding of emotional/behavioural difficulties may be an even later
developmental achievement. Together, the findings have shown that children
primarily conceptualise emotional/behavioural disorders using a social/psychological
framework and this may be the reason for the later emergence of these concepts. This
result is consistent with Maas et al. (1978), who found that older children construed
emotional/behavioural disorders in social/environmental ways. However, it could
also be that children understood the emotional/behavioural vignettes to be specific
instances of behaviour as opposed to more persistent patterns of behaving. Thus,
children may not even construe disordered behaviour as a disability at all. Future
investigations need to establish by what criteria children classify something as a
disability.
8.4 The Origins and Acquisition of Disability Concepts
The early acquisition of disability concepts is perhaps surprising given the complexity
of disability as a phenomenon. Yet, these data show that children acquire disability
concepts early in life and seemingly without systematic teaching. Several key issues in
the acquisition of domain-specific knowledge may help in discussions about the origins
and acquisition of disability concepts: cognitive constraints, social experiences and the
linguistic environment.
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A set of very early cognitive constraints is probably an important factor in the
acquisition of disability concepts. As noted in Chapter 1, many researchers assume that
the process of knowledge acquisition proceeds under a variety of cognitive constraints
that direct and restrict children's attention towards relevant interpretations of a
phenomenon (Keil, 1989; Gelman, 1990; Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). The early acquisition
of disability concepts may be assisted by a set of constraints that serve to eliminate in
advance, a large number of possible interpretations of the causes of disability. This
discussion of cognitive constraints is not based on firm empirical evidence, as there
have been no experimental studies focusing on constraints in the origins and
acquisition of disability concepts. However, based on the present data, it can be
surmised that some cognitive constraints are present to allow for an abstract insight
into the causation of disabilities, prior to the acquisition of more concrete pieces of
knowledge. The argument is not that children have an innate tendency to acquire
disability concepts but rather they have an early onset of cognitive constraints that
directs their attention towards relevant causal-explanatory frameworks, which in turn
may assist in the acquisition of disability concepts.
The presence of cognitive constraints does not exclude the possible influence of social
experiences in the acquisition of disability concepts. Indeed, as reported in Chapter 3,
Diamond (1994) found that participation in a classroom with a hearing-impaired peer
improved young children's understanding of hearing loss. Diamond et al. (1997) also
found that young children in inclusive school settings were more likely than other
children to understand the chronicity of physical and sensory disabilities. In contrast to
these findings, Study 2 has shown that children's causal conceptions of disability are
not easily influenced by social experiences with disabilities. Those with classroom
contact with disabilities did not have a different nor more advanced conception of the
causes of disability than children without such contact. This finding does not mean
social experiences have no effect in shaping children's disability concepts. The contact
that children in Study 2 experienced was limited and more extensive contact may have
led to different results. Therefore Inagaki & Hatano's (2002) contention that social
experiences are essential constituents in the enhancement of conceptual knowledge still
stands.
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Yet there are at least two possible interpretations that can be offered for the lack of
experiential effects found in this thesis. Firstly, the origins of causal concepts of
disability may not be social. Social experiences did not influence the causal framework
within which disability is placed (Study 2) and therefore children's causal
understanding may have more cognitive origins than social ones. If young children do
initially have an abstract and implicit notion of the causes of disability then this indeed
would suggest a greater role for cognitive constraints. This is not to deny that other
aspects of children's disability concepts may have social origins (e.g., understanding the
consequences of disability), but the causal framework in which disability is
conceptualised appeared relatively impervious to experiences with disability. The
acquisition of knowledge about the causes of disabilities may be more easily learned
when children are given direct instruction about those origins. This is an issue that
requires further research exploration.
Secondly, classroom contact with disabilities may not be the most effective social
influence on causal concepts of disability. The mere presence of a child with a
disability in a classroom may not be sufficient in generating ideas about disability
especially when contact is limited to one particular disability. Furthermore, contact
may have a limited effect if the disability is inconspicuous or less easily understood, as
was the case in Study 2. Evidence of this comes from a recent study by Glasberg (2000)
on children's autism concepts. She found that siblings of individuals with autism, and
who therefore have extensive experience with a disability, did not have a more
sophisticated conception of autism than would be expected on the basis of their current
developmental level. As noted in Chapter 3, children's difficulty in acquiring concepts
of autism may stem from the nature of the disability (Glasberg, 2000). Indeed, Swaim &
Morgan (2001) found that children's attitudes and behavioural intentions towards a
peer with autistic symptoms did not improve when given educational information
about autism. Consistent with suggestions by Lewis (1993; 1995), a concept of learning
difficulties is more difficult for children to acquire and therefore experience with this
disability may not lead to an improvement in their conceptual knowledge.
The finding that classroom contact with disabilities has no significant influence on
causal conceptions of disability makes it even more important to explore other factors
that may contribute to the origins and acquisition of disability concepts. As discussed
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in Chapter 7, one factor that is thought to influence attitudes towards disability is
language. The role of language has also been explored in the conceptual development
literature and to a lesser extent in domain-specific research. The data from Study 3
showed that the linguistic form in which a disability is expressed does not influence
children's conceptions of disability. This is a somewhat surprising finding given that
teachers' and peers' attitudes towards children with disabilities are often influenced by
the assignment of disability labels and one may have expected similar effects on
conceptions of disability (Wood & Valdez-Menchaca, 1996; Cornett-Ruiz & Hendricks,
1993; Graham & Leone, 1988).
One implication of this is that the factors that influence attitudes towards disability may
be different to those that shape understanding of disability. That is, children's attitudes
towards disabilities may develop in a different manner to their conceptual knowledge
of disabilities. Further research is ultimately required to explore this possibility but it
must also be noted that the labelling of disabilities is only one example of many
possible linguistic influences in children's disability concepts. For example, Innes &
Diamond (1999) explored the relationship between mothers' comments and children's
ideas about disabilities. They found that mothers' verbalisations about children with
disabilities were related to children's comments and questions. It may be important to
examine the relationship between parents' communication with their children about
people with disabilities and the acquisition of disability concepts in childhood.
Another linguistic factor that may influence the acquisition of disability concepts is
vocabulary. For example, in Japanese culture, living kind concepts are influenced by
word meanings (Inagaki & Hatano, 2002). It is not uncommon to find the Japanese
assigning life status to inanimate objects. This is because, kanji (Chinese character)
which represents life, can also mean 'fresh' and 'perishable' and can therefore be
applied to inanimate objects such as wine and cakes. Similarly, Stavy & Wax (1989)
have shown that within Israeli culture, linguistic factors influence the classification of
plants as living kinds. The Hebrew word for 'animal' is similar to that for 'living' and
'alive' whereas the word for 'plant' has no obvious related terms and consequently
Israeli children frequently categorise plants as non-living. The point is that the way a
concept is understood is influenced by its associated words and this could also apply to
disability. Parents or educators may use the term 'disabled' differently when
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describing a particular person or group of people, which children may then use to
reason about what constitutes a disability. For example, the term 'disabled' may be
applied to those with minor difficulties (e.g. wearing glasses) or to more severe and
specific difficulties (e.g. wheel-chair bound). Children's beliefs about what constitutes a
disability may therefore be influenced by language in their environment.
It must be acknowledged that the findings on the acquisition of children's disability
concepts are somewhat paradoxical. The contradiction is apparent when attempting to
reconcile the age differences found in this thesis (Studies la and lb) with the lack of
social (Study 2) and linguistic experiential effects (Study 3) on children's disability
concepts. On account of their ages alone, one can expect a younger and older child to
have accumulated differential levels of both social and linguistic experiences with
disability. It seems important however to draw a distinction between gradually
accumulated knowledge that children may have about disabilities and more direct and
limited social experiences with disability that may influence the way disability is
conceptualised. This thesis did not find any effects of direct limited social and
linguistic exposure to disabilities on children's conceptualisations, but it is
acknowledged that children may be exposed to other indirect and more extended
experiences that may shape their disability concepts.
8.5 Educational Implications
The findings from Study 2 suggest that limited contact with disabilities does not
influence the content, structure and development of children's disability concepts. This
does not negate the importance of classroom inclusion of disabled peers, as this may be
an important example of 'non-formal' education of disabilities. It does however
become important to consider the role of formal education in children's disability
concepts. This thesis shows that much of the conceptual groundwork is already present
in the form of implicit concepts of disability and therefore it seems obvious that formal
teaching should seize on this and exploit young children's intuitive knowledge. Formal
teaching should be concerned with enhancing and resolving misunderstandings in
children's disability concepts.
There is no easy answer however to how this should be accomplished. To date, there
are no empirical studies that have attempted to improve children's conceptual
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understanding of disabilities and taken into account children's prior knowledge of
disabilities. Yet it seems important to recognise that children's initial causal concepts of
disability are often guided by an abstract explanatory insight, based on core causal
reasoning systems and cognitive constraints. As Keil & Silberstein (1996) note, teaching
should consist of highlighting the relevance of established systems of explanation and
then expanding upon them. It must also be remembered that providing formal
teaching as to the origins of disability will not necessarily produce more accurate
knowledge about other aspects of disability. As noted earlier, young children do not
evidence much coherence in their disability concepts and therefore they should be
encouraged to evaluate individual aspects of their beliefs about disability. In some
cases, this may help theory-like concepts of disability to advance. In other instances, as
Keil & Silberstein (1996) argue, it may help children recognise inconsistencies in their
concepts and formal teaching can help to reduce these.
One method by which this could be achieved is collaborative learning. Many theorists
argue that allowing children to discuss their concepts promotes a restructuring and
refinement of their existing ideas (Doise, 1990; Hatano & Inagaki, 1997; Williams &
Tolmie, 2000). In relation to biological knowledge, group discussions have been found
to be extremely useful in advancing existing biological concepts (Hatano & Inagaki,
1997; Williams & Tolmie, 2000). For example, Williams & Tolmie (2000) found that
discussion groups composed of children holding different naive inheritance concepts
experienced a greater improvement in their knowledge, compared to children in
groups with individuals of similar ideas or children working independently. These
discursive techniques could be used to encourage young children to explicate and
advance their concepts of disability. Formal teaching may be a powerful tool in the
development of disability concepts, as long as the content and structure of children's
initial disability concepts are recognised. The domain-specific cognition approach has
therefore much to offer discussions about the role of formal education in the
advancement of children's disability concepts.
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8.6 Limitations and Implications for Future Research
Apart from the specific limitations of each study already discussed in the relevant
chapters, the broader limitations of this thesis require attention. The extent to which
these findings can be generalised to other complex phenomena is questionable and
therefore a potential limitation of this thesis. Given the lack of research into
phenomena that span several core domains of knowledge, it is difficult to know
whether some of the key findings in relation to children's disability concepts would
also extend to other concepts. For example, in relation to disability, it would appear
that children are not able to simultaneously draw upon several core domains of
thinking until eleven years of age. Would this also extend to other complex
phenomena? Many of the findings of this thesis, such as the abstract nature of young
children's causal concepts of disability and the theory-like status of older children's
disability concepts, do mirror developments in children's biological knowledge. In
addition, the biological to social shift in causal understanding of disability is consistent
with the development of children's gender and racial concepts (Taylor, 1996;
Hirschfeld, 1995). Yet, it is still unclear if conceptions of an 'across-domain'
phenomenon, such as disability, develop in any way differently from 'within-domain'
phenomena (e.g., inheritance concepts in the biological domain). Future research will
need to establish whether the main changes observed in the development of children's
disability concepts are unique to disability or can be applied to other areas of
conceptual development.
Another difficulty that was encountered in the present research was choosing a
methodology that was appropriate for a wide age range of children. Although a semi-
structured interview format was considered most appropriate given the exploratory
nature of Study lb, it probably under-estimated the youngest participants' knowledge
of disability given the verbal requirements of this task. Yet it did allow the older
children to express their beliefs about disability. However, the opposite limitation is
found with the forced-choice format used in Studies 2 and 3. The older children were
more constrained by this methodology but it did afford the youngest children the
opportunity to express their knowledge about the causes of disability. This highlights
the difficulty in designing suitable studies that aim to capture developmental trends in
children's cognitive development. These difficulties are to some extent abated by the
use of 'mixed methods' which provide complementary opportunities to produce more
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ecologically valid and useful results (Lewis & Lindsay, 2000). The use of both open-
ended and forced-choice techniques in this thesis led to a better characterisation of the
development of disability concepts in childhood than either alone would have done.
Although 'mixed methods' were employed in this thesis, the framework for this
research was largely quantitative. Yet, more qualitative methods could have yielded
valuable insights into children's disability concepts (see Christensen & James, 2000).
One such method is group interviewing and can be particularly useful at the
exploratory stage of research (Dockrell, Lewis & Lindsay, 2000). Group interviews with
children allow the possibility of discussions which can often generate new ideas among
children and has the potential strength of a more natural style of interaction (Dockrell
et al, 2000). Previous research on non-disabled and disabled students' views of
inclusion in mainstream schools has also utilised discursive techniques in an attempt to
explore pupils' discourses and observations about the complex process of inclusion and
exclusion (Allan, 1999). In directly questioning how researchers frame knowledge
about disability and education, Allan (1999) argues that a positivistic orientation of
researchers often fails to situate children's perspectives in the context of their
experiences, behaviour and interactions. Indeed, Rowan (1998) has been critical of
research that builds up knowledge by establishing 'facts' and this has often led to the
rejection of quantitative methods. However, it seems important that future research
into children's concepts of disability should not abandon quantitative methods but also
utilise qualitative approaches to explore the role of the school, political and cultural
contexts in which disability concepts emerge. This will enable the use of
complementary rather than competing methodological approaches to the investigation
of children's disability concepts.
The present findings have raised several important issues that require further research
attention. More work is required on the implicit and abstract nature of children's
disability concepts. Firstly, the structure of these initial concepts deserves further
scrutiny, especially in relation to their cohesiveness. Although younger children's
explicit disability concepts are not theory-like, it is possible that they have more
coherent implicit disability concepts. According to Kiel & Silberstein (1996), theoretical
knowledge need not necessarily be fully stateable, although they recognise the danger
in endorsing some kinds of non-verbal knowledge as theoretical. Similarly, Inagaki &
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Hatano (2002) argue that young children can possess naive theories even if they cannot
offer explicit verbal causal explanations. Karmiloff-Smith (1992) also acknowledges
that there are examples of theory-like knowledge (termed 'theories-in-action') which
the child cannot encode linguistically. Thus, it is possible that young children could
have the beginnings of theory-like knowledge even if they cannot verbally express this.
Comparisons should be made between the structure of younger children's implicit
disability concepts and the structure of older children's explicit concepts.
Secondly, the role of experiential factors in the acquisition of children's early disability
concepts should be ascertained. Although not discernible from the present findings,
social experience with disabilities may encourage the development of more explicit and
cohesive concepts of disability. There may also be important differences in the types of
social experiences that contribute to the development of disability concepts. For
example, future research should compare the effects of classroom contact with
disabilities with more prolonged and intensive contact experienced by siblings of
individuals with disabilities. Relatedly, future research should aim to clarify the
relationship between acquired and specific pieces of knowledge about disabilities and
children's intuitive understanding of disabilities. Such research may have important
implications for how and when we teach children about disabilities.
8.7 Concluding Comments
The domain-specific view of cognitive development has offered unique insights into
how children conceptualise disabilities. From as early as the pre-school years, young
children do develop naive concepts of disability. The content of their disability
concepts is initially drawn from two main causal frameworks of understanding: naive
physics and naive biology. Even young children can reason about the biological causal
aspects of disability and this has implications for debates about the onset and
development of naive biological knowledge. Furthermore, the development of
children's disability concepts seems to proceed from the implicit and abstract to the
explicit and concrete. In later years, children's disability concepts become gradually
more explicit and flexible in structure. Older children begin to co-ordinate their core
cognitive reasoning systems in appropriate ways. Their causal concepts become
increasingly tailored to specific disabilities and older children are more able to
differentiate the consequences of different disabilities. This indicates that a theoretical
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structure to children's disability concepts does not emerge until late childhood.
Altogether, the findings from this thesis represent a unique and positive contribution to
our knowledge about the content, development and structure of disability concepts in
childhood. Concurrently, the study of disability concepts over a range of age levels has
provided an advantageous opportunity to examine domain-specific theories of
cognitive development.
In their endeavour to resolve issues such as the naive biology debate or the structure of
naive psychology, many researchers have focused attention on phenomena that clearly
fall within one domain of reasoning, without considering the plethora of concepts that
span several core reasoning systems. In focusing on concepts of disability and utilising
the domain-specific approach to cognition, the role of core knowledge domains in the
conceptualisation of more complex phenomena has been explored. This research has
the potential to lead to future investigations into the origins and influences on
children's disability concepts. Furthermore, it offers insights into a range of
educational issues, from inclusive practices to formal tuition, which may impact
significantly on the development of children's understanding of disability.
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Appendix I
Local Educational Authority Research Permission Letter
Sample Copy of Parental Consent Form
•< DINBVRGH-
THE CITY OF EDINBURGH COUNCIL
EDUCATION
QUALITY SERVICES
Lesley Smith
Department ofEducation
The University ofEdinburgh
St John's Land
Holyrood Road
Edinburgh
EH8 8AQ
Date 10 November 1999
Your rcf
Oiii- rcf Q/krb/rr
Direct dial 0131 469 3164
Dear Ms Smith
RESEARCH ACCESS TO CITY OF EDINBURGH SCHOOLS
Thank you for your undated letter requesting permission to undertake research in
schools in the City of Edinburgh. I have been asked to reply on behalf of the
Education Department.
1 have taken into account the information you supplied in your letter and note that you
liave already contacted Mrs Wendy Haywood, Head Teacher at Riccarton Primary
School, who has agreed in principle to let you carry out research in the school. As it is
the policy of the Department to leave final discretion on participation in research
projects to Head Teachers and their staff, I am pleased to inform you that you have
permission to undertake your research.
I would like to wish you every success with your thesis and look forward to receiving
a copy of your completed findings in due course.
Yours sincerely
(Dr) Ken Bogle
Resources Officer
Wellington Court 10 Waterloo Place Edinburgh EHi 3EG Tel 0131 200 2000 rax 0131 469 3141
Date: 11 March 2002
Dear Parent/Guardian
Re: Children's Understanding of Disability
I am currently a researcher at Edinburgh University arid supply this letter to
give a brief overview of the interviews I will be conducting at Curriehill Primary
School.
For the past 3 years I have been investigating children's understanding of
disability as part ofmy doctoral research. This final project is investigating the
effect of disability labels on children's understanding. To investigate this,
children will be interviewed for one five-minute session designed to elicit their
ideas about disability. The session is done in the format of a game where
children listen to 5 short stories of a child with a disability and then are asked
questions about the children in the stories. This study is also interested in how
contact with persons with disabilities may affect children's understanding.
Do not hesitate to contact me if further information is required.
Regards,
Lesley Smith
0131.651.6487
Tear Here To be returned to class teacher
If you allow your child to participate in this study please complete and return
the tear-off slip to the class teacher.
Child's Name Class
Does any member of your family have an disability? YES/NO (please delete)
If so, please state which family member: (e-g / aunt)
disability: (e-g-/ blind)
If not, does your family have contact with someone with a disability? YES/NO
If so, please state which disability:
Signed by parent/guardian:.
Appendix II
Study 1a/1b Vignettes
Blindness: Stephen has never been able to see very much and doesn't know what
things look like. So, Stephen has to feel things so he know what shape they are and he
has to be careful he doesn't bump into things because he can't see very well.
Hearing Loss: John has never been able to hear very well and can't hear noises like
other children. He wouldn't be able to hear us talking. So, because John can't hear, he
often watches things with his eyes a lot because he can't hear very much.
Physical Disability (Minor): Nicola has a thumb missing on her hand. Sometimes
Nicola finds it hard to play games the other children play and it took her longer to learn
how to tie her shoelaces. Nicola takes longer to draw and write than her classmates
because she has a thumb missing.
Physical Disability (Major): Micheal can't feel his legs so he can't walk. Micheal gets
around in a special chair so he is sometimes slower at getting around than other
children. He wouldn't be able to go up and down stairs very easily. Micheal can only
get to school or the shops if he has the chair.
Learning Disability (Non-specific): Claire takes longer to learn the alphabet and count
numbers than the other children. Claire finds it harder to read and write. Often she
forgets the rules to simple games and can't follow the teacher's instructions in the
classroom.
Learning Disability (Down syndrome): Rachel takes longer to learn things than other
children do and does things a little more slowly. Sometimes, Rachel doesn't want to
join in a game and no-one ever makes her do it. Although Rachel takes longer to learn,
she still feels the same things as other children.
ADHD: Chris doesn't pay attention or listen well in class. Sometimes Chris is so lively
in his chair he falls out of it. Chris often disturbs the other children in class. He is quick
to get angry and often gets into fights with other children.
Lacking in Social Skills: Anna often won't look at you when you're talking to her.
Sometimes she stares at people longer than she should. Anna is quite shy and usually
doesn't like asking the other children if she can join in.
Appendix III
Study 1a Pictorial Stimuli
Reading (cognitive)
Puzzles (cognitive)
|
Climbing (physical)
Jumping (physical)
Running (physical)
Invited to dinner (social)
1 las friends (social)
Appendix IV
Study 2 Vignettes and "Thumbs" Pictorial Stimuli
Blindness: One thing to tell you about Micheal is that his eyes don't work too well.
This means that he can't see very much. Even ifMicheal had his eyes open he wouldn't
be able to see anything because it's like being in the dark. Last week, Micheal and his
friend David were playing at breaktime. David had to lead Micheal around so he
didn't bump into anybody.
Physical disability (major): One thing to tell you about Andrew is that he isn't able to
move his legs so he can't use them to get around. He's got no feeling in his legs so he
can't run or walk. This means he has to use a wheelchair to get around. On Friday,
Andrew's friends were playing a running game in the playground so they helped push
him in his wheelchair.
Down syndrome: One thing to tell you about Robert is that it takes him longer to learn
things and he often forgets what people say to him. Sometimes Robert doesn't
imderstand or remember how he's told to do things in class. Yesterday in the
classroom, a friend helped Robert finish his work because he was taking longer to finish
and was sometimes making mistakes.
ADHD: One thing to tell you about Chris is that he gets excited really quickly and can
only pay attention for a few minutes at a time. He gets up and out of his seat a lot and
often does things without thinking about it. On Monday in class, Chris was doing a
puzzle with his best friend. Chris couldn't seem to sit still and he left the puzzle
without finishing it.
LIKELY
MAYBE
UNLIKELY
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Abstract
The present study explored typically developing children's (n = 77) understand¬
ing of physical, cognitive and social competencies of children with impairments.
Children in each of four age groups (4-5 years, 6-7 years, S-10 years and
11-12 years) were interviewed to explore their ideas about the abilities of
children with physical impairments (minor: missing thumb; major: wheel-chair
bound), sensory impairments (vision and hearing), learning disabilities (non¬
specific and Down's syndrome) and emotional/behavioural difficulties (attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder and lack of social skills). Significant age differ¬
ences were found in children's judgements of the capabilities of children with
impairments. Furthermore, children's understanding of the consequences of
impairments varied as a function of disability type. Findings are discussed in
relation to previous research on children's disability concepts and implications
for inclusive education practices.
Keywords: children, concepts, impairments, consequences, inclusion, disability
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Introduction
Recently, researchers from a variety of disciplines have become interested in
young children's concepts of disability. This focus on children's understanding
is consistent with recent theoretical claims regarding young children's early
competencies (e.g.Wellman & Gelman 1998; Keil 1999} Scholnick et al. 1999).
Additionally, given the rise in inclusive practices, typically developing children
5 2001 Blackv/eil Science Ltd 603
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are increasingly likely to interact with children with disabilities (Thomas
et al 1998). Consequently, typically developing children's attitudes, ideas
and knowledge about impairments have become an important new area of
research.
Much of the existing work in this field has examined children's attitudes
towards non-typically developing peers (Lewis & Lewis 1987,1988; Lewis 1995;
Maras & Brown, 2000).The broad conclusion of this body of research on chil¬
dren's attitudes is that contact will have positive outcomes for children's atti¬
tudes towards children with disabilities (e.g. Maras & Brown 1996). Another
strand of research has been concerned with children's understanding and mis¬
understanding of impairments relating to broader conceptual development
(Conant & Budoff 1983; Diamond 1993; Lewis 1995).This suggests that chil¬
dren's understanding of impairments develops during the preschool years
(Goodman 1989; Diamond 1993; Diamond & Hestenes 1996). For example,
Conant & Budoff (1983) found that 3- to 5-year-olds were aware of physical
and sensory disabilities but showed no expressed awareness of mental re¬
tardation. Awareness of mental retardation and psychological disturbance
appeared only in the late primary school years. This finding suggests that young
children can identify the presence of impairments in others and that preschool¬
ers are more aware of impairments that have observable salient cues. More¬
over, it is been shown that young children's developing conceptions of im¬
pairments are influenced by their own experiences (Diamond & Hestenes
1994; Diamond et al. 1997)- Consequently, the study reported in this paper
focuses on children who have had little prior experience of impairments and
examines the development of their understanding of impairments cross-
sectionally across age. In particular, the research presented here focuses on
children's conceptions of the consequences of impairments.
Children's understanding of the consequences of impairments has rarely
been the focus of research. Diamond (1994) explored how preschool children
without disabilities think about the skills of their classmates with mild learn¬
ing difficulties and severe physical disabilities.The results showed that children
with disabilities were judged to have lower cognitive, language and physical
competencies. Moreover, Diamond (1994) found that preschoolers were sen-
Chiid: Care, Health s^ve t0 differences as a function of disability type. The child with a physi-
and Development cal impairment received lower ratings for physical competence. However,
volume 27 preschoolers rated the child with a learning difficulty as less competent on cog-
number 6 nitive, physical and language tasks. This could reflect a general confusion about
learning disabilities as suggested by Conant & Budoff (1983).
However, Diamond (1994) found that children with learning and physical
pages 603-617
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disabilities did not receive lower ratings on social competence than their typi¬
cally developing classmates. Moreover, Diamond & Hestenes (1996) found that
preschoolers rated their classmate with hearing loss more positively on social
competence than in other areas. This is an interesting finding, given that
considerable previous research suggests that children with disabilities are often
socially isolated by peers without disabilities (e.g. Guralnick & Groom 1987;
Diamond et al. 1993).
This study explores the ways in which typically developing children, with
limited experience of disability, conceptualize the capabilities and limitations
of children with different types of impairments. It extends previous studies
by Diamond (1994) and Diamond & Hestenes (1996) by including a broader
spectrum of disabilities and adopts a developmental perspective to children's
conceptions of impairments. This study includes children aged 4-12 years who
have little or no direct school or home experience of children with disabilities
and examines their understanding of physical, cognitive and social competen¬
cies of children with different types of impairments.
Method
Participants
Sevenry-seven children participated in the study (see Table 1). Children were
recruited from a state nursery and a state primary school ofmiddle-class socio¬
economic status in east Scotland through a process ofwritten parental consent.
Response rates were high, as only a few parents of the younger aged child¬
ren failed to return consent forms. No child had an immediate family member
(parent, sibling) with an impairment. Only the 6- to 7-year-old age group had
fortnightly contact with a child with a physical impairment who was included
in the classroom.
Child: Care, Health
and Development
volume 27
number 6
Table I Participant
information
pages 603-617
O 2001 Blackwell Science Ltd 605
Females Total Mean age (range)
Preschoolers 7
6-7 years 7
9-10 years 12
11-12 years 9
17
20
4.6 (4.4-5.1)
7.3 (7.1-7.9)
9.1 (8.9-9.4)
11.1 (10.11-11.7)
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Materials
Impairment vignettes
Eight vignettes were written (see Appendix), each describing a child of approx¬
imately 8 years of age who exhibited one of the following disabilities: physical
impairments, missing thumb (minor PD) and wheel-chair bound (major PD);
sensory impairments, blindness and hearing loss; learning disabilities, non¬
specific learning impairments (NSLD) and Down's syndrome (DS); and emo¬
tional/behavioural difficulties, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)
and lacking in social skills (LSS).The disabilities were chosen to represent a
broad spectrum ofdistinct types of impairments in the general population. The
design of the vignettes is similar to those used by Maas et al. (1978), and
descriptions ofeach impairment were adapted from Bowley St Gardner (1980).
There were equal numbers of male and female characters, and all vignettes
were designed to be of the same length and complexity. To maintain children's
interest, they were shown a coloured photograph depicting the character in
each story- (with permission from Pettenuzzo 1987, 1988; Bryant-Mole 1994;
Bryan 1996).
Competency ratings
An adapted version of the Pictorial Scale of Perceived Competence and Social
Acceptance for Young Children (Harter St Pike 1984) was used (see Table 2).
This measure required children to indicate how competent they believed some¬
one else was in three domains: physical, cognitive and social. There were
three items in each domain, and children were asked to indicate whether the
Table 2 Adapted Pictorial Scale of Perceived Competence and Social Acceptance for Young
Children
1. Do you think X is good at puzzles or not very good at puzzles? (cognitive competence)2. Do you think X doesn't have many friends or does have a lot of friends? (social competence)3. Do you think X is good at running or not very good at running? (physical competence)4. Do you think X gets invited to parties or doesn't get invited to parties? (social competence)
Child- Care Health 5' Do you think X is not very ^00d at climd'n9 or is 9ood at climb'n9? (physical competence)
-nd Development 6" you lh'nl< X's ^ood at read'n9 or not vefy 9ood at reading? (cognitive competence)7. Do you think X is good at jumping or not very good at jumping? (physical competence)
volume 27 a" you tf1inl< X isn l vefy ^ooc' at count'nS nurn0ers or is good at counting numbers? (cognitive
number 6 competence)
9. Do you think X gets invited to dinner at a friend's house or doesn't get invited to dinner? (social
,00I competence)
pages 603-617
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child in the vignette was 'good' or 'not very good' at each item (e.g. Is this girl
good at running or not very good at running? Would this boy get invited to
parties or not get invited to parties?). For each item, two sets of line drawings
of children participating in the particular task were pointed to and described.
One picture depicts a child with a high level of competence or acceptance, and
the other picture depicts a child with a low level of competence or acceptance.
Children were instructed to pick the drawing that best described the child in
the vignette. This format is similar to previously adapted versions of the scale
used by Diamond (1994) and Diamond & Hestenes (1996). However, to reduce
task demands, the original scale was modified during piloting, and the stand¬
ard four-point response format was replaced with a two-point response format
using phrases 'good' and 'not very good' for each item. The child's judgement
provides a score of 1 (the child is competent at the task) and 2 (the child would
have difficulty performing the task). During piloting, it was found that the four-
point scale was too demanding and time consuming for the youngest children.
Moreover, the youngest children tended to ignore the intermediate responses
on the four-point scale.
Procedure
Primary-aged children were interviewed individually in a small room separate
from their regular classroom. Preschool children were interviewed separately
within a quiet area of the nursery classroom. Every child was read the vignettes
outlined above in a random order. Children were presented with each of the
consequences and the positive/negative response choices in a random order.
Responses were video and tape recorded for subsequent analysis.
Results
Impairments were analysed to see whether they could be collapsed into
sensory, physical, learning and behavioural categories. However, the rank cor¬
relation coefficients within impairment categories were small; therefore, each
impairment was analysed separately. The reliability of the consequence scales
Child: Care, Health was assessed using Cronbach's alpha, and internal reliabilities were acceptably
and Development high: 0.79 for the physical domain; 0.79 for the cognitive domain; and 0.86
for the social domain. Consequently, judgements for each separate item werevolume 27
number 6 summed within their competency areas. This provides ratings ranging from
3 (competent) to 6 (has difficulty) for cognitive, physical and social conse¬
quences, for each impairment.
© 2001 Blackwell Science Ltd 607
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Impairment differences
A repeated measures two-way ANOVA was computed to test for differences in
consequence ratings across impairments. A significant main effect was foundfor consequence [F (2,118) = 30.95; P< 0.001], impairment [F (7,413) = 23.40;P< 0.001] and consequence by impairment [F (14, 826) = 36.66; P < 0.001].As shown in Table 3, a one factor within subjects ANOVA for each impairmentseparately showed an effect of consequence type for every impairment excepthearing loss. Post hoc analyses (see Table 3) revealed that, for blindness, ratingswere significantly more positive for social than for cognitive and physical con¬
sequences. Similar results were found from post hoc analyses on the child withDown's syndrome who received more positive social judgements than cogni¬tive and physical ratings. The opposite results were found for ADHD. Childrenjudged there to be more negative social consequences for the character withADHD than cognitive and physical consequences. The description of a char¬
acter who lacked social skills also received significantly poorer ratings for social
consequences than cognitive and physical consequences. Ratings for NSLD
were more negative for cognitive tasks than for physical and social tasks. MajorPD received significantly more negative judgements on physical tasks than on
cognitive and social tasks. In contrast, minor PD was judged more negativelyon cognitive consequences than on physical and social consequences. Physicaltasks were rated more negatively than social tasks.
Age differences
The results fromTable 4 show the mean competency ratings in each age groupfor different impairments. A two-way mixed measures ANOVA was completedfor each impairment comparing consequence type (cognitive, physical and
social) between ages (preschoolers, 6-7, 9-10 and 11-12 years).The results in
Table 4 show significant age effects for hearing loss, minor PD, major PD,NSLD and LSS. A significant interaction effect of age and consequence rating
was also found for blindness, minor PD, major PD, NSLD and ADHD. To
examine the interactions in more depth, first, a series of one-way ANOVAs was
conducted for each consequence type (physical, cognitive and social) between
ages (preschoolers, 6-7 years, 9-10 years and 11-12 years) as shown in Table 4.Secondly, each consequence type was compared within age (seeTable 5). Tak¬ing each type of analysis separately, significant age effects were found from
tests on the effect of consequence type between age. For blindness, significant
age differences were found for physical and social consequences. Post hoc
O 2001 Blackwell Scjer.ce Lid 608
Child: Care, Health
and Development
VOLUME 27
NUMBER 6
2001
PAGES 603-617
Smith andWilliams • Understanding the consequences of impairments
Child: Care, Health
and Development
VOLUME 27
NUMBER 6
2001
PAGES 603-617
© 2001 Blackwell Science Ltd
i„8SSSS8
dzdi 00000
$ S 5? 8 S? ||£ 8 O £ CN ® 05
ifluinonvpo
riririnnn"''
a g> c
11 iili
jj o 9 (
ra c7) to S i
2 z a < •
609
Smuh andWilliams • Undemanding the consequences of impairments
Child: Care, Health
and Development
VOLUME 27
NUMBER 6
PAGES 603-617
C 2001 Blackwell Science Ltd 610
in s s s CM -
b-' 0 cvi
oi
11
oi -
0 CM
T s 0 cm"
<0 to" <0* to" to" to" to" to"
u. u. u. u. or ST or tr
« • CD
K „ 8 5
£ 2 ; 5
3 Sr toN 05
Oi
10 8 to oi
o" w" ST C CM 1 |
CM CM CM* cm" cm" cm" cm"
or or or or c c or a:
1 eo ® o
o " Jin
— — crl
1 ^ to ® to
n cm to cm
n ri <6 en'
N Q N N
n N 7 o
ci n ri us
— >2 o OSN Ol Q N
w ri to ri
Soonw to to
ri v- ri v-
8 8 S S !
ri vr id ri •
§ s is
J S n S
i ri ui r
8 ie §
vr ri ri
— to o vs
CO CO PI PS
888
«o in o us 1
ri t ri t
w o e S
pi ps iri
8 55 8
■ 0 ri V T
• ri ri t tt
8 8 8 15 ,
V * us ri 1
■2 Q Q
OS 0. 0.
f " *"
Smith andWilliams • Understanding the consequences of impairments
Table 5 Age differences in
children's racings of physi-
Consequancetype
cal, cognitive and social
consequences for each
Impairment Physical Cognitive
Sociai
impairment Blindness fl[3, 73) - 3.90" F{3. 73) =
2.15 F{3. 72) = 4.23"
Minor PD F[3, 73) = 1.68 F{3. 73) = 8.67* H,3, 71) = 13.14*
Major PD F[3. 73) -11.21* F[3. 73) - 16.12* F\3. 69) » 7.39*
NSLD F\3. 72) = 5.52" *3. 71) = 6.69* F{3. 72) « 1.47
ADHD F{3, 72) = 4.29* F{3, 69) = 5.02" F[3, 73) = 1.63
*P< 0.001; nP< 0.01.
analyses revealed that preschoolers were more negative about the social con¬
sequences (P < 0.05), and 6- to 7-year-olds were more negative about physical
outcomes (P < 0.05). An age difference was found for major PD in relation to
cognitive, physical and social tasks. The youngest age group was more nega¬
tive about the cognitive (P< 0.05) and social (P< 0.05) abilities of a child with
major PD but significantlymore positive about physical consequences than any
other age group. Age differences were evident for minor PD for cognitive and
social tasks. Preschoolers' ratings were significantlymore negative on cognitive
and social functioning CP < 0.05) than all other age groups. Significant age
differences were found for ADHD in cognitive and physical functioning.
Preschoolers gave more negative ratings for physical tasks (P < 0.05) than all
other age groups. Both preschoolers and the oldest age group gave significantly
more negative judgements on cognitive tasks (P < 0.05) than 6- to 7- or 9- to
10-year-olds. Age differences in cognitive and physical functioning were also
found for NSLD. The II- to 12-year-olds gave more negative ratings on cog¬
nitive tasks (P < 0.05) for NSLD than all other age groups, and the 6- to
7-year-olds were more negative about physical functioning (P< 0.05).
From Table 6, it can be seen that significant differences were found in con¬
sequence ratings within each age group. Preschoolers were the only age group
that did not give different competency ratings for each of the impairments
examined. Significant differences for preschoolers were only found in their con¬
sequence ratings for minor PD and major PD. Post hoc r-tests were carried
out within each age group comparing each consequence type. Every age group
except preschoolers judged there to be physical and cognitive limitations to
blindness but not social outcomes. Compared with the older age groups,
preschoolers gave more negative ratings for cognitive than physical tasks for
minor PD.Whereas the older age groups acknowledged physical limitations for
major PD compared with cognitive and social consequences, preschoolers did
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Table 6 Differences in children's competency ratings for each impairment for preschoolers, 6- to
7-, 9- to io- and ii- to 12-year-olds
Preschoolers 6-7 years
Cog Cog Phy Cog Cog Phy
vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs.
Impairment ANOVA Phy Soc Soc ANOVA Phy Soc Soc
Blindness F(2. 32) = 1.86 - - _ F[2. 38) = 54.25* NS 8.78* 10.99*
Minor PD F[2. 32) = 12.49* 3.77** 4.64' NS F{2. 38) = 11.49* NS 4.59* 3.90*
Major PD F[2, 32) = 3.93*** NS NS 4.24* F[2. 36) = 450.67* 22.36* 21.23*
NSLD F[2, 30) = 0.71 - - - F(2. 38) = 30.57* NS 6.10* 7.77*
ADHD F{2, 32) = 1.42 - " F{2. 38) = 21.27* NS 6.09* 3.94*
< 0.001; **P < 0.01; *"P < 0.05.
PD, physical disability; NSLD, non-specific learning disability; ADHD, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder.
not differentiate their physical and cognitive competency ratings for these
impairments. Both 9- to 10- and 11- to 12-year-olds judged there to be cogni¬
tive and physical limitations to NSLD. Additionally, each age group except
preschoolers thought there to be significantly more negative social outcomes
for ADHD.
Discussion
Child: Care, Health
and Development
volume 27
number 6
pages 603-617
Children of all ages had a positive perception of the capabilities of children
with different types of impairments. Such findings are encouraging for issues
surrounding educational and social inclusion. Moreover, the findings extend
the work of Diamond (1994) and Diamond & Hestenes (1996) by revealing
that even 4-year-old children can differentiate their competency judgements
for certain types of impairments, and there is an increasing degree of differ¬
entiation of consequences of impairments with age.
Children in this study appeared to be sensitive to limitations associated with
physical impairments, suggesting that physical impairments are a relatively
straightforward concept for children to grasp (see Conant & Budoff 1983).
Children in this study also understood the consequences of emotional/behav¬
ioural impairments and the effect such difficulties may have on social func¬
tioning. This result is similar to that of Milich et al. (1982), who found that
even preschoolers had a negative social evaluation of a child with ADHD. Chil¬
dren overall showed an understanding of the competencies of learning impair¬
'S 2001 Blackweli Science Led 6l2
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9-10 years 11-12 years
Cog Cog Phy Cog Cog Phy
vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs.
ANOVA Phy Soc Soc ANOVA Phy Soc Soc
F{2. 36) = 43.67* NS 8.50* 6.43* F(2, 38) = 17.64* NS 4.47* 6.11*
F{2. 34) = 10.50* NS 4.12* 5.10* F[2. 38) = 17.51* NS 3.58** 7.28*
F{2, 34) = 113.05* 15.90* NS 14.71* F{2, 36) » 168.77* 42.14* 3.01** 11.40*
F(2, 36) = 13.83* 2.49" 6.87* 2.25*** F(2, 36) = 46.34* 6.43* 10.48* 2.24***
F{2. 30) = 18.98* NS 4.56* 6.51* F[2. 36) = 24.36* 3.51** 3.08** 8.73*
ments, maintaining that only cognitive functioning would be affected. This is
an unexpected finding, as previous research has argued that disabilities with
primarily psychological symptoms are much more difficult for children to com¬
prehend (Conant & Budoff 1983). However, Goodman (1989) found that 8-
to 9-year-olds have an accurate conceptualization of learning disability, viewing
it as a trait that is abstractly defined and irreversible. Additionally, children in
this study did not expect social functioning to be compromised by the pres¬
ence of learning difficulties. This is an interesting finding, as earlier research
suggests that learning-delayed children have deficiencies in using peer-related
social behaviours (Guralnick & Groom 1985,1987). Despite having little or no
prior experience of learning disabilities, children in this study did not over-
generalize the effects of learning difficulties from one developmental domain
ofconsequences to another.The role that experience plays in shaping children's
views of the competencies of children with impairments is therefore another
important area for future research.
Unlike previous research, this study investigated and found age differences
in children's understanding of the competencies of children with impairments.
Many of the differences evident were between preschool age and older age
Child: Care, Health groups. Preschoolers appeared to have a different conception ofmajor PD than
and Development all other age groups. Preschoolers were more optimistic about the physical
volume 27 competencies of a major PD and more pessimistic about cognitive function-
number 6 ing. These findings are difficult to interpret, as the type of impairments that
have salient, physical cues are generally easier for young children to understand
(e.g. Conant & Budoff 1983; Diamond 1994). It could be that, in contrast to
pages 603-617
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work by Diamond (1994) and Diamond & Hestenes (1996), preschoolers inthis study had little experience of impairments and thus exhibited a generalconfusion about the effects of being in a wheel-chair. It is worth noting thatthe 6- to 7-year-olds in this study were not confused about the consequencesof a physical impairment. This could result from the fortnightly contact thatthis age group had with a child who was wheel-chair bound.However, the findings suggest that, for several impairments, preschoolersgeneralize the limitations in one set of consequences to another consistentwith previous findings in older children (Maras & Brown 1992). In this study,preschoolers perceived there to be cognitive and physical limitations of chil¬dren with emotional/behavioural difficulties. They were also likely to extendthe limitations of the child with blindness to the social domain, a finding alsoshown in other work (Diamond & Hestenes 1996). Moreover, preschoolerswere less likely than older age groups to differentiate between the consequencesof impairments. Thus, although young children are aware of the competenciesand limitations of children with difficulties, they lack sufficient knowledge tomake a differentiated judgement. In contrast to older children, preschoolersgeneralize the consequences of impairments across several domains of ability.Surprisingly, older childrens' conceptualization of learning disabilities wasnot radically different from that of preschoolers. There were no age differencesin children's understanding of Down's syndrome, and only the 11- to 12-year-olds made differentiated judgements on cognitive functioning for NSLD. Wecontend that children reveal fundamental difficulties in understanding learn¬ing disabilities. Future research should investigate how we can improve under¬standing of learning difficulties through experience or direct instruction.In conclusion, although children were generally positive about the capabili¬ties of children with impairments, several age and impairment differences inchildren's understanding were identified. The relationship between children'sunderstanding of the consequences of impairments and how salient this infor¬mation is in friendship choices, for example, requires further attention. Thefindings that even young children develop ideas about children with impair¬ments and that such ideas change with age provide us with an opportunity todevelop age-appropriate interventions to instruct young children about thepositive ways in which we are all alike and different.
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Appendix: impairment vignettes
Visual impairment: Stephen has never been able to see very much and doesn't
know what things look like. So, Stephen has to feel things so he knows what
shape they are and he has to be careful he doesn't bump into things because
he can't see very well.
Hearing loss: John has never been able to hear very well and can't hear noises
like other children. He wouldn't be able to hear us talking. So, because John
can't hear, he often watches things with his eyes a lot because he can't hear
very much.
Physical impairment (minor): Nicola has a thumb missing on her hand.
Sometimes, Nicola finds it harder to play games the other children play and it
took her longer to learn how to tie her shoelaces. Nicola takes longer to draw
and write than her classmates because she has a thumb missing.
child: care, Health Physical impairment (major): Michael can't feel his legs so he can't walk.
and Development Michael gets around in a special chair so he is sometimes slower at getting
around than other children. He wouldn't be able to go up and down stairs veryvolume 27
number 6 easily. Michael can only get to school or the shops if he has the chair.
Learning disability (non-specific): Claire takes longer to learn the alphabet
and count numbers than other children. Claire finds it harder to read and write.
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Often she forgets the rules to simple games and can t follow the teacher s
instructions in the classroom.
Learning disability (Down's syndrome): Rachel takes longer to learn things
than other children do and does things a little more slowly. Sometimes, Rachel
doesn't want to join in a game and no-one ever makes her do it. Although
Rachel takes longer to learn, she still feels the same Things as other children.
Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder: Chris doesn't pay attention or listen
well in class. Sometimes, Chris is so lively in his chair he falls out of it. Chris
often disturbs the other children in class. He is quick to get angry and often
gets into fights with other children.
Lacking in social skills: Anna often won't look at you when you're talking to
her. Sometimes, she stares at people longer than she should. Anna is quite shy
and usually doesn't like asking the other children if she can join in.
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